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SUMMARY
The combination of today’s national security environment and mandated ac-
quisition policies makes it necessary for military systems to interoperate with each
other to greater degrees. This growing interdependency results in complex Systems-
of-Systems (SoS) that only continue to grow in complexity to meet evolving capability
needs. Thus, timely and affordable acquisition becomes more difficult, especially in
the face of mounting budgetary pressures. To counter this, architecting principles
must be applied to SoS design.
The research objective is to develop an Architecture Real Options Complexity-
Based Valuation Methodology (ARC-VM) suitable for acquisition-level decision mak-
ing, where there is a stated desire for more informed tradeoffs between cost, schedule,
and performance during the early phases of design. First, a framework is introduced
to measure architecture complexity as it directly relates to military SoS. Develop-
ment of the framework draws upon a diverse set of disciplines, including Complexity
Science, software architecting, measurement theory, and utility theory. Next, a Real
Options based valuation strategy is developed using techniques established for finan-
cial stock options that have recently been adapted for use in business and engineering
decisions. The derived complexity measure provides architects with an objective
measure of complexity that focuses on relevant complex system attributes. These at-
tributes are related to the organization and distribution of SoS functionality and the
sharing and processing of resources. The use of Real Options provides the necessary
conceptual and visual framework to quantifiably and traceably combine measured ar-
chitecture complexity, time-valued performance levels, as well as programmatic risks
and uncertainties.
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An example suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capability demonstrates
the development and usefulness of the resulting architecture complexity & Real Op-
tions based valuation methodology. Different portfolios of candidate system types are
used to generate an array of architecture alternatives that are then evaluated using
an engagement model. This performance data is combined with both measured ar-
chitecture complexity and programmatic data to assign an acquisition value to each
alternative. This proves useful when selecting alternatives most likely to meet current




Maintaining effective armed forces is an integral part of national security. This re-
quires, among other things, arming both today’s and future forces with the proper
military weapons systems. These systems are crucial to achieving desired mission
capabilities within a dynamic national security environment. Thus, investments in
technologies, programs, and product support are necessary to develop state-of-the-art
complex systems capable of aiding the Department of Defense (DoD) in achieving the
National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States (U.S.) [60].
Defense acquisition has a long history and major wars fought in the past had
enormous impact on how defense acquisition has been conducted over the years.
While World War I saw many improvements in the application of new technologies and
processes such as aircraft, submarines, industrialism, and mass production [90], World
War II (WWII) is often considered the first major turning point for the following
reason [120]:
Until World War II, weapons acquisition in the United States was more a
political than a military problem. Shielded from large external threats, the
country had no pressing need for sophisticated weapons; with few excep-
tions it was content to let European militaries take the lead in developing
and fielding new weaponry.
WWII saw the advancement of many new and existing technologies, the most
notable of which is the development of the atomic weapon. To win the war effort,
the nation was forced to spend unprecedented amounts on national defense and to
incur corresponding unprecedented deficits — a trend that continues to the present
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day [146]. The lasting mark on defense acquisition has been the continued emphasis
on research and development (R&D) programs. This has also impacted the scientific
community. This sustained research and development is pivotal in ensuring that
rapid advancements in technology would be a necessary capability for world powers
to dominate in a global context. After WWII, escalating tensions between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union over the potential spread of communism created a tense national
security environment. The year 1947 is generally regarded as the commencement of
the Cold War with the Soviet Union. During this time the U.S. saw the emergence
of a persistent, international security threat. Thus, weapons systems were developed
almost exclusively against a Soviet threat counterpart [146]. In terms of defense
acquisition, the previous wars emphasized “simplicity, reliability, and producibility” of
weapons systems [146]. During the Cold War, however, state-of-the-art technological
advances were rapidly applied as military interests expanded into new realms such as
communications, spaceflight, microelectronics, astrophysics and a host of other fields
[146].
Defense acquisition during this time catered to a threat-based, stove piped mil-
itary decision-making environment where duplication of capabilities among the na-
tion’s armed forces was commonplace [93]. Joint war fighting was not emphasized
and each service independently assessed their Concept of Operations (CONOPs),
warfighter needs, and capabilities. After the Cold War, however, the nature of the
international security environment began to fundamentally change. The security en-
vironment is now extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, and
partnerships. Also, the rise of transnational terrorism means that Irregular War-
fare (IW) has emerged as a major and pervasive form of warfare. IW is typically
characterized by a less powerful adversary seeking to disrupt or negate the military
capabilities and advantages of a more powerful, conventionally armed military force.
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Those who wage IW pose an asymmetrical threat that rely on guerrilla tactics and un-
conventional methods, including the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
[94]. This has prompted a shift away from a threat-based approach to one that fo-
cuses more on the required capabilities necessary to neutralize such an asymmetrical
threat. The emergence of technologies such as the Internet, GPS, wireless networking,
and fiber optics accompanied this shift, resulting in systems that have become more
interdependent and interconnected. This increased level of system coupling has been
deemed necessary in order to achieve greater levels of functionality and performance
[36]. For example, Information Technology (IT) has become an essential feature of to-
day’s governmental, civil, and commercial organizations and many of their associated
products and processes. Improvements in both computer hardware and software, and
the development of the World Wide Web have fundamentally changed how we store,
retrieve, process, and disseminate data, information, and other resources on a global
scale.
Warfare has also been significantly impacted. The ability to gain information su-
periority through the use of IT has radically shifted how command & control (C2)
is achieved on the battlefield. The post-Cold War military of today also relies more
heavily on the use of IT to realize enhanced battle space dominance [12, 44]. This
is embodied in the concepts of Command, Control, Communications, Computing,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and Network Centric
Warfare (NCW). NCW advocates the intelligent use of information sharing for in-
creased situational awareness and the promotion of synergistic effects [12, 44, 68]. Add
to this the nature of the post-Cold War security environment previously discussed,
and the response by military planners has been to make joint operations between
different branches of the armed forces the dominant military doctrine [46, 97]. Joint
operations requires that military systems be able to interoperate with one another.
Facilitating this interoperation creates a greater dependence on IT for communication
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and coordination [68]. The immediate result is that now, complex Systems-of-Systems
(SoS) must be considered in the context of design to deliver capabilities against vary-
ing and adaptive threats.
The DoD defines a SoS as a “set or arrangement of systems that results when in-
dependent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique
capabilities” [1]. Alternately, a SoS can be considered as “Groups of systems, each
of which individually provides its own mission capability, that can be operated col-
lectively to achieve an independent, and usually larger, common mission capability”
[10]. SoS are commonly associated with complex behavior. The following list is a
compilation of system traits from various sources that commonly lead to complex
behavior [33, 34, 59, 114]. These traits are directly applicable to military SoS:
• Operational & Managerial Independence of Elements
• Evolutionary Development
• Geographical Distribution of Elements
• Networks of Systems
• Inter-disciplinary Study
• Heterogeneity of Systems
Two examples of the types of complex SoS recently under development are the
Army’s Future Combat System (FCS), which is intended to be a modernization pro-
gram consisting of a family of manned and unmanned systems connected by a com-
mon network, and the nation’s Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). A graphical
overview of each is provided in Figures 1 & 2.
While SoS bring added capabilities to help achieve greater levels of military effec-
tiveness, they also introduce additional complexities in the fielding and maintaining
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Figure 1: Example SoS: Army Future Combat Systems.
Figure 2: Example SoS: Ballistic Missile Defense System.
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new weapons systems. In view of this, perhaps the greatest impact of the Informa-
tion Age on engineering design is the heightened importance of understanding and
managing the complexity that results from this new level of interconnectivity and
interdependency [13]. The reason for this is that functional interoperation between
systems requires complex information and resource exchanges, system interfaces, co-
ordination, and added training to deliver full capabilities to the warfighter [64]. There
is added difficulty when one considers that older so-called legacy systems must be in-
corporated into the mix as well. Legacy systems may possess outdated interfaces or
technology, and different platforms of the same type may cover a spectrum of different
upgrade versions. This means that functional interoperation must occur even when
some assets may not have been designed for such from the outset. This also highlights
the fact that different systems within the SoS will most likely be in different stages
of their respective life cycles. Finally, there will be multiple stakeholders, oftentimes
with conflicting interests. When all is said and done, the move towards SoS adds yet
another layer of complexity to the acquisition problem. Figure 3 provides an excellent
summary of this challenging problem domain.
Military planners quickly realized that a method to identify warfighter needs that
cuts across all services would be more beneficial to fulfilling the NSS. This prompted
a shift to a more top-down, capabilities-based approach to identify current gaps in ca-
pabilities across the joint war fighting areas. The Capabilities Based Planning (CBP)
process encompasses the principal processes for transforming the nation’s military
forces to support the NSS. Once capability gaps have been identified and a materiel
1 solution deemed necessary, it is the role of defense acquisition to bring the needed
systems and capabilities to the warfighter in a cost-effective, timely manner. How-
ever, capitalizing on and managing the complexities of CBP and NCW requires the
1Materiel is a generic word for equipment. It is inherently plural. It is distinguished from
material, which is what things are made of [1].
6
Figure 3: Comparing the Acquisition of Systems vs. Systems-of-Systems [69].
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further development of Systems Engineering (SE) practices beyond traditional SE ap-
proaches. The response has been the development of System-of-Systems SE (SoSSE)
and the mandated use of architectural frameworks such as the Department of De-
fense Architectural Framework (DoDAF) [64, 69]. The SoS design framework aids in
conceptualizing the organization and arrangement of systems that results when inde-
pendent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system. This larger system is
then able to deliver unique capabilities greater than the sum of the constituent parts.
In conjunction, emerging SoSSE principles help to effectively manage the planning,
analyzing, organizing, and integration of these emergent capabilities [69].
Since the threat environment is a dynamic one, existing and developing systems
must constantly evolve to continue to provide value to the warfighter. SoS evolution
can be properly managed through the use of architecting principles to adequately or-
ganize, describe, and maintain a complex grouping of systems. Within this context,
the architecture defines the way in which the contributing, constituent systems work
together. An architecture can be defined as a shared, persistent techni-
cal framework that governs the structure of components within the SoS,
their relationships and dependencies, and the principles and guidelines
governing their design evolution over time. An architecture includes
not only systems and their functions, but data flow and communications
protocols, key SoS functions, as well as end-to-end functionality. An
architecture is used to address possible changes in functionality, perfor-
mance, or interfaces [54, 64, 69]. The development of SoS architectures to manage
the increased complexity of weapons systems underlines the growing challenges the
acquisition community faces moving forward in acquiring new capabilities, especially
in the face of mounting economic and budgetary pressures.
8
The research objective is to develop an Architecture Real Options Complexity-
Based Valuation Methodology (ARC-VM) suitable for acquisition-level decision mak-
ing, where there is a stated desire for more informed tradeoffs between cost, schedule,
and performance during the early phases of design. It has been observed that decisions
regarding the SoS architecture made early in the design process greatly influence the
success of acquiring timely, affordable military SoS. First, a framework is introduced
to measure architecture complexity as it directly relates to military SoS. Develop-
ment of the framework draws upon a diverse set of disciplines, including Complexity
Science, software architecting, measurement theory, and utility theory. Next, a Real
Options based valuation strategy is developed using techniques established for finan-
cial stock options that have recently been adapted for use in business and engineering
decisions. The derived complexity measure provides architects with an objective
measure of complexity that focuses on relevant complex system attributes. These at-
tributes are related to the organization and distribution of SoS functionality and the
sharing and processing of resources. These attributes describe both the organization
and allocation of the functionality required to meet stated capability needs as well as
the allocation, movement, and processing of vital resources such as information. This
gives architects the ability to make more informed tradeoffs when determining the
number, types, and relative complexity of constituent systems under consideration,
the degree of overlapping/redundant functionality present, and also the patterns and
levels of collaboration that provide the greatest benefits. The use of Real Options
provides the necessary conceptual and visual framework to quantifiably and traceably
combine measured architecture complexity, time-valued performance levels, as well as
programmatic risks and uncertainties.
An example suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capability demonstrates the
development and utility of the resulting architecture complexity & Real Options based
valuation methodology. Starting with the stated capability need, a notional SEAD
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mission profile is decomposed into hierarchical activities and tasks. Then different
portfolios of candidate system types are used to generate an array of architecture
alternatives that can be evaluated using an engagement model. This performance
data is combined with both measured architecture complexity and programmatic data
to assign an acquisition value to each alternative. This proves useful when selecting




2.1 Defense Acquisition Decision Support Systems
2.1.1 Defense Acquisition Overview
Acquisition, as it is defined by the DoD, encompasses the design, engineering, con-
struction, test and evaluation (T&E), production, sustainment, operations support
and disposal of defense systems [38]. Thus, when acquiring new weapons and related
items such as military cargo trucks, IT systems, processes, services, and end products
for national defense, the entire life cycle of the system from “cradle to grave” must
be taken into account. Acquisition is comprised of three major Decision Support
Systems (DSS) as depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Defense Acquisition Decision Support Systems [16].
Commonly, a distinction is made between defense acquisition as a whole (often
referred to as the ’Big A’ encompassing all 3 DSS) and the Defense Acquisition System
as a separate DSS [63]. As stated in DoD Directive 5000.01 [60]:
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The Defense Acquisition System exists to manage the nations investments
in technologies, programs and product support to achieve the National
Security Strategy and support the United States Armed Forces. The
investment strategy of the Department of Defense shall be postured to
support not only todays forces, but also the next force and future forces
beyond that. The primary objective of defense acquisition is to acquire
quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to
mission capability and operational support, in a timely manner, and at a
fair and reasonable price.
The Defense Acquisition System is the management process by which the DoD
provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to the users [60]. Some of the





• Streamlined & Effective Management
• Cost & Affordability
• Cost Realism
• Integrated Test & Evaluation
DOD policy requires that a program manager be designated for each acquisition
program in order to direct the development, production, and initial deployment of a
new defense system. Program management represents the integration of a complex
12
system of differing but related functional disciplines such as business and financial
management, logistics, systems engineering, software management, T&E, manufac-
turing management, etc. These functional disciplines must work together to achieve
program goals [60].
For management purposes, different acquisition categories (ACATs) are used to
distinguish individual defense acquisition programs. Figure 5 provides a listing of
the different categories as well as the criteria for designation and respective decision
authority.
Figure 5: Acquisition Categories for Weapons Systems (FY2000 Dollars) [60].
The different ACAT levels, which determine different levels of oversight and man-
agement processes, are principally based on dollar value level and level of milestone
decision authority (MDA). When determining the level of oversight required, the risks
associated with each program must be taken into account as well, though there is some
criticism that the current ACAT paradigm does not go far enough in addressing these
risks [125].
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2.1.2 JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration Development System
The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS), created in 2003 to
support the shift to a top-down, capabilities based approach, is the system respon-
sible for identifying and documenting warfighter needs. Potential solutions to capa-
bility shortfalls can encompass any combination of changes to doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).
Therefore, JCIDS is used to determine the best approach, materiel or otherwise, to
meet existing capability gaps [46]. JCIDS is one component of the CBP process.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between NSS, Capability Based Assessment (CBA),
and JCIDS.
Figure 6: Top-Down Capability Needs Identification Process [45, 46].
The CBA forms the backbone of the JCIDS process and identifies required capabil-
ities, shortfalls, operational risks due to lack of capabilities, and possible non-materiel
approaches for eliminating shortfalls [60]. Once a materiel solution is deemed neces-
sary, the Acquisition system is engaged to develop the appropriate system. Otherwise,
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changes to doctrine, organization, training, leadership & education, personnel, and/or
facilities are requested.
2.1.3 PPBE: Planning, Programming, Budgeting & Execution
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting & Execution (PPBE) Process is the first
phase in the allocation of resources to different programs responsible for developing





PPBE is intended to provide the best mix of forces, equipment, and support
within fiscal constraints and develops the proposed budget to the President for all
acquisitions [146]. Figure 7 provides an overview of the resource allocation process.
PPBE is a calendar driven system that works in annual cycles. It is based on a
series of national strategy documents, such as the President’s NSS, the Secretary of
Defense’s National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (CJCS) National Military Strategy (NMS). Every four years a review is
conducted in the following manner [38]:
The NSS and NDS provide the strategic framework for a congressionally
directed Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that takes place every four
years during the first year of a new presidential administration. The QDR
report is provided to congress concurrent with the President’s Budget in
the 2nd year of a new administration. The PPBE process includes plan-
ning, programmatic and budgetary actions to implement the military force
15
Figure 7: Resource Allocation Process.
structure and defense priorities outlined in the QDR report. The QDR
occurs every four years. The NSS and NDS may be updated annually.
The NMS is updated by the CJCS as necessary.
Once the President submits an annual budget for Congressional review the En-
actment phase begins. Programs that receive approval and authorization also receive
maximum funding levels and specifications on the quantities of systems to be pro-
cured. Next, the appropriations process provides budgetary authority to obligate and
expend funds. During the apportionment phase the DoD and other federal agencies
receive funds for further allocation within their respective departments. Finally, the
appropriated funds are spent on defense programs during the execution phase. While
planning is essentially a continuous process, many other actions run concurrently, for
e.g., the current fiscal year budget is being executed while enactment of next year’s
budget is under way, and programming for the following budget is in process [38].
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2.1.4 Acquisition Life Cycle
The life cycle of a system from pre-system acquisition to operations & support (O&S)
is separated into different phases by decision points called milestones. Three such
milestones exist before a system reaches initial operating capability (IOC). These
milestones are designated as Milestones A, B, and C. They are shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Acquisition Life Cycle.
The designated MDA is tasked with determining if the system satisfactorily meets
certain entrance and exit criteria for continuation into the next phase of development.
The following is a brief description of what occurs at each milestone [60]:
• Milestone A: The MDA approves a materiel development decision and grants
formal entry into the acquisition process. This is a mandatory step for all
programs. An Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is conducted to determine which
best provides the needed capability. Innovation and competition are emphasized
and a technology development strategy is developed to help guide the efforts
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during the next phase. This phase ends when a recommendation is made for
technological development of a materiel solution found using the AoA.
• Milestone B: This is normally the point of program initiation for defense acqui-
sition programs. The MDA will confirm that the technology is mature enough
for system-level development to begin. The MDA will also approve the acqui-
sition strategy, acquisition program baseline, and types of contracts in place
for the next phase of development before authorizing entry into the engineering
and manufacturing development and demonstration phase. At this point the
MDA must also certify that the program is affordable, has adequate funding,
the technology has been demonstrated in a relevant environment, and that the
acquisition program is likely to be successful.
• Milestone C: At this point, the MDA makes the decision to commit the DoD to
production and authorizes entry into low-rate initial production or procurement.
Transition from this phase means the system is ready to begin production and
deployment and provide IOC, where a selected number of operational forces will
receive the new system in order to conduct and support war fighting operations.
To support the program management decision-making process, credible and timely
technical information that considers all of the life cycle needs must be furnished to
decision makers at each Milestone. To accomplish this, the DoD acquisition process
is critically dependent on effective and rigorous SE processes. SE is a standardized,
disciplined management process that organizes and coordinates all engineering efforts
toward the development of system solutions in an environment of change and uncer-
tainty [65]. SE is applied at the initial stages of program formulation and continues
throughout the system’s life cycle to transform needed operational capabilities into
an integrated system design. Without this, operationally affordable and sustainable
weapon systems cannot be built [1].
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2.2 Department of Defense Architecture Framework
2.2.1 DoDAF Development Timeline
As the acquisition environment for obtaining systems and capabilities becomes more
dynamic and integrated, a method for managing the large amounts of data and infor-
mation that describes the relationships between material, processes, and organizations
internal and external to the DoD takes on even greater importance. One of the key
means for ensuring interoperable and cost-effective military systems is to establish
comprehensive architectural guidance for the entire DoD [62]. Therefore, the purpose
of defining an architecture framework is to ensure the standardized development of
architectures that promote interoperability across capabilities and among integrated
architectures. The use of the word integrated in this context means that data required
in more than one of the architectural models is commonly defined and understood
across the models [64]. In this sense, a framework can be thought of as a compu-
tational or other modeling environment that allows analysis of an architecture, or
put another way, the framework is used to view an architecture [31]. DoDAF serves
as the principal guide for the development of integrated architectures and its use is
mandated by law, policy, and guidance (Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Office of Manage-
ment and Budget Circular A-130, and the 2004 DoDAF Promulgation Memo) [69].
Development of DoDAF began with the C4ISR Architecture Framework released in
June 1996 in response to the Clinger-Cohen Act. Its primary purpose was to define
and develop a better means and process for ensuring that C4ISR capabilities were
interoperable and met the needs of the warfighter. Later, the C4ISR Framework was
restructured into DODAF to broaden its applicability to all mission areas, not just
the C4ISR community [62]. Figure 9 provides a timeline of DoDAF’s development





























In general, DoDAF describes different architectural views that help define the struc-
ture for organizing architecture concepts, principles, assumptions, and terminology
about operations and technology into meaningful patterns to satisfy specific DoD
purposes [64]. Prior to DoDAF V2.0 data was organized into “products” such as
graphical representations or documents. DoDAF V2.0 places greater emphasis on a
“data-centric” approach to organizing architectural data in supporting analysis and
decision making. The primary motivation behind this approach is to provide renewed
emphasis on Net-Centricity, or the ability to provide a framework for full human and
technical interoperability to facilitate enhanced information sharing and protection.
Thus, DoDAF V2.0 is organized around data, models (templates for collecting
data), and views (a representation of data in any understandable format) [64]. DoDAF
V2.0 also places greater emphasis expanding the types of graphical representations
that can be used to support decision-making. In comparison to DoDAF V1.5, DoDAF
V2.0 specifies 2 new objects, the viewpoint and the viewpoint definition. A viewpoint
describes data drawn from one or more perspectives and organized for useful decision
making by management. Moreover, a viewpoint definition includes the information
that should appear within individual views as well as how to construct and use the
views. The viewpoint definition also includes the modeling techniques for expressing
and analyzing the necessary information and a description of the purpose of the view
and its intended audience. In all, over 50 different models exist for expressing the 8
different viewpoints. Figure 10 provides a description of the 8 different viewpoints and
their relationship to DoDAF V1.5 products [130]. Figure 11 depicts the relationship
among the different architecture methods, data, and presentation techniques.
An example of an operational view from the Operational Viewpoint is provided in
Figure 12. This figure shows an OV-1, or a high-level operational concept graphic for
providing a Single Integrated Air Picture capability (SIAP). This operational concept
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Figure 10: DoDAF Version 2.0 [64].
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Figure 11: Relationships Between Architecture Methods, Data, and Presentation
Techniques [64].
makes use of a combination of air, sea, land, and space-based military assets. Figure
13 is an example of an OV-2, or operational resource flow description. This view
provides a description of the resource flows exchanged between operational activities.
Many of the other views that can be created are capable of containing much more
information than the views presented here, making them quite complicated. For ex-
ample, there are various Standards, Systems, and Services views that seek to capture
information such as technical standards, system-to-system interconnectivity & sup-
porting automated systems, system functionality descriptions, and system resource
flows. Depending upon the architecture being modeled, the construction of views
using every single model from the 8 different viewpoints may not be necessary in
describing the architecture, yet the sheer multitude of different models highlights the
challenges in fully understanding and presenting the different interrelations, interac-
tions, and interfaces a collective group of systems may posses within an architecture.
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Figure 12: SIPA OV-1 High Level Operational Graphic.
Figure 13: Example OV-2 Operational Resource Flow Description.
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2.3 Ongoing Challenges to Successful Acquisitions
2.3.1 Cost, Schedule & Performance Tradeoffs
The success of an acquisition program is traditionally judged using cost, schedule,
and performance as the main criteria [60]. In the past, when budgetary resources
for defense spending were readily available, performance was the dominant criterion
[81]. A 1986 study [141] found that “when acquisition problems arise, cost is the
constraint most easily relaxed and schedule is next, whereas performance goals are
adhered to most closely.” Tyson et al. reported in 1992 that 66 out of 82 programs
examined had experienced cost growth [156]. The current acquisition environment
is also characterized by the frustration of the White House and Congress over cost
overruns, schedule delays, and misdirected spending on major weapons programs.
Recent studies by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that out of
the 96 programs in the DoD’s fiscal year 2008 portfolio of major defense acquisition
programs, 42% of those programs had 25% or more increase in program acquisition
unit cost by 2009 [86]. This is reflected in Figure 14. Moreover, the average delay
in delivering initial capabilities has grown to 22 months for for the 2010 portfolio of
major defense acquisition programs [87].
Figure 14: GAO Analysis of DoD Cost & Schedule Overruns [86].
25
Perhaps this current frustration is amplified by the nostalgia of the past [10]:
During World War II and the early Cold War, programs such as the Man-
hattan Project, the Defense Support Program (DSP), the intercontinen-
tal ballistic missile, and the U-2 surveillance aircraft all delivered very
quickly, generally in fewer than 6 years, first products that today would
be described as major systems. Currently, such major programs would
likely require 10 to 20 years to complete.
Add to this that “The Apollo program in the 1960s, arguably one of the most
complex space programs ever, took fewer than 8 years to complete” [10]. Tyson et
al. provide a concise summary of the negative impacts of cost and schedule growth
in the following statement [156]:
Excessive schedules have two significant negative effects: U.S. forces may
be left without needed capabilities and longer schedules often mean higher
costs.
The authors go on to state that:
Cost growth forces the DoD to revise budget plans, makes systems less af-
fordable, and frequently erodes congressional support for acquisition pro-
grams.
In 2009 Defense Secretary Robert Gates was quoted as saying that the “spigot
of defense spending that opened on 9/11 is closing” and he predicted “hard choices”
[80]. Soon after, in May 2010, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided
a detailed summary of the billions of dollars in budget cuts recommended by Defense
Secretary Gates. Among some of the programs that would be terminated or see
significant program budget reductions were the C-17 air lifter, the F-22 Raptor fighter
aircraft, Future Combat Systems, and Airborne Laser program, to name a few [43,
128].
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2.3.2 Past Acquisition Reform Efforts
The DoD has a long history of acquisition reform efforts. For the most part, these
reform efforts have been in response to governmental reports aimed at identifying and
providing recommendations for seemingly chronic cost and schedule overruns [16, 146].
Past recommendations for reform all have in common their reiteration for far-reaching
and significant changes to improve the overall process. Collectively, these reports have
focused on nearly every aspect of defense acquisition from the size, culture, and train-
ing of the acquisition workforce to improving the contractual relationships between
the DoD and defense industry suppliers, to restructuring the budgetary landscape.
As a direct result the defense acquisition community has adopted a number of poli-
cies, practices, and project management techniques over the years aimed at helping
it meet its overarching goal of delivering needed weapons systems on-time and within
budget. One example is the shift towards design for affordability, where affordability
is defined by the DoD as the degree to which the life cycle cost (LCC) of an acquisition
program is in consonance with the DoD’s long-range investment and force structure
plans [1, 86, 117, 140].
Treating cost as an independent variable (CAIV) is another example of a rela-
tively recent acquisition reform effort [1, 81]. The goal of CAIV is to reduce LCC
especially in the early phases by performing cost/tradeoff analyses. Here, cost is held
fixed, allowing performance and schedule to vary somewhat in an attempt to keep
weapon systems affordable. As an acquisition process, CAIV is intended to integrate
proven successful business-related practices with promising new DoD initiatives to ob-
tain superior, yet reasonably priced war fighting capabilities [81]. This includes the
mandated use of private sector management techniques such as Integrated Product
and Process Development (IPPD) implemented by multifunctional, multidisciplinary
Integrated Product Teams (IPT) that organize for and accomplish tasks that acquire
goods and services [129]. The IPTs have at their disposal other quality management
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techniques pioneered in the private sector such as Quality Functional Deployment
(QFD) for understanding user requirements and Six Sigma for managing quality and
minimizing variability in manufacturing and business processes [37].
A last example is the use of Earned Value Management (EVM), a program man-
agement tool, whose implementation is even mandated for ACAT I programs [1].
EVM utilizes a work breakdown structure (WBS), or hierarchical product, data,
and/or service decomposition of a project to track weekly progress. A valuation of





In this way, the earned value (EV) of completing certain project tasks can be
tracked and measured. The primary benefit of this approach is that it acts as a diag-
nostic tool to alert program managers to any significant problems impeding progress.
However, some of the major limitations and criticisms of EVM is that it is a measure-
ment of project quantity, not quality, and that though preferred, it does not require
precise, quantifiable measures for assessment of work completed [150]. This means
that completion estimates may not accurately reflect the true state of the acquisition
program, leading to decisions based on inaccurate assessments.
2.3.3 Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009
Part of the purpose for the development of the many tools, processes, and methods
adopted and developed by the DoD is to aid acquisition analysts and decision makers
in analyzing and selecting the best alternatives for future development. Based on
historical trends, it remains to be seen the degree to which these more recent efforts
will be successful in curbing the excessive cost and schedule overruns experienced
in the acquisition of major weapons programs. Nonetheless, the task of delivering
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cost-effective weapons to the warfighter in a timely manner continues to take on even
greater importance in the current national security environment. This has recently
prompted Congress to pass legislation aimed at pushing for greater tradeoffs between
cost, schedule, and performance at early stages in the design/acquisition process [80].
The result is the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (S.454/P.L. 111-
23) which became public law on May 22 of that year. One of the major provisions
of the act is that it makes it more difficult for programs experiencing significant cost
and schedule growth to pass key acquisition milestones. Another key provision is the
appointment of a Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation within the
DoD. This person is responsible for for issuing policy and guidance on cost estimating
and for developing confidence levels for those cost estimates. The bill also appoints
a director to oversee developmental T&E as well as a director in charge of overseeing
SE practices [146].
Undoubtedly, past recommendations such as providing a highly competent and
stable workforce will add tremendously to achieving the goals of the acquisition com-
munity. Yet the recent reform act clearly illustrates that there is a strongly recognized
need within the acquisition community for further improvements to current SE meth-
ods, especially when confronted with acquiring new weapon systems that must operate
as part of one or more military SoS [5, 20]. Consequently, an initiative is underway
within industry, academia, and government to refine guidelines and methodologies for
systems engineers and architects. This is evidenced by the development of the DoD’s
2008 Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems [69]. This guide states that,
“Most military systems today are part of an SoS even if they are not explicitly recog-
nized as such. Operationally, the DoD acts as an SoS as the battle space commander
brings together a mix of systems in an operation to meet mission objectives.”
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2.4 Analysis of Alternatives
2.4.1 AoA & Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy
The mounting pressures affecting today’s acquisition environment further emphasizes
the importance of successfully analyzing different SoS architectures under consid-
eration. It is also important to consider that the challenges faced when design-
ing/acquiring weapons systems are not strictly limited to the higher-level scope of
SoS design problems. On the contrary, the challenge is compounded when one con-
siders that these same design challenges affect a diverse array of individual systems
ranging from automobiles to aircraft [50, 67, 83]. This is especially true when the
design solution must be found outside of the historical database to provide new and
evolving capabilities, and also relevant when these systems must now collectively work
together within a unified architecture. Conklin eloquently describes this fundamental,
polarizing nature of design [50]:
Any design problem is a problem of resolving tension between what is
needed and what can be done. On the one hand, the process of design is
driven by some desire or need—someone wants or needs something new.
The need might be expressed by a customer, or it may be a guess about
what the market wants. The need or want is expressed in the language
of what ought to be—what should be done, what should be built, what
should be written.
On the other hand, the process of design is constrained by resources—what
can be done given the available resources such as time and money and the
constraints imposed by the environment and the laws of science. Every
need has a price tag—the process of design is about devising solutions
that are feasible and cost effective.
When an individual does design, she stands with one foot in each world.
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Moving back and forth between the two worlds, she tries to create a solu-
tion that joins the two polarities of design in an elegant way.
Thus, an AoA is a critically important element of defense acquisition. An AoA
is formally defined as an analytical comparison of each alternative to determine its
suitability in terms of the costs, operational effectiveness in meeting a capability need,
and risks associated in designing, fielding, and maintaining that capability [1, 127].
Costs can be expressed as either life cycle or total ownership cost 1 (TOC). The
AoA is part of the materiel solution analysis to identify the most promising end-state
materiel solution for further technological development at Milestone A, as well as the
best possible path to achieving that end-state solution. This is reflected in Figure 15
[1].
In order to reduce cycle time and speed the delivery of an advanced capability to
warfighters, the DoD has identified evolutionary acquisition as the preferred strategy
for achieving the end-state solution. Evolutionary acquisition is defined as a strategy
that defines, develops, acquires, and fields an initial hardware or software increment
(or block) of operational capability. Using this approach, a needed operational capa-
bility is met over time by delivering the capability in several increments. This means
that future capability requirements are needed as the first increment may only deliver
60% to 80% of the desired final capability. But it also allows for the rapid insertion
of new technologies as they develop. Overall, this approach requires collaboration
among the user, tester, and developer to be successful [60, 74]. There are a number of
DoDAF models designed to support the implementation of an evolutionary acquisition
strategy. One example is the CV-3, or Capability Phasing model. The CV-3 tracks
the development of a capability over time. Another is the SV-8, or Systems Evolution
Description, which portrays the planned incremental steps toward migrating a suite of
1The TOC includes the elements of a program’s LCC, as well as other related infrastructure
or business process costs not necessarily attributed to the program in the context of the defense
acquisition system [1].
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systems to a more efficient suite, or toward evolving a current system to a future im-
plementation. A final example is the SV-9, or Systems Technology & Skills Forecast.
The SV-9 keeps track of the emerging technologies, software/hardware products, and
skills that are expected to be available in a given set of time frames and that will
affect future system development [64].
Figure 15: Establishment of an Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy. Image adapted
from [1].
Developing a cost-effective, evolutionary strategy also depends upon a balanced
assessment of a number of factors which should be addressed during the AoA [127]:
• What alternatives provide validated capabilities?
• Are the alternatives operationally effective and suitable?
• Can the alternatives be supported?
• What are the risks (technical, operational, programmatic) for each alternative?
• What are the life cycle costs for each alternative?
• How do the alternatives compare to one another?
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In addition to the items mentioned above, scheduling is also a key consideration
along with the scenarios and threats used during the analysis [1]. Also, it is imper-
ative that alternatives be studied in realistic operational settings so that reasonable
comparisons of relative performance can be made.
2.4.2 Effectiveness & Cost Analyses
Effectiveness analysis during the conceptual design phase is normally the most com-
plex element of the AoA, oftentimes requiring sophisticated, iterative modeling and
simulation (M&S) efforts to capture different system/architectural aspects. There are
many different M&S methods available. They range from Markov chains [88, 133],
Petri Nets [121, 160], Agent-Based Modeling [35], System Dynamics Models [103],
and Discrete-Event Simulation [121], to name a few. SoS architectures often require
multiple models to adequately capture the many different modes of behavior that can
be exhibited during their operation. Figure 16 provides an excellent overview of the
many different disciplines involved in modeling relevant aspects of complex systems.
For M&S to be of value, appropriate Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) and Mea-
sures of Performance (MoP) must be carefully chosen. MoEs are qualitative or quanti-
tative measures of a system’s performance or characteristic that indicate the degree to
which the system performs the task or meets a requirement under specified conditions.
MoEs are closely related to mission tasks and objectives so that each alternative can
be evaluated against them. MoEs also provide the basis for investigating performance
sensitivities to variations of key assumptions and MoP values. Raw quantities like
number of units lost or frequency of counter-detection are typically used to express
MoEs. MoPs, on the other hand, are typically a measure of a system characteristic.
Representative examples include range, velocity, mass, and weapon load-out. MoPs
are usually chosen to enable calculation of one or more MoEs [127].
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Figure 16: Disciplines Involved in Complex Systems Study.
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Cost Analysis is usually conducted in parallel with effectiveness analysis and is
considered to be of equal importance. Estimation of the LCC is usually combined
with the results of the effectiveness analysis to perform a combined cost-effectiveness
comparison. The following is a non-inclusive list of elements usually captured in the
LCC estimation [1, 105, 127]:
• Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Cost (RDT&E)
• Investment Cost (Low Rate Initial Production and Deployment)
• O&S Cost
• Disposal Cost
There are a multitude of cost estimating methodologies and cost models available
to the analyst. Examples of different cost methodologies include the following: relying
on expert opinion, bottom-up, parametric, and the analogy technique [105, 127]. The
bottom-up methodology requires detailed breakdowns and cost data of the various
engineering tasks to be completed. In general, this method is more time-consuming.
Also, because detailed design data is usually not available in the early stages of design,
this method is considered least appropriate for advanced system studies. The analogy
method uses actual costs from a similar program and uses adjustments based on the
level of difficulty and other differences the new program may have. This method is
normally used when there is insufficient data early in the program to use as a basis for
a detailed approach. While this method may be applied at any level of detail in the
system, it is usually considered too inflexible for trade studies. Lastly, the parametric
method is frequently used in the early stages of a program. This particular method
involves collecting relevant historical data at an aggregated level of detail and relating
it to the area to be estimated through cost estimating relationships (CERs). These
CERs are based on actual program cost history, but are at a very high level so that
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most detail is lost. Parametric cost models are the most appropriate for trade studies
and provide the following advantages:
• Less time consuming than traditional bottom-up estimates
• More effective in performing cost trades
• More consistent estimates
• Traceable to the class of systems for which the model is applicable
A major limitation encountered when using a parametric cost model is that its
use is applicable only to the range of parameters described in the historical database
used for calibration of the CERs. As systems or technologies in use by those systems
fall further outside of the database, the validity of the CER lessens. This may also
be true as legacy systems are used in new operating environments and scenarios, or
are required to interoperate in new ways with other systems. This is an especially
important consideration for military SoS. While military SoS may include legacy
systems, oftentimes there are new technologies and systems that must be acquired
as well. Also, since there is an added emphasis on joint operations, disparate and/or
novel components from the different branches of the armed forces may be present to
provided the needed capability.
In summary, cost models are usually tailored to a specific discipline or problem
domain, such as software or logistics. No cost model can perfectly forecast the future,
so there is always some degree of uncertainty, just as with any other type of estimation.
A good illustration of this is the “Cone of Uncertainty” developed by the Government
Accountability Office’s Cost Assessment Guide [85], and reproduced as Figure 17. The
Cone of Uncertainty illustrates that cost uncertainty is relatively large in the initial
stages of design, but diminishes with progression through the design process. Cost
uncertainty then reaches a minimum later in the production and deployment stage of
the system life cycle.
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Figure 17: Cost Uncertainty During Different Phases of Acquisition & Design [85].
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2.4.3 Cost-Effectiveness Comparisons
The need to assess the value of pursuing an investment alternative or opportunity is
not unique to defense acquisition. Firms across various industries must frequently en-
gage in resource allocation decisions when deciding upon investments in new products,
services, or R&D efforts. Commercial firms that operate for profit in competitive mar-
kets typically have an advantage in that the market communicates the relative value
of a good, service, or investment in terms of a monetary price through the relation-
ship of supply and demand. Thus, the commercial firm is better able to objectively
compare the costs it will incur as well as the required rate of return it must achieve
from an investment of resources when assessing different alternatives. In comparison,
it is difficult for the government to determine what the fair market price should be
for many of the new defense systems it wishes to acquire. The U.S. government is
oftentimes the most important and/or only customer to defense contractors who sup-
ply such systems. This results in government acquisition decisions directly impacting
the performance of its supplier base and the subsequent distortion of market prices
[134]. Augustine provides an insightful summary of the situation [16]:
On the surface, defense acquisition appears to have little in common
with commercial acquisition. For starters, defense acquisition occurs in
a monopsony 1. Further it is replete with mini-monopolies. (From how
many places could one have purchased, say, an additional B-2?). De-
fense acquisition also operates in a governmental system that intention-
ally traded optimal efficiency for strong checks and balances—such as
those implicit in separating the Legislative and Administrative branches.
Nonetheless, there are certain fundamentals of sound management which
are applicable virtually everywhere, including in the defense acquisition
1A monopsony occurs where there is imperfect competition, as only one buyer faces many sellers,
or the opposite of a monopoly [142]
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process. They are just much more difficult to apply in government, where
the stakes are higher, authority less hierarchical, and the spotlight much
brighter.
Compounding this problem is the fact that national defense is a service that is
broadly consumed for the benefit and welfare of the public. So unlike a good or
service sold into a market place by a for-profit firm, there is no direct return on in-
vestment that can be measured in terms of dollars and cents. This prompts non-profit
organizations and agencies like the government to adopt either Cost-Effectiveness or
Cost-Benefit Analysis methods to evaluate different investment alternatives. Cost-
Benefit Analysis involves determining the Benefit-to-Cost Ratio (BCR) of a project
or alternative. There are several definitions of the BCR, but in general, it can be de-
fined as the ratio of the equivalent worth of benefits to the equivalent worth of costs.
The use of the word worth to describe both benefits and costs denotes that each is
measured in monetary terms [41, 106]. It has been noted that determining equivalent
monetary values of some benefits can be a flawed approach in some cases, or not
even really possible in others [8, 106]. This proves to be the case for the acquisition
of weapons systems in support of national defense. For example, how does one put
a precise dollar value on the amount of freedom and safety a B-2 bomber provides?
Cost-Benefit Analysis, then, is usually reserved for a limited number of situations,
making Cost-Effectiveness Analysis the more commonly utilized methodology of the
two [106].
Like Cost-Benefit Analysis, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis also involves determining
a ratio. The use of effectiveness instead of benefits means that native units of evalu-
ation can be used. In this case, the Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (CER) merely requires
combining cost data with the various MoEs that have been carefully considered and
evaluated using M&S. The next step is to eliminate non-viable alternatives. This
is followed by a comparative screening focused on selecting the most cost-effective
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solution(s) for recommendation and development. Rather than use a CER, however,
the defense acquisition community traditionally utilizes scatter plots such as the one
shown in Figure 18 from the Defense Acquisition Guidebook.
Figure 18: Notional Scatter Plot of Effectiveness vs. Cost [1].
The data is presented in this way to avoid the use of cost-to-effectiveness or
effectiveness-to-cost ratios that are more commonly seen in other applications of Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis [106]. The rationale for this is provided in the following [1]:
Note that the notional sample display shown. . . does not make use of ra-
tios (of effectiveness to cost) for comparing alternatives. Usually, ratios
are regarded as potentially misleading because they mask important in-
formation. The advantage to the approach in the figure above is that it
reduces the original set of alternatives to a small set of viable alternatives
for decision makers to consider.
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Either implementation of a Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (scatter plot or CER) al-
lows the relative comparison of alternatives for fulfilling a particular set of mission
capabilities. Sensitivity analyses are usually included in order to quantify the amount
of uncertainty present in the cost and effectiveness estimates and provide an added
dimension to decision making. This can be seen in the boxes surrounding each al-
ternative in Figure 18. However, a more complete AoA requires additional criteria
that must be taken into consideration. Therefore, a risk assessment must also be
conducted, with inputs such as scheduling considerations, technology maturity, and
other key programmatic parameters included as well.
From Figure 18, decision makers can safely conclude that Alternative 1 would
be a poor selection since it does not meet the minimum required threshold for ef-
fectiveness. The same argument could be made for Alternative 3, whose measured
uncertainty crosses the threshold boundary. However, the issue is not as clear for
the remaining alternatives. Alternative 6 will be chosen over Alternative 2 if the the
increase in effectiveness is judged to be worth the additional cost. Also, while Alter-
native 6 is deemed more cost-effective than Alternatives 4 & 5, this cost-effectiveness
may come with some types of programmatic risk not captured in the displayed uncer-
tainty estimates [127]. To further aid the decision maker, the use of multi-attribute
portfolio analysis is commonly used to aggregate and display additional useful infor-
mation [56, 57, 127]. Usually this type of analysis is presented using similar, common
visualization formats. These formats are often referred to as portfolio analysis tools
(PATs), dashboards, or alternative comparison matrices. Such views are useful for
depicting information across multiple capability mission areas. A representative ex-
ample from the Air Force’s Office of Aerospace Studies AoA Handbook is provided as
Figure 19 [127]. In Figure 19 the letters R, G, and Y signify the colors Red, Green,
and Yellow, respectively.
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Figure 19: Notional Matrix of Alternative Comparison Results [127].
Multi-attribute portfolio analysis seeks to provide a top-down depiction of the dif-
ferent alternatives in relation to relevant data that decision makers wish to see, such
as performance, cost, and risk. More detailed supporting data is usually provided
in different views and made accessible to the decision maker on demand. Different
analysis tools usually only vary significantly in their respective features for manipulat-
ing the underlying data and the software used for their implementation. Traditional
analysis methods such as cost-effectiveness scatter plots and multi-attribute portfolio
analysis are helpful to the decision maker. They aid the decision maker in discovering
the important tradeoffs that occur between competing alternatives, prompting fur-
ther analysis and inquiry. Yet the acquisition of weapons programs is fundamentally
a resource allocation decision, and these methods still do not address a critical issue
that lies at the heart of acquiring military SoS. Levin poignantly addresses this when
describing one of the significant limitations of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis [106]:
That is, we can state whether a given alternative is relatively more cost-
effective than other alternatives, but we cannot state whether its total
benefits exceed its total costs. That can only be ascertained through a
cost-benefit analysis.
Keeping in mind the DoD’s stated goal of developing affordable weapons systems,
the principal conclusion that can be made is that the cost-effectiveness comparison
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methodology currently in use has room for improvement, especially if applied to more
difficult SoS acquisition problems. More specifically, the current cost-effectiveness
methodology is adequate for procurement, which is defined by the DoD as the act of
buying goods and services for the government [38]. According to the DoD, procure-
ment is often (and mistakenly) considered synonymous with acquisition; it is, instead,
only one of the many functions performed as part of the acquisition process, which
also includes design [38]. For procurement, the cost of complexity has already been
converted into monetary costs by progressing through the different stages of design.
Thus, knowing the relative cost-effectiveness of a group of alternatives does not
guarantee that the most cost-effective alternative justifies the planned investment of
resources such as time, money, or labor. Nor does it help determine whether any
additional allocation of resources towards a particular alternative would prove benefi-
cial. Furthermore, the traditional analysis methods in use by the defense acquisition
community do not combine cost, schedule, performance, risk, and other program-
matic parameters in such a way that decision makers can readily make a balanced
assessment across multiple dimensions to judge the value of an alternative. Value in
this context represents whether or not an alternative is worth an investment of re-
sources in the absolute sense. A cost-benefit analysis would help determine this, but
as previously discussed, this proves rather difficult for defense acquisition since bene-
fits must be expressed in monetary terms. Without an objective valuation mechanism
for decision makers, they are still left with the task of determining when additional
effectiveness is worth additional cost during an AoA [1, 127]. The Air Force’s AoA
Handbook describes this as a “common AoA dilemma” [127].
The end result is that it may be difficult at first glance to determine which al-
ternatives in the design space hold sufficient promise to be further developed and
evolved into more promising solutions for an acceptable level of effort. This can un-
necessarily limit design freedom by influencing decision makers to prematurely focus
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on a handful of alternatives for analysis. Taking all of this into consideration, an
improved valuation method for acquiring alternatives that will provide capabilities
deemed crucial to national defense is needed. This approach must augment decision
making by providing the defense acquisition community with the ability to ascertain
when an investment of budgetary, labor, and scheduling resources to acquire systems
that will later be included in a complex military SoS architecture is indeed a worth-
while endeavor. To accomplish this during the early stages of acquisition and design,




3.1 The Impact of Pre-Milestone A Decisions
The social and technical complexities that are a part of acquiring weapons systems
for national defense can and have occasionally led to failure. Yet despite the many
criticisms and past attempts at reform it is important to remember that the U.S. con-
tinues to field arguably the most technologically advanced, capable, and far-reaching
military of all time. The defense acquisition process has, in Augustine’s words, “pro-
vided our armed forces with the equipment that is the envy of the world’s military
forces. It’s just that it could, and should, do even better” [16]. In order to maintain
this level of superiority, however, requires constant improvement to the methods and
policies currently in place. The sense of urgency accompanying these improvements
grows as the threat environment itself evolves, forcing the systems operating within
that environment to evolve as well.
This research seeks to address the technical challenges of refining capabilities-
based SoSSE practices by researching methods to deal with evaluating the growing
complexities of SoS architectures that inevitably impact decision making. As a re-
minder, Milestones A, B, and C are where critical management decisions are made
when acquiring weapons systems. Milestone A encompasses the conceptual design
effort. This is where system architecting is usually initiated and where concept re-
finement takes place. It is here that the MDA can approve a materiel development
decision and grant formal entry into the acquisition process. Milestone B marks for-
mal acquisition program initiation with dedicated funding, and Milestone C is where
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the MDA deems a system/technology mature enough commit to low-rate initial pro-
duction. The importance of using a capabilities-based approach and applying sound
SoSSE practices from the very beginning is made readily apparent in Figure 20.
Figure 20: Life Cycle Cost at Different Acquisition Milestones [14].
Figure 20 shows that between 70%–75% of the LCC is influenced by decisions
made prior to Milestone A, while approximately 72% of the funding is not actually
expended until after Milestone C has been passed. It is important to note that these
decisions not only impact cost, but also schedule and performance. A similar trend is
also observed for computer software architectures, which the DoD relies on heavily as
well. For software architectures, often less than 1% of the total cost can be attributed
to system architecting related efforts while those decisions define up to 80% of the
total development cost [168]. The conclusion to be drawn here is that while the
application of sound SoSSE methods and practices are needed throughout the system
life cycle, they are most critical and will have the most impact on cost, schedule,
and performance during the pre-Milestone A phase of the JCIDS process [10]. The
problem that arises, though, is that the early stages of conceptual design is the point
at which there is the greatest amount of design flexibility, but in contrast the least
amount of design knowledge [117, 165]. As the design process progresses from the
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conceptual stage to more detailed phases such as manufacturing, production, and
O&S, more knowledge is gained. However, this knowledge comes at the expense of
restricting design freedom to the point where changes quickly become more costly and
burdensome. Thus, the focus of this research will be applied to supporting decisions
made during the pre-Milestone A phase. Specifically, the focus will be on aiding
decision makers in the selection of cost-effective complex military SoS architectures
during the AoA that have the greatest likelihood for successful acquisition.
3.2 Seeds of Failure Planted During Pre-Milestone A
A 2008 report delivered to the Air Force by the National Research Council of the
National Academies was commissioned by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering. The main goal of the study was to
“examine the role that systems engineering can play during the defense acquisition life
cycle in addressing the root causes of program failure, especially during pre-Milestone
A and the early phases of a program” [10]. The 2008 Pre-Milestone A study outlines 6
drivers of cost, development time, and performance risk addressable by SE processes.
These “Six Seeds of Failure” are shown in Figure 21.
Figure 21: The Six Seeds of Failure During Pre-Milestone A and B [10].
The first seed of failure identified, inexperienced leadership, considers both the
length of experience and the number of programs that systems engineering/acquisition
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professionals have participated in. Obviously, the possible solutions to mitigate inex-
perienced leadership will fall far from being exclusively technical ones. As the study
points out, however, the main contribution that the focus of this research can provide
will be in correctly identifying the risk or difficulty associated with each alternative.
In this way, the most experienced personnel can be allocated to projects deemed
worth pursuing, but that are considered to be high risk. To accomplish this, the
contribution to program risk from the other seeds of failure must be reliably assessed
as well. The study notes, for example, that “the use of unproven technology in large
system developments can introduce a high risk of schedule and cost growth.” Like-
wise, large and complex software elements have historically been the source of high
costs and long development times on many programs as well. The Pre-Milestone A
study also notes that it is not unusual for programs to proceed beyond Milestone A
with incomplete or unstable requirements. The study provides a basic explanation of
how this trend came to be:
One characteristic of very complex system developments during World
War II and the early Cold War years was the simplicity and urgency of
the needs and missions. Beating the Germans to the atomic bomb, the
Russians to the Moon, penetrating the Iron Curtain, and so on, provided
clear, urgent goals that galvanized the sponsors of the complex systems
and focused and empowered the government and contractor teams. Such
clear, driving missions, and the simple user interfaces that they required,
allowed the program team to develop its concepts quickly and to keep the
top-level requirements stable until IOC.
In the post-Cold War era, the immediacy of the threats often seems less
apparent, and programs often try to serve many missions and users with
a single system, or system of systems. The interaction of multiple systems
that were not designed together (e.g., military satellite communications
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[MILSATCOM]), often termed ‘systems of systems,’ also can greatly in-
crease the difficulty of creating a stable requirements base for a new sys-
tem.
The Pre-Milestone A Study acknowledges that funding instability, while the result
of a political process and not systems engineering, is another driver of unstable re-
quirements that affects cost, schedule, and performance. It goes on to suggest placing
greater emphasis on making schedule a key performance parameter. This sentiment
is mirrored in the 2006 Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense [16]. Both sets of findings strongly advocate considering
the “time value of a capability” in order to seek concepts that can deliver initial ca-
pability either within about 5 years from Milestone B or no more than six years from
Milestone A [10, 16]. Since the time value of a capability is typically used later during
the AoA process to down-select to a smaller group of alternatives, decision makers
may not afford it the attention usually attributed to cost and effectiveness analyses.
However, the time value of a capability necessarily influences cost, schedule, and per-
formance tradeoffs. For example, an 80% solution developed earlier may be preferred
to a 100% solution delivered significantly later. The Pre-Milestone A Study goes on
to say that “Further, extended delivery times run the risk of the system becoming
obsolete before deployment and can be an indication that the concept is excessively
complex or excessively dependent on immature technology in its first delivery.” A
more favorable method is an evolutionary acquisition strategy, where a capability that
is initially fielded can be upgraded over time as technologies mature and operational
requirements become clearer. This is usually the case with past successful acquisition
programs, case-in-point being the F-16 Fighting Falcon [16].
The two remaining seeds are focused on complexity, making it a key design issue.
As Maier succinctly states, “Generally speaking, the more complex a system, the
more difficult it is to design, build, and use” and “When architects and builders
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are asked to explain cost overruns and schedule delays, by far the most common,
and quite valid, explanation is that the system is much more complex than originally
thought” [113]. The Pre-Milestone A Study describes some of the relevant factors that
have contributed to overall system complexity, and also provides recommendations
on limiting complexity in system design:
• External Interface Complexity: The concept of network-centric operations, in
particular, can introduce external complexity. The complex processes necessary
to coordinate these communities of interest seem to have hidden costs that can
add many years to the development cycle and lead to substantial budget over-
runs. In addition, systems dependent on highly complex external interfaces can
be far more difficult to operate after deployment. SE should treat the minimiza-
tion of external interface complexity as a key driver in selecting concepts and
architecture. Simplifying and standardizing the ways that external users access
the system and seeking to minimize the degree to which the systems capabilities
must be tailored specifically for individual users can help.
• System Complexity: The flexibility and capability enabled by advances in elec-
tronics technology and software provide systems designers with far more options
than their predecessors enjoyed 30 years ago. The downside is that these new ca-
pabilities can tempt designers into unnecessarily complex concepts and designs
that impose a “cost of internal complexity” similar to the external complex-
ity costs described above. SE should treat complexity minimization as a key
driver in selecting concepts and architecture. Architecture selection can have a
powerful effect on controlling complexity.
The trend towards increasing system complexity is an ongoing study conducted
by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) META program [77].





















































Figure 22 highlights the correlation between perceived complexity and the impact
on both cost and schedule for three different types of systems. Figure 22 clearly shows
that while the complexity of automobiles and integrated circuits have increased over
time, there has been significantly less cost and schedule growth for these types of sys-
tems in comparison to the cost and schedule growth experienced by aerospace systems.
The complexity metric utilized by META is a linear combination of part count and
source lines of code. META acknowledges, however, that this metric needs improve-
ment and intends to develop a more suitable metric. In comparison, a complexity-
based risk assessment (CoBRA) method developed by Bearden uses a complexity
index to show the impact of complexity on cost and schedule during satellite design
[7, 26, 27]. This is shown in Figure 23.
Figure 23: Cost & Schedule as a Function of Complexity for NASA Planetary &
Earth-Orbiting Missions [26].
CoBRA is an analogy based estimating technique that relies on information from
planetary and earth-orbiting satellite missions from the National Aeronautics & Space
Administration (NASA) historical databases. The complexity index is calculated us-
ing 21 separate subsystem parameters such as satellite launch mass, design life, solar
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array area, and propulsion type. The parameters are selected based on requirements
that exert a significant influence on spacecraft design. The minimum, maximum, and
average value for each parameter is evaluated by analyzing the historical database of
previous missions. These results are then aggregated into a normalized complexity
index. A proposed mission is given a complexity index close to 100% if the values of
many of its subsystem parameters lie near values that historically correlate to greater
cost and schedule overruns. It follows that, “The expectation is that a proposed mis-
sion is on the road to success if the locus of the cost (and schedule) versus complexity
point lies in the vicinity of the data for successful missions in the past” [7]. One of
Bearden’s key findings is that “A comparison of NASA planetary and earth-orbiting
missions showed that low-cost planetary missions cost more, are developed faster,
and fail more often than do earth-orbiting missisions” [26]. This assessment further
emphasizes the impact of complexity on cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs.
While this method of estimating complexity is more sophisticated than a simple part
count, Bearden acknowledges that the relative importance of the parameters con-
tributing to the complexity index and correlation among them in representing and/or
driving technology selections remains to be investigated [26]. Since the complexity
index relies on a historical database, this method may be unsuitable when considering
new technologies or systems that trend away from the historical database.
An example of a parametric SE cost model that includes the effects of architec-
ture complexity is the Constructive Systems Engineering Cost Model (COSYSMO)
developed at the University of Southern California Center for Software Engineer-
ing. COSYSMO is used to estimate the time and effort associated with performing
the system engineering task for large scale hardware and/or software projects [159].
COSYSMO’s CER is as follows:
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• PMNS = estimated effort in Person Months 1 based on the nominal schedule
(response variable)
• A = calibration constant derived from historical project data
• Size = determined by computing the weighted average of the size drivers
• E = exponent representing the (dis)economy of scale dependent on size drivers
• n = number of cost drivers (12)
• EM = effort multiplier for the ith cost driver. The geometric product results in
an overall effort adjustment factor to the nominal effort.
The key inputs to the CER are the calibration constant and the size and cost
drivers. The calibration constant is derived from over 50 projects provided by major
aerospace and defense companies such as Raytheon, Northrup Grumman, Lockheed
Martin, SAIC, General Dynamics, and BAE systems. The following is a brief de-
scription of the four COSYSMO size drivers:
1. Number of System Requirements: The number of requirements taken from the
system specification. A requirement is a statement of capability or attribute
containing a normative verb such as shall or will. It may be functional or system
service-oriented in nature depending on the methodology used for specification.
System requirements can typically be quantified by counting the number of
applicable shall’s or will’s in the system or marketing specification.
1Person Months is a man-hour estimate [3] used especially on large projects as a basis for cost
accounting and wages.
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2. Number of Major Interfaces: The number of shared major physical and log-
ical boundaries between system components or functions (internal interfaces)
and those external to the system (external interfaces). These interfaces typi-
cally can be quantified by counting the number of interfaces identified in either
the system’s context diagram and/or by counting the significant interfaces in
applicable Interface Control Documents.
3. Number of Operational Scenarios: The number of operational scenarios that a
system is specified to satisfy. Such threads typically result in end-to-end test
scenarios that are developed to validate the system satisfies its requirements.
The number of scenarios can typically be quantified by counting the number
of end-to-end tests used to validate the system functionality and performance.
They can also be calculated by counting the number of high-level use cases
developed as part of the operational architecture.
4. Number of Unique Algorithms: The number of newly defined or significantly
altered functions that require unique mathematical algorithms to be derived in
order to achieve the system performance requirements.
The 12 COSYSMO cost drivers 1, or effort multipliers, are divided into 5 Ap-
plication Factors and 7 Team Factors. While COSYSMO provides a comprehensive
formulation of key SE factors in its cost estimation, many of the cost drivers are based
on a qualitative scale. This includes architecture complexity, which COSYSMO de-
fines as the relative difficulty of determining and managing the system architecture in
terms of platforms, standards, components, connectors (protocols), and constraints.
A listing of the cost drivers is presented in Table 1.
1Level of Service Requirements measures the difficulty and criticality of satisfying Key Perfor-
mance Parameters such as security, safety, and response time. Migration Complexity is the difficulty
in migrating the system from previous system components, databases, or work flows for example.
For further details see Reference [159].
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Table 1: COSYSMO Cost Drivers.
Team Factors Application Factors
Stakeholder Team Cohesion Requirements Understanding
Personnel Capability Architecture Complexity
Personnel Experience/Continuity Level of Service Requirements
Process Maturity Migration Complexity
Multi-site Coordination Technology Maturity
Formality of Deliverables
Tool Support
In comparison, Technomics provides a simpler parametric cost model for esti-
mating RDT&E costs [98]. The Technomics model relies on information captured
in DoDAF models and explores the interdependencies that exist between system el-
ements as a result of their interconnections. Therefore, the system architecture is
described in terms of nodes and links. A node is described as an element of architec-
ture that produces, consumes, or processes data. Thus, there are three node types:
Ns is a node that sends information, Nr is a node that receives information, and
Ns/r is a node that both sends and receives information. A link is a representation
of the physical realization of connectivity between Nodes. A link can either allow
uni-directional information flow or bi-directional information flow. The total number
of links is expressed as Lt, while the total number of nodes is Nt. The cost model
uses the following equations:
RDT&E$ = aN be (3)
Ne =
(








The first term in parentheses in Equation (4) captures the complexity associated
with the types of nodes. The second term in parentheses captures the connectivity
complexity associated with the system. The parameters a, b, d, g, h, and c used in both
equations are estimated using residual-minimization techniques. The average value
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of Lt/Nt is obtained from the database of all architectures under evaluation. An
analysis using the Technomics model leads one to the conclusion that understanding
the relationship between links and nodes is critical in understanding the potential for
RDT&E cost growth [98].
In summary, each of the four analyses previously discussed seek to capture the
impact of complexity on system design. While this impact is often cast in the negative
light of cost and schedule overruns, one must also bear in mind that complexity is
not inherently a bad property. As Moses explains, “you usually have to expend
complexity dollars to achieve useful goals, such as increased functionality, efficiency,
or flexibility” [153]. Since added complexity often carries with it additional risk, this
makes it necessary to determine what level of complexity is appropriate and how
that complexity should be managed. Therefore, while complexity can add value in
achieving capabilities, complexity and affordability are often two conflicting objectives
that need to be traded against each other to find a compromise. As previously
mentioned, the Pre-Milestone A Study emphasizes that architecture selection can
have a powerful effect. Then it stands to reason that the complexity that results
when systems interoperate as part of a SoS architecture should be given greater
consideration upfront in the decision-making process [53]. In this way, an accurate
measure of complexity can serve as an even more powerful tool to decision makers
during the AoA.
3.3 Research Objective
The objective of this research is to develop a valuation methodology suitable for
acquisition-level decision making during the pre-Milestone A phase of acquisition. To
determine how well this method aids decision makers in the down-selection of alter-
natives for the implementation of a cost-effective, evolutionary acquisition strategy,
the valuation method should be judged according to a list of criteria that represents
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the stated needs of the acquisition community. Therefore, the following should be
addressed:
1. Must take into account programmatic risks, uncertainties, and sensitivities [1,
127]
2. Must take into account the hidden costs of complexity [10]
3. Must consider the future direction of the SoS in the developing architecture,
i.e. how the architecture will evolve [69]
4. Must take into account the “time value of capability” [10, 16]
5. Must help determine when additional effectiveness is worth an additional in-
vestment of resources when comparing alternatives [1, 127]
6. Must ensure that the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative are pre-
sented in a clear and unbiased manner, and that it depicts the analysis results,
understandable interpretations, and defensible recommendations [127]
Meeting the research objective would not be possible without leveraging past and
current advancements from the following disciplines:
• The development of architecture frameworks for organizing and describing key
SoS attributes and information
• Advancements in the emerging field of Complexity Science for characterizing
and measuring complexity
• Previous and newly emerging methods for applying financial valuation methods
to business and engineering problems for decision making
• Advancements in computing and IT that allow for the efficient manipulation,
display, and comprehension of data and information
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• The development of graph/network theory as a visual and mathematical aid in
analyzing complex architectures
Currently, estimates of system and architecture complexity are limited in their use.
Complexity is merely being used as a parameter to further inform cost and schedule
forecasts. For this research, however, the treatment of complexity as the primary focus
during pre-Milestone A decision making will be the key difference that sets this method
apart from current practices. More specifically, since complexity is already thought of
as a type of cost that is exacted for increased functionality [16, 153], this research
advocates that it can be similarly treated as such during the early phases of design.
Applying this conceptual shift in order to “monetize complexity” means that now,
more advanced financial theories and methods can be brought to bear during the AoA
to gauge the true value of competing alternatives. For example, it may be possible
to apply a discounting mechanism using an appropriate valuation framework that
takes into account attempts to manage complexity with programmatic resources such





4.1 Research Question #1: Measuring SoS Architecture
Complexity
A summary of the observations leading to the first research question are:
O1a. Defense acquisition is increasingly more complex in a network driven, joint
capability focused acquisition environment. In order for weapons systems to
deliver greater war fighting capabilities, military SoS must be considered in the
context of design. This necessitates improved SoSSE methods and architecting
principles to manage and evolve these complex military SoS.
O1b. Complexity is a key design driver that impacts the cost, schedule, and perfor-
mance of acquisition programs. Failure to adequately account for complexity in
pre-Milestone A acquisition negatively impacts the timely acquisition of cost-
effective systems to meet warfighter needs.
O1c. Varied methods for measuring complexity exist. Different complexity measures
used by DARPA’s META program, CoBRA, COSYSMO, and Technomics, for
example, range from qualitative to more quantitative assessments of complexity.
Based on observations O1a.—O1c., the focus of the first research question be-
comes:
RQ1. What is an appropriate method of measuring military SoS complexity
during the pre-Milestone A phase of acquisition to aid decision makers
in architecture selection?
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4.2 Research Question #2: Developing a Valuation Frame-
work
A summary of the observations leading to the second research question are:
O2a. Traditional analysis methods such as cost-effectiveness scatter plots and multi-
attribute PATs are helpful to the decision maker. Yet, these methods still leave
decision makers with the task of determining when additional effectiveness is
worth an additional investment of resources when comparing alternatives. An
improved valuation methodology is needed.
O2b. Complexity can be considered as the cost inherent in design for achieving in-
creased functionality, efficiency, or flexibility. However, current methods of
incorporating architecture complexity into an AoA are limited in application.
O2c. The conceptual shift of monetizing complexity, or treating complexity as a cost
allows for more advanced financial theories and methods to be used, such as
applying a discounting mechanism directly to measured architecture complexity.
Based on observations O2a.—O2c., the second research question is as follows:
RQ2. What financial theories and methods are appropriate for developing a
complexity-based valuation method to determine when additional ef-





5.1 Defining a Complex System
Churchman & Ratoosh make clear that, “it is meaningless to speak of measurement
unless there is already available some form of definition” [48]. So before evaluating
or deriving a complexity measure, complexity must first be defined in terms readily
applicable to complex systems and their behavior. To do this, an understanding
of what is meant by a complex system must be obtained. Then it will be possible
to infer possible architectural and design characteristics that give rise to complex
phenomena. Complexity itself is a concept that impacts numerous disciplines, from
biology to economics to mathematics, computer science, and IT. As a result, attempts
to define and characterize complexity span many different approaches.
The Oxford dictionary meaning of the word complex is “consisting of many dif-
ferent and connected parts” or “not easy to analyse or understand; complicated or
intricate” [4]. The word complex can be traced back to the Latin complexus, which
means ‘plaited’, or braided together and intertwined [4]. Though the use of the word
complicated is often used synonymously with the word complex, it has been suggested
by some that understanding and engineering complex systems represents a new de-
sign paradigm [36, 151]. In this new paradigm both Complexity Science and system
architecting play prominent roles. At its core, the nascent field of Complexity Science
centers on the philosophical debate between Reductionism and Holism [149] to dis-
tinguish the complex from that which is merely complicated. Each philosophy seeks
to define whether the properties and behavior of systems can best be understood by
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studying the fundamental components individually or only rather by holistically ob-
serving the interactions of components as an entire, functioning system. Complexity
Science favors the latter. Whereas a system that is merely complicated may have
many parts arranged in intricate ways, its behavior can still be well understood from
a careful decomposition of its parts. Former NASA administrator Michael Griffin
provides a succinct summary when he states, “Complicated is decomposable, which
is what systems engineering is based on. Complex systems are no longer strictly de-
composable, and systems engineering has to adapt” [161]. With this in mind, two
pertinent definitions describing a complex system are:
1) A system composed of interconnected parts that as a whole exhibit one or
more properties (behavior among the possible properties) not obvious from the
properties of the individual parts [99].
2) A system having many interrelated, interconnected, or interwoven elements and
interfaces [52].
Examples of non-obvious behavior that are typically attributed to complex sys-
tems include adaptive behavior, self-organization, and the difficult-to-predict interac-
tions between elements of a system. Global emergence is also observed, and Bar-Yam
describes this as collective behavior that is contained in the behavior of parts only if
they are studied in the context in which they are found [22]. Also, complex systems
tend to evolve desirable traits such as robustness and adaptability [153].
In general, these behaviors and traits are a direct result of the manner in which
the functionality of a system, or group of systems, is achieved. A function can be
defined as a necessary task, action, or activity that must be accomplished. Functions
are performed or accomplished through the use of a combination of resources such
as information, equipment, personnel, facilities, or software [65]. For a system or
SoS composed of interconnected parts, these resources are transmitted via interfaces.
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This being the case, it follows that a careful examination of a system in terms of both
functionality and resource sharing is needed to fully understand a system’s complexity,
or lack thereof.
5.1.1 Complex System Classification
5.1.1.1 Physical/Functional Relationships
Balestrini-Robinson provides a relevant classification scheme for different system types
that is based on the relationship between a system’s observable physical and func-
tional traits. Figure 24, along with the accompanying descriptions, summarizes this
classification scheme.
Figure 24: Complex System Classification Using Physical-to-Functional Relation-
ships [21].
• Simple System: Simple in both the physical and functional domains. The sys-
tem is predictable and traditional engineering techniques can be successfully
applied.
• Complicated System: Physically complex, yet functionally simple. These sys-
tems are less predictable than those classified as simple because the functional
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requirements are satisfied, but cannot be ensured under all possible conditions
and states. A reductionist approach still applies.
• Non-deterministic Chaotic System: Functionally complex, yet physically sim-
ple. The non-deterministic system is influenced by random perturbations to
produce the appearance of complexity. This behavior, while similar in appear-
ance to chaos, has rather different implications for prediction and control. These
systems have the property of being predictable for short times, yet completely
unpredictable over long time periods [70]. Solved using traditional Robust De-
sign Techniques [116].
• Complex System: Both physically and functionally complex. Emergent behav-
ior and highly nonlinear interactions make predicting and understanding these
systems difficult. Must architect the system to behave correctly by tailoring the
emergent behaviors.
Figure 25 provides a visual example of the behavior of each type of system in
terms of a time-series [21]. This illustrates the system state regimes where the tran-
sition from static, linear behavior to nonlinear patterns of behavior occur. Note that
the complex regime lies between the periodic and chaotic system states. Balestrini-
Robinson makes note that “The difficulty in determining where exactly the system
is ‘complex’ is evident from the picture, unlike the periodic and static states, the
chaotic and complex are difficult to discern by the human mind, i.e., there is not a
clear boundary where the system is complex, or chaotic” [21].
5.1.1.2 Nonlinearity & Coupling
Perrow, in his book Normal Accidents, provides a complementary means of classifying
complex systems in terms of system interactions and coupling. Taking into account
both couplings and interactions, Perrow illustrates how an alternative mapping of
system complexity emerges. This is depicted in Figure 26.
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Figure 25: System State Regimes [21].
Figure 26: Perrow’s Interaction/Coupling Chart [136].
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Perrow defines Linear interactions as those interactions that occur within the
system that are usually expected and familiar, or at the very least visible even if un-
planned; linear interactions are readily comprehensible. In opposition, “Complex in-
teractions are those of unfamiliar sequences, or unplanned and unexpected sequences,
and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible” [136]. Perrow also explores
the effect on complexity due to coupling in the design and function of a system. Per-
row explains, “tightly coupled systems have more time-dependent processes: they
cannot wait or stand by until attended to” [136]. Thus, tightly coupled systems have
little slack, buffers and redundancies must be designed in, and functional sequenc-
ing remains invariant. Loosely coupled systems, by contrast, can tolerate delays and
can remain in “standby mode” if necessary. Additionally, the order of functional
sequences can be changed and buffers and redundancies are “fortuitously available”
[136]. These are but a few of the differences in tendencies between tightly coupled
and loosely coupled systems according to Perrow. Furthermore, Perrow provides an
analysis of the different system groupings:
By combining our two variables in this way, a number of conclusions can
be made. First, it is clear that the two variables are largely independent.
Examine the top of the chart from left to right. Dams, power grids, and
nuclear plants are all roughly on the same line, indicating a similar degree
of tight coupling. But they differ greatly on the interaction variable.
While there are few unexpected interactions possible in dams, and not
that many in power grids, there are many in nuclear plants.
Perrow goes on to state the following regarding systems with loose coupling:
The post office and the university, then, are similar with regard to cou-
pling; both can recover from upsets because sequences are not that in-
evitable, there is slack in resources, substitutions are possible. But the
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post office is largely limited to linear interactions, while the university is
full of many potentially complex ones that can reach unexpectedly into
other parts of the system.
In developing the Interaction/Coupling Chart, Perrow acknowledges, however,
that “the degree of coupling and type of interactions have been inferred from a rough
idea of the frequency of system accidents in the various systems, rather than derived
from analysis of the properties of the systems independent of the nature of their fail-
ures” [136]. This highlights the need for an objective quantification of independent,
observable system properties that contribute to overall system complexity. Neverthe-
less, from each of these analyses, it is readily apparent that many engineered systems
are considered complex due to the couplings and interactions between system compo-
nents that are oftentimes considered physically and functionally complex in their own
right [21]. Naturally occurring biological systems, on the other hand, show us that
complex collective behavior can also arise from networks of individual components
with little or no centralized control. This complex collective behavior occurs even
when the individual components are relatively simple in terms of structure, behavior,
and variation [123]. This provides an added third dimension to complexity to what
was previously shown in Figure 24. Relevant examples of these system types include
insect colonies such as ants and bees, the collection of neurons in the human brain,
and human immune systems. The self-organization exhibited by these systems ap-
pears to be common in nature and can be produced by simple processes operating
locally on simple agents or components [36]. In terms of engineered systems, this
type of complexity can be seen most often in distributed computing architectures,
where multiple autonomous computers (or even multiple parallel processors on one
or more computer) communicate through a network to fulfill tasking. In other fields
such as satellite design, recent emphasis has been placed on fractionated architec-
tures, where smaller and cheaper space modules are wirelessly interconnected to form
68
a “virtual satellite” [6]. DARPA’s F6 Program is a recent example of this kind of
system architecture, and a conceptual graphic is shown in Figure 27 [6, 39].
Figure 27: DARPA F6 Fractionated Satellite Architecture Concept.
Such systems, whether naturally occurring or engineered, highlight the impor-
tance of including information processing and computation when describing com-
plexity [163]. The implication for engineered systems is that even when components
are functionally simpler and more homogeneous than competing architectures, ex-
tra time and effort may still be required to adequately test, understand, and shape
system behavior to desired specifications. As in naturally occurring systems, this
type of complexity is mainly due to the underlying patterns of collaboration and re-
source sharing that result due to the formation of sub-networks. Research focusing on
studying the properties of discrete dynamical systems such as cellular automata and
Random Boolean Networks (RBNs) has yielded many particularly useful insights in
this regard. Kinsner describes a dynamical system as one that can be defined math-
ematically as a set of rules governing the evolution in time t of its state in a phase
[101]. Additionally, dynamical systems can be modeled at discrete time intervals and
described in terms of differential equations.
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5.1.2 Overview of Elementary Cellular Automata
Cellular automata were originally invented by von Neumann for proving the existence
of a self-producing universal computer [107]. Cellular automata have found a vast ar-
ray of applications, ranging from modeling biological systems, describing populations
of mobile organisms, describing the growth of dendritic crystals (such as snowflakes),
to studying problems in number theory and their applications to tapestry design.
They have also been applied in military contexts for modeling effects-based opera-
tions [55]. In addition to being viewed as information processing systems, cellular
automata can also be viewed as discrete dynamical systems, or discrete idealizations
of partial differential equations [163, 164]. RBN’s are a more general case of cellular
automata “where the state of each node is not affected necessarily by its neighbors,
but potentially by any node in the network” [84]. Wolfram explains the importance
of studying these types of systems when he states, “from their analysis, one may, on
the one hand, develop specific models for particular systems, and, on the other hand,
hope to abstract general principles applicable to a wide variety of complex systems”
[163].
The rule states that govern local behavior, which then propagates to a global level,
are what distinguish the different classes of behavior expressed by similarly connected
elementary cellular automata. An elementary cellular automaton is compromised of
any number of individual cells, with each cell either in an on (black) or off (white)
state. An elementary cell neighborhood is defined as a middle cell and its adjacent
cells on both the left and the right. The state of a middle cell in the next time step
is determined by the state of its neighborhood at the previous time step and the
particular rule state in use. An example of a rule state can be seen in (b) of Figure28.
An example space-time diagram for the 6 cell lattice shown in (a) is depicted as
(c) in Figure 28. Since there are eight possible configurations of states for a three-cell
neighborhood and only two possible ways to fill the update table (on or off) for each
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Figure 28: (a) One-dimensional 6 cell elementary cellular automaton whose ends
wrap in a circle; (b) Rule table for rule number 110; (c) A space-time diagram,
showing three successive configurations. Adapted from [123].
of the eight configurations, there are only 256(28) possible rules for all elementary
cellular automata [123]. For rule number 0, the middle cell is always updated to an
off (white) state. Conversely, the middle cells in rule number 256 are always up-
dated to on (black). Wolfram provides numerous illustrations and analyses of evolved
space-time diagrams for both elementary and more complex CA’s [164]. Wolfram
also developed a classification scheme to group the evolved space-time behavior of
certain rules from random initial configurations. This behavior ranges from achiev-
ing very simple, homogeneous states to stable periodic patterns, chaotic aperiodic
behavior, and complex behavior seemingly at the “edge of chaos”. A summary of the
classification scheme is as follows:
• Class 1: Rapid convergence to a uniform, homogeneous state after a finite
number of time steps from almost all initial states.
• Class 2: Periodic behavior is observed as rapid convergence to a repetitive or
stable state.
• Class 3: Aperiodic, “chaotic” patterns evolve from almost all initial states.
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• Class 4: Complex localized structures are observed as locally chaotic patterns
interact with stable patterns.
Rule 110, which is a Class 4 rule, has proven to be capable of universal computa-
tion. This means that if the initial state is considered as a program and initial data,
then the CA is capable of evaluating any computable function [102, 163]. Figure 29
provides an example of evolved space-time diagrams for different Wolfram classes of
Elementary CA’s. In addition, an example of a naturally occurring Elementary CA
pattern is shown.
Figure 29: Space-Time Diagrams for Four Wolfram Class Elementary Cellular Au-
tomata Rule States & Naturally Occurring Rule 30 Pattern on the Shell of C. textile.
Cellular Automota Images from [164].
An important parameter for understanding the organizational structure of the
Elementary CA rule space is the λ parameter (which should not be confused as an
eigenvalue). For cellular automata, the λ parameter is defined as the percentage of
all entries in a rule table which map to non-zero states. For cellular automata with 2
states per cell, the rule spaces have a symmetry with respect to λ = 0.5. This means
that rules with λ = x are equivalent to rules with λ = 1−x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5; the roles
of states 0 and 1 are simply reversed [107]. Thus, the λ parameter for the example




. The λ parameter is analogous,
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but not directly equivalent to the temperature in statistical physics, or the degree of
nonlinearity in dynamical systems [107]. It can also be observed that the particular
value of the λ parameter determines the amount of information passed to the middle
cell from its left and right neighbors as the update rule is being applied. These two
facets of information processing are key features that distinguish the evolution of one
lattice from another, and are important features to consider while developing methods
to capture the complexities of exchanging resources within a complex system.
Wolfram’s classification scheme, though the most widely recognized, has faced
some criticism. One of the reasons for this is that not all Elementary CA rules fit
neatly within one of the four classes devised by Wolfram, though the scheme holds
true in general. This had led researchers in the field to postulate that an additional
“phase” parameter is needed to more accurately classify transitions that occur from
one class of rules to another within the Elementary CA rule space [32, 102, 104, 107].
This is graphically depicted in Figure 30.
Figure 30: Schematic Diagram of 2D Phase Diagram for CA and its Projection onto
the λ Parameter [107].
Ref. [107] describes the dark-shaded region in the middle as a “critical region”.
Without knowing the value of the second phase transition parameter, experimental
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results show that both first and second order transitions over a range of λ values.
This 2D phase description is analogous to having to know both the temperature and
pressure of a physical system to understand its transition points. Li et al. explain
further Ref. [107]:
For many physical systems exhibiting phase transitions, more than a single
parameter is required to accurately reveal the phase-transition structure.
For instance, the transition point from a solid to a fluid is not captured
precisely by temperature alone, one must also control the pressure. For
any specific pressure, there is a unique melting temperature, but if pres-
sure is not being controlled carefully in an experiment, one will observe a
range of temperatures at which melting will be observed to occur. This
suggests that we will have to find at least one more parameter affecting
the dynamics of cellular automata before we can fill out all of the details
of the transition or bifurcation structure of cellular automata rule spaces.
As an example, Binder develops an additional independent phase parameter, µ, for
Elementary CA’s by taking into account the average sensitivity of a rule’s outcome to
small changes in the neighborhood configuration (for example, comparing the change
in outcome for configuration (101) vs. (001) for a three cell neighborhood) [32].
Binder also assumes that all neighborhoods are equally probable. µ is used primarily
to discriminate between rules with equal λ. Binder observed that it is possible for a
rule to have a large sensitivity to changes in neighborhood configuration even though
the rule does not allow transmission of information. It has been observed that Class
3 and Class 4 rules are more sensitive than Class 1 and Class 2 rules to changes
in site configurations [32]. The notion of sensitivity, especially to initial conditions
or configurations is a common theme in the study of chaotic systems [155]. Binder
notes that though µ is somewhat crude, it is however directly obtainable from the
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description of the rule and independent of λ. Thus, it is important to include this
aspect of complexity as well. In summary, enumerating the connectivity and the
formation of sub-networks that exist between systems provides some insight into the
information processing complexity of a system. Yet it proves insufficient as an overall
accounting of a system’s computational complexity. Elementary cellular automata,
for instance, show that homogeneous components, composed in the the exact same
structural arrangement can still produce very different behavior.
5.1.3 Complex System Definition
Based on the observations made up to this point, there appears to be a few commonly
accepted attributes that tend to be prevalent in describing a system’s complexity.
These include the number and diversity of system components, the nature of their
interconnections and interactions that bind components together, and the difficulty
in characterizing the resulting system behaviors [13, 28, 143]. For example, in the
field of mechanical engineering design, Summers & Shah refer to these attributes as
“size, coupling, and solvability” [152]. Furthermore, there is a recurring theme that
arises based on observations of systems that are regarded as highly complex and even
chaotic. It has been observed that high levels of complexity/chaos correspond to
increased sensitivity to small perturbations. Bak et al. note that “dynamical systems
with extended spatial degrees of freedom naturally evolve into self-organized critical
structures of states which are barely stable [18]. For engineered systems, this means
that the current state of the system and the nonlinear relationships that develop over
time can cause substantial and unpredictable system reconfigurations [153], making
long term planning difficult. For system architects, this makes evolving the system
over longer time horizons in a controlled, predictable way more difficult. The end
result is that having a good measure of system complexity takes on even greater
importance.
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In order for an architecture complexity measure to be useful, these relevant prop-
erties that contribute to varying levels of complexity must be captured. Thus, for
purposes of this research, a complex system is viewed as being composed
of multiple nodes that are interfaced to share and process resources as
part of a cyclic network, and that are able to interact to varying degrees
to perform functions and provide a capability. To clarify, a node is viewed
as an element of either a system or SoS that must interact with other nodes. At
the traditional systems level of scope, a node would be considered a subsystem. At
the SoS level of scope, a node is what would be usually considered as a system in
its own right, such as an F-16 or an aircraft carrier. Also, networks may be either
cyclic, meaning they contain closed loops of edges, or acyclic meaning they do not.
Newman notes that some networks, such as food webs, are approximately but not
perfectly acyclic [126]. This is an important criteria for complex systems, for without
cycles present there are no mechanisms for feedback and the emergence of what is
commonly viewed as complex behavior. In conclusion, with a clear definition of a
complex system in hand, it now becomes possible to evaluate the suitably of different
approaches for measuring military SoS architecture complexity.
5.2 Complexity in Relation to Parsimony & Perception
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.”
-Albert Einstein
Use of the words simple and complex to describe different systems speak as much
to our level of understanding and perceptions about different systems, as well as to
the mathematics and techniques used to describe and manage them. From the study
of complex systems, we see that the perception of what is complex is important to
understanding complexity as well. The problem that we encounter, though, is that
perception often changes with time and experience. This has prompted many in the
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field to make clear distinctions between actual and perceived complexity. Summers
& Shah provide an apt description when they state [152]:
Complex systems lie between ordered systems, as in carbon atoms in a
diamond, and chaotic systems, as in molecules in a gas [110]. Across
this continuum a complexity measure should persist, yet vanish at the
extremes. This is a näıve view in that the molecules in a gas may be
ordered and acting according to specific laws of physics as yet not dis-
covered. Thus chaos, in these terms, may simply be a description of a
complex system that is as yet not understood.
In similar fashion, Crawley makes a distinction between essential, perceived, and
actual complexity. In Crawley’s view, “it is necessary to keep perceived complexity
below the limit of understanding (comprehension) and the actual complexity close to
the essential complexity. The actual complexity is never smaller than the essential
complexity” [100]. Likewise, Suh postulates that there is an imaginary component to
complexity in addition to an observable, real component. According to Suh, “This
imaginary complexity is a complexity that is not real, but exists because of our
lack of understanding about the system design, system architecture, and/or system
behavior” [151]. The conclusion that can be drawn is that one’s current level of
knowledge, expertise, and technological know-how is a primary factor in shaping
one’s perception of what is simple vs. what is complex. This is in agreement with
Summers & Shah’s research in the field of mechanical engineering design, where design
is viewed as “a cyclic process that includes synthesis, analysis, and decision-making
stages to migrate from design problem to design product” [152]. Furthermore, the
design problem is a statement of the requirements, needs, functions, or objectives
while the design process includes the steps that are undertaken to find satisfactory
solutions to the stated problem. Designer experience as well as established rules,
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procedures, and domain knowledge are all valid resources that may be utilized during
the execution of the process. Lastly, the design product is “a representation of the
envisioned physical solution to the problem through the realization of the dependent
design variables such that the design relations are satisfied” [152].
A simple example using the automobiles depicted in Figures 31 and 32 further
illustrates the relationship between design problem, process, and product in terms of
the effect on actual vs. perceived complexity. Henry Ford, for instance, developed
the Model T automobile during the 1900’s. If, during the 1900’s, he could have been
presented with an automobile from a later time such as the 1960’s or 1970’s, he would
most likely view such an automobile as a step forward in manufacturing and design
complexity. In contrast, today’s automakers most likely consider that same automo-
bile from the 1960’s and 1970’s as relatively much simpler in comparison to today’s
vehicles, especially when modern automobiles incorporate into their design the use
of integrated electronics and computerized sensors, more advanced materials such as
plastics, novel propulsion plants such as hybrid gasoline/electric engines, and so forth.
The reason for this shift in perceived complexity is that both the design problems and
processes encountered by automobile manufacturers have changed dramatically from
the time of the Model T to today. In terms of the design problem, the automobiles
of today must meet different requirements and provide different functionality in com-
parison to past automobiles. Increased fuel efficiency standards, crash-safety ratings,
and the ability to interoperate with portable communications and electronic devices
are but a few. Likewise, the design process itself is influenced by the education and
training of the industry workforce, affecting the levels of proficiency and efficiency
that can be brought to bear in the allocation of resources.
These considerations provide an important insight that will prove useful later
when attempting to monetize complexity. That is, complexity can be discounted at
least in part based on the perception of the difficulties and risks inherent in migrating
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Figure 31: 1910 Ford Model T and a 1970 Ford Torina Cobra.
Figure 32: Exterior and Interior Views of the 2010 Ford Fusion Hybrid.
a system through the different phases of design, beginning with the conceptual design
phase and ending in a physically realizable system. From this example it is also
important to consider that even though the perception of a system’s complexity may
change over time, there is one aspect of a system’s complexity that can be considered
an absolute property, meaning it is independent of the observer [100]. From this
point of view, as a design product, the 1960-1970’s era automobile did not change
in terms of the functionality it provides, the number and types of interfaces used
to interconnect its many sub-components, or any other similarly objective system
parameters that speak directly to the makeup of that particular vehicle. This brings
up an important assumption that should be discussed when speaking in terms of
architectures. An architecture is assumed to be defined in terms of the set of functions
that compromise the required end-to-end capability. With this being the case, it is
possible for the complexity of an architecture to remain the same even though the
complexity of a system within the architecture changes. The caveat is that this is
dependent upon the required functionality that defines the architecture remaining
the same. For example, a bicycle and an automobile might be limited to providing
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the same function within an architecture, with that function being to transport one
person one mile. Intuitively, an automobile is thought to be more complex than
a bicycle. However, since either system can meet the required functionality as it
is specified, from this strict perspective trading one for the other does not change
the overall complexity of the architecture. Here, other considerations such as cost,
maintainability, and flexibility may come into play.
Hence, when faced with choosing between a highly complex product design vs.
a much simpler one as a solution to a design problem, a decision maker that only
requires basic functionality may very well decide on a parsimonious solution to the
decision problem. The principle of parsimony, which is the preference for the sim-
ple over the complicated or complex whenever possible, is a guideline that is often
adhered to in science and engineering. In science there is a preference for the sim-
plest plausible explanation of an observation. Meanwhile, engineering designs that
meet functional requirements in the least complex manner are preferred [33, 132].
In essence, complexity should be limited to that which meets the necessary system
requirements for improved functionality, reliability, etc. This task becomes more com-
plicated, however, when other pertinent system attributes such as affordability and
flexibility must also be considered. Here, the architecture again plays an important
role in helping to define just how adaptable and flexible the system will prove to be
[52, 69]. This is all the more reason to ensure that system architects are equipped
with a quantitative, objective measurement of architecture complexity when compar-
ing alternatives. Besides clarifying the intuitive sense of complexity and making the
design problem more transparent, it can also aid decision making by helping to bet-
ter inform tradeoff analyses, while also ensuring the strategic allocation of resources
occurs in order to effectively manage complexity, reduce risk, and prevent negative
acquisition outcomes.
80
5.3 Approaches to Measuring Complexity
Over time, notable descriptions of complexity have ranged from organized vs. disorga-
nized complexity pioneered by Weaver in 1948 [162] to the algorithmic complexity of
data structures developed in the 1960’s by Kolmogorov, Solomonoff, and Chaitin [100]
to Suh’s uncertainty-based characterization of complexity [151]. This has lead many
researchers in the field of Complexity Science, as well as those in disciplines that fre-
quently encounter and analyze systems considered to be complex, to formulate a wide
variety of complexity measures. Likewise, many researchers provide well-researched
listings and critiques of many of the most popular complexity measures [36, 76, 123].
Lloyd states that intuitively, an ideal measure of complexity would be universal and
applicable to any dynamical system—whether living, nonliving, or artificial [110].
Others note that many of the existing complexity measures developed by complexity
scientists tend to be very domain specific or too theoretically abstract to usefully
apply to real world systems [13, 75, 123]. Perhaps the overarching reason for this is
that the diversity that exists among both natural and engineered systems makes it
difficult at best to define an absolute measure of complexity that is applicable to any
and all systems [101, 123]. As Kinsner states, “Complexity appears to be context
sensitive, and cannot be defined universally, once and for all” [101]. Rather than
trying to adapt or define a single, universal measure of complexity when evaluating
military SoS architectures, the focus will be to capture the specific traits that have
general consensus as primary contributors to what is commonly viewed as complex
behavior.
Though there is a large and growing number of ways to measure complexity,
both Kinsner and Lloyd demonstrate that many of these represent variations on a
few underlying themes [101, 109]. This makes it possible to classify many existing
measures into a manageable number of categories. A particularly useful classification
scheme devised by Lloyd points out that in general, researchers frequently ask the
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following three questions to quantify the complexity of an object under study [109]:
1. How hard is it to describe?
2. How hard is it to create?
3. What is its degree of organization?
Many of the measures that seek to address the first question usually do so in terms
of measuring the amount of randomness exhibited by a system. This has led to new
theories in describing the link between information and entropy [147]. Thus, these
measures tend to focus on patterns that signify the amount of disorder or irregulari-
ties exhibited by a system. Within this class of measures, an alternative approach to
measuring entropy advocates that the complexity of an object is also related to the
size of the shortest computer program that could generate a complete description of
the object. This, of course, requires that the object in question can be represented in
the form of messages such as a string of data [123]. One example of such a string could
be a binary sequence of zeros and ones such as 0101010101 or 1100100010. Another
common example is the representation of a DNA sequence where the letters A, C, T,
& G are used to represent nucleotide bases. There is general agreement that these
measures of structural complexity should have the property that there is low mea-
sured complexity for both very ordered, regularly repeating patterns and for random
patterns as well [101], since they each convey very little information. Gell-Mann ac-
complishes this, for instance, by only specifying the information content of the string’s
regular patterns. In this way, a purely random string has no regularities and thus no
effective complexity [82]. In between are patterns of various levels of complexity that
possess both patterns of regularity and randomness. While complexity is related to
the amount of information needed to describe a phenomena, measuring complexity
in this way for engineered systems poses certain difficulties. Chief among them is
that to do so requires a consistent means of representing the physical system itself as
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messages. Even when this is accomplished, the definition of patterns of regularities
and irregularities can be very subjective and difficult to define [123].
Complexity measures geared toward answering the second question attempt to
assess the complexity of an object by measuring how difficult the object is to construct.
Within this class of measures there are varied metrics ranging from time, energy,
dollars, and computational resources. Even the “logical depth” of a system can be
considered, which is a measure of how difficult the object is to construct or reproduce
using the most plausible method of creation [29, 123]. This is at odds with assessing
the complexity of an acquisition during a capabilities-based conceptual design effort,
even if the required functionality is known. To accurately estimate complexity in
this way requires highly detailed information which is usually not available at this
stage of design, especially in the case of newly developing systems and interfaces.
For example, the amount of time, energy, and dollars used to either construct a
military SoS or integrate new components into an existing SoS is heavily dependent
on many dynamic factors. These include the materials, technologies, manufacturing
methods, logistics, and T&E processes to name a few. If this information could be
predicted well in advance, then selecting the best architecture becomes a simple cost-
effectiveness comparison. Ultimately, the system architect is attempting to infer this
aspect of complexity ahead of time from the limited knowledge that is possessed at
the conceptual design phase.
Braha et al. state that “An essential tool for understanding complex systems is
to study the system’s organization, which is often relatively simple. Understanding
the organization of the system can also lead to a better understanding of the system’s
behavior” [36]. Therefore, addressing the third aspect of complexity is more directly
applicable to system architecting. Lloyd points out that measuring the degree of
organization can be separated into two fundamentally important aspects. The first
is the difficulty of describing the organizational structure of the object under study.
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The second focuses on the amount of information shared between the parts of a
system as a result of the organizing structure [109]. This is directly applicable to
SoS, where the added value of SoS capabilities are “derived from the interaction
among components rather than from contributions of the individual components”
[68]. Consequently, the primary goal of the system architect is to determine the
best arrangement of system functionality and resource sharing. Once achieved, this
makes it easier to conduct testing, verification, and maintenance of the system while
ensuring robust functionality in dynamic acquisition and operating environments.
While the specific measures that are catalogued under this third category still tend
to be information-theoretic or entropy based, the general premise proves useful and
provides an important conceptual underpinning on which to develop a framework
applicable to military SoS. Measuring the complexities of the combined interactions
and resource sharing between systems will provide the necessary understanding of the
behavior and performance of the SoS. This is critical to successful SoSSE [69].
5.4 Measurement Criteria
McCabe & Butler, while developing measurements that quantify the architectural
complexity of different software designs, present additional criteria that can be used
to judge the applicability of any proposed measure for quantifying the architectural
complexity of a complex system [119]:
1. The metric intuitively correlates with the difficulty of comprehending a design
i.e., when we view large complicated designs, the metric should yield a high
number. Designs we intuitively deem as simple should have a relatively low
number.
2. The metric is objective and mathematically rigorous. The same design viewed
at two different times or by two people should yield the same complexity.
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3. The metric should be related to the effort to integrate the design. The proposed
metric should correlate directly with the cost and effort experienced in the
integration phase.
4. The metric should help generate an integration test plan early in the life cycle.
If the metric can be computed in the design phase, a set of tests that are derived
from the design can traverse the architecture in a rigorous way.
5. The metric and associated process should be automatable.
These requirements may seem obvious at first glance, however, ensuring that these
criteria are adequately addressed are essential to confirming the utility of the measure
that will be later applied.
5.5 Existing System Complexity Measures
During the course of this research some notable methods of measuring system com-
plexity were encountered. In particular, Summers & Shah provide a valuable survey
of different approaches for measuring complexity in engineering design, evaluating
the applicability of each in terms of measuring the complexity of design problems,
processes, or products [152]. What follows in the ensuing sections is a brief discus-
sion of different measures deemed potentially the most relevant in helping to measure
the complexity of military SoS architectures. Each of the existing system complexity
measures are evaluated according to the criteria put forth by McCabe & Butler. They
are also evaluated against their potential suitably for use in conceptual design.
5.5.1 Abstraction Based Complexity Management
An abstraction based complexity measure developed by Zeidner et al. for managing
complexity in aerospace systems [28, 166, 167] provides many useful features & princi-
ples for measuring system complexity. This method of measuring system complexity
is focused on using parameters that are readily available to the designer to assess
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the complexity of a vehicle resulting from the required interactions of its subsystems.
The abstraction based complexity measure possesses a distinct advantage over the
preliminary method of measuring complexity used by DARPA’s META program, for
instance, where META uses part count and number of source lines of code. This is
because the abstraction based complexity measure seeks to avoid the oversimplifica-
tion of complexity that occurs when only considering the part count of the number
of distinct system components and interconnects that exist within the system. The
rationale for this reasoning is that “it is of course possible to design a system that con-
sists of many interconnects, and yet is not complex” [28]. As a result, the abstraction
based complexity method assigns complexity weighting factors to each node (sub-
system/component) and interconnect during the summation of each. The complete


















- αi = component complexity
- βk = interconnection complexity
- αijk = an interconnected component
- n = level of abstraction
- E(A) = graph energy
The first term in Equation (5) is a weighted sum that not only represents the
number of system components under consideration, but also the inherent complexity
associated with each individual component. Because of this, system architects can
gain a better sense of the important tradeoff that occurs when component reduction is
achieved at the expense of fewer, more complex components [28, 166, 167]. The second
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term captures the number of interconnects/interfaces present as well as the relative
complexity of each interconnect. Inclusion of this second term provides a distinct
advantage over Technomics’ method, which does not make a distinction between the
contribution to complexity of different types of interfaces. Without this distinction, it
is possible that an architecture with very few, but very complex interfaces to support
resource sharing could be rated as being relatively less complex than an architecture
with very many, but very simple interfaces [167].
The final term in Equation (5) contains two distinct quantities that are multi-
plied together (It is not clear what γ represents beyond being an additional weighting
factor). The level of abstraction currently under consideration, denoted as “n”, is
based on the assumption that from the highest to lowest level of abstraction there
are seven layers. This appears to be modeled after the abstraction layers developed
for the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) standard developed by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO). The seven abstraction layers in the OSI Ref-
erence Model define the movement of data over a network. For example, the first
layer in the OSI model is the physical layer which provides mechanical, electrical,
functional, and procedural characteristics to establish, maintain, and release physical
connections between data link entities. In contrast, the seventh and highest layer
is the application layer where direct service is provided through interaction with an
operating system or application [169]. Layering provides a structuring technique so
that the network of open systems can be viewed as logically composed of a succession
of network layers, each wrapping the lower layers and isolating them from the higher
layers [169]. The value of n used in Equation (5) is based on a heuristic decom-
position of typical aerospace vehicles, requiring refinement for other systems under
consideration. The graph energy term, E(A), captures the density of connections in
the system with respect to the total number of possible interconnections [19]. Graph
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theory can be used to render a system in mathematically abstract terms, where col-
lections of vertices are connected or linked together by edges. An adjacency matrix
can be formulated to also describe the patterns of connections between vertices [42].
Figure 33 provides a visual depiction of a generic system made up of nodes A, B,
and C and the corresponding adjacency matrix. Two cases are shown. Case (a) is a
simple undirected graph. Case (b) is a directed graph (or digraph) with a loop. Mixed
graphs include a combination of directed and undirected edges. Also, the adjacency
matrix for a simple, undirected graph is the same as that of a bi-directional digraph
with no loops.
Figure 33: Example Graphs & Adjacency Matrices.
Cares remarks on the usefulness of using eigenvalues derived from a graph’s asso-
ciated adjacency matrix for analysis [42]:
A very rich and formal field of mathematics exists to perform these opera-
tions. One of the most useful operations is the calculation of eigenvalues.
An eigenvalue, usually denoted by the Greek symbol, λ, is a measure of
the value of the network and is derived from the adjacency matrix.
The energy of a graph is defined to be the sum of the absolute values of the
eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix [19]. It is intended to be a measure of the dy-
namic instabilities that can increase as both systems and time scales become more
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interconnected [28]. This same principal is also applied in Technomics’ formulation
of measuring complexity. Together, these three factors (weighted node complexity,
weighted interconnect complexity, and abstraction-weighted connection density) are
summed together to present an overall view of system complexity. An important
technical note to discuss is that when values are assigned to the links and nodes of a
graph, a system with its own logic is created. This system is more properly defined
as a network.
In evaluating the abstraction based complexity measure as a whole, the summation
of these submeasures proves problematic in a sense. Theoretically, one could define
systems with either zero node complexity or zero interconnections between nodes but
that are still rated as complex. For example, a system whose behavior is easy to
predict is one in which the nodes are either lacking in functionality or lacking the
necessary interfaces that allow the passing of information or other resources between
nodes to carry out the intended functionality. Based on this description, it would be
difficult to justify this type of system as being a complex system. Yet the summation
of the submeasures could mathematically lead to such a system being deemed more
complex than one with relatively fewer functioning nodes and interconnects. This
violates the first criterion proposed by McCabe & Butler. In addition, since a linear
combination is used one must pay careful attention to the relative weightings of each
of the three terms in Equation (5) in relation to each other. Failure to do so could
easily result in one term incorrectly dominating the entire complexity calculation.
A final observation is that this measure is more characteristic of a descriptive ap-
proach to measuring complexity. As such, it may be more appropriately used when
there are well-defined subsystems. This is mainly due to the fact that the measure
was developed with the goal of researching existing drivers of complexity in aerospace
systems. As a result, this particular approach assumes that a certain level of tech-
nical detail about the constituent subsystems is available when making comparisons.
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Consequently, adapting this measurement to capability-based conceptual design may
prove difficult in certain cases. This is especially true as the number of novel and
disparate systems that are candidates for incorporation into the SoS architecture
increases.
5.5.2 Object-Process Model Based Complexity Measures
Kinnunen describes various complexity measures for system architecture models [100].
These measures rely on an Object-Process Methodology (OPM) modeling language
designed to model any system as a collection of objects, processes, and states. Dori
describes this relationship as “Objects exist, and processes transform the objects
by generating, consuming, or affecting them. States are used to describe objects,
and are not stand-alone things” [73]. By using the same coding language to represent
system architecture models, the relative complexity of each model can be compared by
assuming that the more difficult the object is to specify or describe, the more complex
the object is. This necessitates deciding upon the level of abstraction of the coding
language, as lower levels of abstraction incorporate more details into the analysis
and result in higher model complexities. Separate system architecture complexity
measures are then applied at a particular level of abstraction. They are based both
on existing complexity measures and on the system architecture models. They include
the following:
1. Number of distinct types of things : The greater the number of types of things
(objects, processes, and state) a model has, the longer the program is needed
to produce the model.
2. Sum of number of things of each distinct type: The more instances there are of
a certain type of thing, the longer the program needed to produce the model.
The length of the program does not depend linearly on the number of instances.
If there is one instance, that instance is counted once. If there are several of the
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same instance, that instance is counted twice. In effect, the program to produce
a model with many instances is twice longer than a program to produce a model
with only one instance.
3. Number of processes affecting an object : The more processes that affect a given
object, the longer the program needed to produce the model. The minimum,
maximum, and average values are calculated. If the minimum is zero, the model
has a dangling object. If the maximum is much higher than the average, the
model may have an uneven distribution of complexity.
4. Number of objects being affected by a process : The more objects a process
affects, the longer the program needed to produce the model. This is very
similar to the previous elementary measure.
5. Number of operands per process : The more operands a process has, the longer
the program needed to produce the model. Again, minimum, maximum, and
average values are calculated, since high average and high maximum values may
indicate an unevenly or highly complex system.
6. Number of interfaces weighted by Interface Complexity Multipliers (ICMs): The
more interfaces the model has, the longer the program needed to produce the
model. ICMs are used to compensate for hidden information due to abstraction.
Regarding these measures, Kinnunen states, “With any real life systems and their
models, the results are very likely to be contradictory. A model is more complex than
another according to one measure, but less complex according to another measure.
For this reason, lumping measures together with any formula is not going to be
meaningful in all situations” [100]. Prioritization of the measures is left to the system
architect. Though this measure as a whole meets the McCabe & Butler criteria, it is
not immediately clear how simply providing a more detailed summation of objects,
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processes, and states provides system architects with additional insight into the more
dynamic aspects of complexity. These dynamic aspects are a result of variations in the
sequence of functional execution and from changes in the patterns of resource sharing
and processing. This information may exist in the OPM models themselves, but are
not quantified in a way from which clear comparisons can be made. The analysis is
made more complicated when comparisons across multiple level of abstractions must
be made, as is done by Kinnunen [100]. Finally, Kinnunen explains that further use
of the methodology requires extending the OPM modeling language, since measuring
the complexity of the system architecture models is quite tedious.
The OPM modeling methodology can be characterized as a measurement that
describes the complexity of engineered systems in terms of how hard it is to describe
or create an object. The methodology does present some useful aspects, however,
one being that this measurement approach lends itself easily to automation. Once
the structure of the model is known, the structural relationships between objects,
processes, and states can be represented by a matrix. Use of the matrix format opens
up the space of graph-theoretic and linear algebra techniques as comparative analysis
tools. This approach also emphasizes the importance of taking into account object
states. In order to fully understand complex system behavior an understanding of
the particular states the system can inhabit and the factors that directly affect the
occurrence of state transitions is necessary.
5.5.3 Suh’s Axiomatic Design
Suh defines complexity as “A measure of the uncertainty in understanding what it
is we want to know or in achieving a functional requirement (FR)”, where a FR is
defined as “a minimum set of independent requirements that completely characterize
the functional needs of the product” [151]. Both COSYMO and CoBRA adhere to
the same principle, as they each attempt to measure complexity by capturing the
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uncertainty that arises due to the number and level of requirements placed on a de-
sign. It was shown previously how the number of system requirements and the level
of requirements understanding are similarly included as size and cost drivers in the
COSYMO parametric cost model. Likewise, CoBRA presents a method of quantifying
complexity based on a historical perspective of the impact of system requirements on
satellite design. As Braha et al. make note of, though, “Suh’s conception of complex-
ity in design as having to do with uncertainty, while potentially useful, is qualitatively
different from the kind of complexity we appear to be confronting in design, which in-
volves interactions and relationships, not just uncertainty” [36]. A particularly useful
concept that arises from Suh’s formulation, however, is the minimization of complex-
ity by reducing the coupling between design parameters (DPs). In this context an
uncoupled design is one in which the FRs are independent in relation to one another
as they map to physical DPs. This mapping is achieved through a design matrix, [A],
that relates FRs to DPs and characterizes the product design. When the set of FRs
and DPs are described in vector form, the following equation results:
{FR} = [A] {DP} (6)
Suh’s Independence Axiom states that when there are two or more FRs, the design
solution must be such that each of the FRs can be satisfied without affecting any of
the other FRs. This means choosing a set of DPs that can satisfy the FRs and
maintain independence. Depending upon the relative numbers of DPs and FRs, a
design can be classified as coupled, redundant, or ideal. When the number of DPs
is less than the number of FRs, the result is always a coupled design. Conversely,
a redundant design is always the case where the number of DPs is greater than the
number of FRs. Finally, an ideal design is an uncoupled design where the number of
DPs is equal to the number of FRs and the FRs are kept independent of each other.









In this case, the Independence Axiom is satisfied and will lead to a less complex









The independence of the FRs can be guaranteed if and only if the DPs are deter-
mined in a proper sequence. Suh refers to this type of design as decoupled. It follows
that as the relationships between FRs becomes more coupled so does complexity. Suh
makes note that the design effort may produce several designs that are acceptable
in terms of the Independence Axiom. Therefore, in addition to the Independence
Axiom, Suh postulates an Information Axiom. The Information Axiom states that
the design with the smallest information content is the best design, since it requires
the least amount of information to achieve the design goals. In this way, a physically
large system is not necessarily complex if the information content is low, but a small
system can be complex if the information content is high. The information content
for a given FR is measured by specifying a probability of achieving the design goals.
Similar to Perrow, Suh specifies time-dependent aspects to complexity in his ax-
iomatic formulation. Since systems must operate within an environmental context,
perceived changes within the operational environment are often communicated as
changes to system requirements. Often this results in the system being forced to
adapt and evolve, or risk becoming obsolete. While the difficulty in achieving a set
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number of functional requirements may be debatable as a sole measure of complex-
ity, undoubtedly an understanding of how requirements relate to each other must be
taken into account when attempting to architect complex systems and guide their
development.
5.6 Architecture Complexity Sub-Measures
The survey of existing system complexity measures yielded the potential benefits and
drawbacks that are characteristic of each. This knowledge can be leveraged to de-
velop an approach for identifying and measuring the chief system properties that can
be readily observed and that describe a military SoS architecture in terms congruent
with the previously developed complex system definition. For example, a fundamental
feature of military SoS architectures is that they are comprised of physically distinct
systems, each performing certain tasks, that combine together to provide a capability
set. A capability is defined as “the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified
standards and conditions through combinations of ways and means to perform a set
of tasks” [46]. Though system level tasks can be further aggregated into higher level
activities, a primary way of distinguishing one military SoS architecture from another
is through the mapping of system level tasks to the physically distinct systems that
make up the SoS. Since the behavior of a SoS is expressed in terms of functionality, or
the ability to meet assigned tasking, it then makes sense to measure the complexity
of the SoS in terms of functionality as well. It is important to note that higher level
activities must be decomposed to an appropriate level of scope so that at least one of
the individual component systems under consideration is capable of completing the
task. As previously discussed, information processing/computation is another impor-
tant aspect of complexity, especially when it involves the parallel or decentralized
computation that can occur from multitudes of networked components [123, 163].
Moreover, the primary reason for applying network-centric principles to military SoS
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is to foster the ability to “share, access, and protect information to a degree that it
can establish and maintain an information advantage over an adversary” [11]. Within
these networks, it is the aggregation of localized interactions that is the dominant,
observable feature that gives rise to complex behavior. Because each system function
within the SoS architecture can be associated with a set of localized information and
service exchanges, it is logical to extend this concept to resource flows in general.
Subsequently, four aspects that contribute to military SoS architecture complexity
and their accompanying sub-measures are the following:
1. System Physical & Functional Boundaries : This aspect captures the organi-
zation and distribution of functionality among systems within the SoS. The
accompanying sub-measure will be referred to as the Functional Distribution
Complexity, or FDC.
2. Functional Process/Task Sequencing : This aspect describes the patterns of
system-to-system interactions dictated by the existing functionality. The ac-
companying sub-measure will be referred to as the Functional Processing Com-
plexity, or FPC.
3. Resource State Characteristics : This aspect characterizes the properties of and
effects from the particular resources being exchanged to ensure functionality is
met. The accompanying sub-measure will be referred to as the Resource State
Complexity, or RSC.
4. System-to-System Interfaces : This aspect delineates the patterns of collabora-
tion and resource sharing that enable cyclic behavior to occur. The accompa-
nying sub-measure will be referred to as the Resource Processing Complexity,
or RPC.
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Defining context appropriate, and thus relevant, complexity sub-measures for each
of these aspects will provide the basis for developing a suitable measure of SoS archi-
tectural complexity. Hence, both contextual nuances specific to an architecture and
the nuances exhibited by different aspects of the notion of complexity itself can be
captured using appropriate metrics, whether they be pre-existing or newly defined.
The following sections will explore each of the four aforementioned aspects in further
detail in order to demonstrate the options available for developing valid military SoS
architecture complexity sub-measures.
5.6.1 Functional Distribution Complexity
SoS architectures can vary in the distribution of functionality among component sys-
tems. Consequently, one architecture may be composed of a number of relatively
simple systems, each with very limited functionality while another architecture may
rely on very few systems, each capable of fulfilling many different tasks. Also, systems
may have overlapping functionality. In the case of the first architectural approach,
where functionality is widely and evenly distributed with little or no overlap or redun-
dancies, fulfilling the performance requirements becomes much easier. The reason for
this is that there is a greater degree of independence in pursuing an optimal solution.
Alternatively, combining multiple functions into a single system raises the possibility
of competing SoS behavioral effects and system design compromises. Perrow provides
an insightful example to describe this condition [136]:
But what if parts, or units, or subsystems (that is, components) serve
multiple functions? For example, a heater might both heat the gas in
tank A and also be used as a heat exchanger to absorb excess heat from a
chemical reactor. If the heater fails, tank A will be too cool for the recom-
bination of gas molecules expected, and at the same time, the chemical
reactor will overheat as the excess heat fails to be absorbed. This is a
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good design for the heater, because it saves energy. But the interactions
are no longer linear. The heater has what engineers call a ‘common-mode’
function—it services two other components, and if it fails, both of those
‘modes’ (heating the tank, cooling the reactor) fail. This begins to get
more complex.
Perrow also notes that “Ironically, in many cases, the complexity is added to
reduce common-mode failures. The addition of redundant components has been the
main line of defense...” [136]. As a result, FDC seeks to capture the complexity
that results from the tradeoff in component reduction when it is achieved at the
expense of fewer, more complex systems [28, 166]. Here, complexity is measured by
the distribution of functionality among the physically & functionally distinct node
types. Figure 34 further illustrates what is meant by functionally & physically distinct
nodes.
Figure 34: Example of Functionally & Physically Distinct Systems with Overlapping
Functionality.
In Figure 34 each circle represents a physically separate system while the letters
A, B, and C represent different functions that must be completed. Though Systems 1
& 2 have overlapping functionality they are still functionally distinct. This is because
System 1 differs from System 2 in the entire set of functions it can fulfill. An additional
system that exactly duplicates the functionality of either System 1 or System 2 would
not meet this criteria and would therefore not be considered in the FDC calculation.
Within an architecture there may be multiple instances of a system type, and in terms
of functionality, functionally equivalent system types are considered equal within a
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functional architecture.
Now that individual functional nodes are properly described and identified, the
next step is to determine a way to quantify FDC, or the contribution to overall
architecture complexity due to the distribution of functionality across nodes. In order
to prove useful, the FDC sub-measure should also capture the added complexities that
arise due to functional integration. More specifically, the FDC sub-measure must
follow the premise that complexity increases when combining multiple functions into
a single node, since at a minimum those functions will be utilizing common resources
such as physical space, power, or computer memory. Lastly, the level of the functional
requirements or the specified tolerances a system must meet in providing the desired
functionality plays an important factor as well. It is assumed that an architecture
that specifies a high level of performance in meeting requirements and that has tight
tolerances will be more complex to create, maintain, and operate [151]. Requirements
can be specified at the level of each function and at the higher SoS-level. Following








- T = number of functionally & physically distinct nodes
- Fi = number of functions performed by the i
th node
- ρ = functional integration exponent
Figure 35 provides an example of alternative functional allocations for a set of
generic functions labeled A-E. For these examples, the following equations demon-
strate how Equation (9) captures the tradeoff in component reduction when it is
achieved at the expense of fewer, more complex systems.
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For ease of comparison, a value of ρ = 2 is arbitrarily chosen for each of the
alternative functional allocations in Equations (10) – (12). For the FDC calculation,
ρ represents the relative difficulty of integrating specific groups of functions into a
single physically & functionally distinct node. The value of ρ should be equal to 1 for
designs where the estimated difficulty of functional integration is low and increase as
functional integration is estimated to create additional nonlinearities, couplings, and
complex interactions. The following are examples of the different approaches that
can be used for determining ρ. In the future, new approaches or techniques may be
developed (possibly including new combinations of existing approaches), expanding
the options available to system architects.
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1. Direct Function-to-Function Comparisons
2. Uncertainty-based Analysis
3. Graph-based Variable Dependency Analysis
4. Historical Database Estimating
5. Matrix-based Correlation Analysis
5.6.1.1 Direct Function-to-Function Comparisons
The first, and perhaps most obvious method of determining ρ, is to perform direct
function-to-function comparisons to analyze the impact on SoS-level behavior result-
ing from nodes with increased multi-functionality. This is similar to Perrow’s tank
and heater example given earlier, and results in a separate ρ for each node. This can
be expressed as ρi, or the functional integration exponent for each i
th node. While
this approach is straightforward, it should be reserved for SoS architectures where the
functional decomposition yields a low number of system-level tasks or functions to
be executed. To conduct a thorough analysis, pairwise comparisons of each function-
to-function relationship for a group of functions must be made. The nature of this
approach creates the potential to quickly make such an endeavor a tedious effort,
especially as the number of functions increases. To illustrate, the number of possi-
ble relationships based on function pairings is nonlinear itself and best expressed by
p = n2 − n, where n is equal to the number of functions. Consider, for example, a
system consisting of only 10 functions. Using the aforementioned formulation, p = 90.
Simply doubling the number of functions to 20 results in p = 380. It is important
to keep in mind that military SoS architectures can easily encompass hundreds of
functions depending upon the desired mix of capabilities. The problem becomes even
more difficult if the exact strength of each function-to-function relationship must be
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adequately assessed, and even more so if the differentiation between the effects of
primary and secondary interactions must be included in the analysis.
5.6.1.2 Uncertainty-Based Analysis
As explained in Section 5.5.3, Suh defines system complexity in terms of the mea-
sured uncertainty in achieving FRs. Suh’s Information Axiom can be adapted for use
in determining ρ, assuming that there is a correlation between information content
and the effort expended for successful functional integration. As more complicated
procedures, policies, resource allocation, and design compromises become necessary
to ensure successful integration, this translates directly to greater information con-
tent. (Here, instead of the term FR, the terms required functionality or functional
requirement will be used to specify requirements for system-level functions and dif-
ferentiate between SoS-level performance requirements, and to avoid confusion with
Suh’s precise meaning and use of the term FR). Using Suh’s formulation, the general
case of determining the information content Ii for Fi number of functions performed





where Pm is the probability of satisfying the functional requirement. Pm is based
on which system will be providing the functionality and the specified levels and tol-
erances imposed on the design. Common choices of the base b for the logarithmic
function are usually 2 (with the unit of bits), 10, or the natural logarithm (with the
units of nats), depending upon the system architect’s preference. The logarithmic
function is commonly used in information-based analyses due to its many unique fea-
tures. In this instance, the logarithmic function is chosen so that the information
content will be additive when there are many functional requirements that must be
102
satisfied simultaneously. When all probabilities are equal to 1.0, the information con-
tent is zero and Ii is zero. Conversely, the information content is infinite when one
or more probabilities are equal to zero. This gives an infinite value for Ii as well. It
should be noted that Equation (13) is a simplified form that assumes independence
between each Pm. To assume otherwise might lead to overestimating the degree of
difficulty due to functional integration, since it is already assumed that multiple func-
tions within a node may cause nonlinear interactions, based on the summation of the
values of Pm within a particular node. With that being said, the following equation
can be used to determine ρ:
ρ = Ii + 1 (14)
In terms of Perrow’s example, if the temperature bands that must be maintained
in the tank and chemical reactor are very wide and well within the functionality
capacity of the heater, then the probabilities of successfully meeting the heating and
cooling requirements will be high. In this case, ρ will approach a low value. On the
other hand, if tight tolerances must be maintained, then the information content will
be high as a result of low probabilities. The resulting large values for ρ will mean
added integration complexity if these functions are made part of the same system.
The main concern with using this method of determining ρ is that it makes pre-
formed assumptions on what types of systems will provide certain functions in order
to calculate the probabilities. System architects must be careful not to eliminate
certain portions of the design space prematurely when using this method, especially
when performing capabilities-based design.
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5.6.1.3 Graph-based Variable Dependency Analysis
From the perspective of design, each function can be mapped to different design
variables. These include independent variables, dependent variables, and design re-
lationships, for example. Independent variables are variables whose values are con-
trolled by the designer. Meanwhile, design relationships are constraints that dictate
the association between other design variables. Lastly, dependent variables are those
whose values are not directly under the control of the designer, but that are derived
from the independent variables, other dependent variables, and design relationships.
Based on these mappings, the connections between variables at multiple levels can
be represented in a graph-based format. An example is provided in Figure 36 where
entities such as design variables are represented by circles and the relationships are
represented by squares.
Figure 36: Example Entity-Relationship Graph: (a) Initial graph and (b) Removed
unary constraint [152].
Summers & Shah provide an approach to measuring the decomposability of a
graph. This is accomplished by removing relationships until the graph is separated
into subgraphs [152]. This is an extension to existing methods noted in their research.
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Removing relationships until the graph is separated into subgraphs demonstrates the
coupling found in the entity-relation subgraph, where a graph that is easily separa-
ble into distinct graphs is not highly connected. An algorithm manipulates the graph
that is being examined in terms of connectivity. First, unary constraints are removed.
These are relations that do not contribute directly to the connectivity complexity of
the graph. The graph connectivity algorithm is then applied recursively against all
resulting subgraphs generated during the process. A cumulative record, or score, is
maintained to quantify the connectedness of the graph. A graph with low connec-
tivity will have a low score. This procedure can be applied for each node, resulting
in the appropriate values of ρi for use in Equation (9). Once the design variables
and relationships are defined, this approach is readily automatable. Overall, the
usefulness of this approach is readily evident, however, system architects engaged in
capabilities-based design must ensure that the chosen design variables and relation-
ships do not prematurely exclude portions of the design space that may later provide
useful alternatives.
5.6.1.4 Historical Database Estimating
Both the CoBRA and COSYSMO cost estimating techniques previously discussed
in Section 3.2 estimate the impact of complexity using historical databases of previ-
ous systems and projects. The complexity index developed in the CoBRA analogy
based estimating technique and the COSYSMO CER developed using various size
and cost drivers each provide a firm basis for developing ρ. Of course, developing ρ
using methods such as these require a historical database that adequately reflects the
problem at hand. For capabilities-based acquisition this may not always be the case,
and system architects must take this into careful consideration.
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5.6.1.5 Matrix-based Requirements Correlation Analysis
The final approach outlined in this section takes a slightly different approach to esti-
mating ρ. This approach is primarily based on the limitations inherent in early phase,
capabilities-based conceptual design. The principal assumption of this approach is
that SoS-level performance requirements can be used in the calculation of FDC, rather
than direct function-to-function comparisons, especially since the number of top-level
SoS performance requirements are usually smaller and more manageable. This as-
sumption is based on the following [65]:
• System functionality exists to support tasks that provide the desired SoS capa-
bility.
• SoS-level performance requirements specify the extent to which the SoS capa-
bility must be achieved.
• Each function should be traceable back to a SoS-level performance requirement
or possibly multiple performance requirements.
• Relationships can exist between performance requirements.
Thus, there is a clearly defined link between system functionality and SoS per-
formance requirements. Based on the strength of these relationships, as the number
of SoS-level performance requirements increases and as the level of performance dic-
tated by these requirements change, the nature of the interactions between functions
will change as well. These relationships can be readily and compactly captured in a
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(15)
The matrix R is the Requirements Correlation Matrix. For an architecture with n
number of performance requirements, R takes the form of a symmetric n× n matrix
and uses either the estimated or measured correlation between requirements, ri,j,
to infer the amount of functional coupling that exists. Again, this is possible since
requirements can be traced back to individual functions. Thus, 0 ≤ ri,j ≤ 1 except
along the diagonals, where ri,j = 1 for i = j. Thus, for independent, unrelated
requirements ri,j = 0 for all i 6= j. For highly correlated requirements, ri,j = 1 for all
i and j. In between are various loosely/tightly coupled matrices. Different options
exist for determining the correlation between requirements. Subject matter expert
opinion can be elicited, or the values can be obtained through (M&S). Since R is a
symmetric square adjacency matrix with nonnegative entries, λ(R) is defined as the
real, positive eigenvalue among the set of eigenvalues that is also the greatest in terms
of absolute value [122]. Use of the matrix format results in the value of λ(R) ranging
from a value of 1 for completely uncoupled requirements (irrespective of the number
of requirements) to a value of n for completely coupled ones. Therefore, λ(R) can
be directly substituted for ρ in the FDC formulation, if desired. Another advantage
to this approach that makes it the preferred method for use in conceptual design
is that the matrix format lends itself easily to automation. Finally, capturing the
information in this format provides an easily traceable way for system architects to
view the impact of changing requirements on architecture complexity.
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5.6.2 Functional Process Complexity
When more than one system within the architecture is capable of carrying out a
system level function, multiple paths are created through which the SoS can provide
the intended capability. While this helps to reduce vulnerabilities and provides the
system architecture with varying levels of flexibility, it also adds to architecture com-
plexity. From an acquisition standpoint, more testing is required to determine and
verify operation of the SoS and understand all the interactions that can occur. Po-
tentially harmful interactions between systems must also be identified and ruled out,
making system-to-system integration for highly complex architectures an important
consideration during acquisition. Consequently, the coordination of these functions
requires a separate accounting. This is captured by the FPC.
Conceptually, the arrangement of operational tasks and activities that must be
executed in an ordered sequence to create a SoS capability is easily comparable in
structure to a computer program. With this in mind, a program control graph similar
to those used in graphically depicting the connections between blocks of code in a
computer program can be adapted for use in describing military SoS architectures.
An example program control graph (G) made up of n nodes (depicted as circles),
e edges (depicted as arrows), and p connected components is shown in Figure 37.
Each node in G is representative of a block of code in the program, “where the flow
is sequential and the arcs correspond to branches taken in the program” [118]. G is
defined in such a way that there are “unique entry and exit nodes, all nodes reachable
from the entry, and the exit reachable from all nodes” [118]. Defining G in this way
means that p = 1 unless G is composed of a hierarchical nest of subroutines.
The dizzying pace of advancements in the IT field over the years has forced soft-
ware architects to quickly confront issues of growing design complexity. Hence, many
techniques for quantifying and limiting software code complexity have been formu-
lated. One of the most well-known measures is Cyclomatic Complexity, developed by
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Figure 37: Example Program Control Graph.
Thomas McCabe in 1976. Cyclomatic Complexity (M) is a graph-theoretic complex-
ity measure used to identify and control the number of paths through a program [118].
It is defined in terms of linearly independent basic paths. The combinations of these
basic paths will generate every possible path through the program. M takes on values
that are ≥ 1. M = 1 when there is only one linearly independent path through G.
The equation for determining M(G), the Cyclomatic Complexity of program control
graph G, is then:
M(G) = e− n+ 2p (16)
When calculating M for a SoS architecture each node now represents a constituent
system that is able to perform the necessary function. The program control graph
subsequently becomes a depiction of the sequential flow of functionality through the
systems that comprise the architecture. Care must be taken when calculating M ,
however, since a military SoS may have more than one entry and exit node, violating
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McCabe’s criterion. In this case, separate subgraphs are formed and must be consid-
ered individually. The M values from each subgraph can then be linearly combined to
achieve the final M . Figure 38 provides example Cyclomatic Complexity calculations
for alternative groupings of military systems performing a range of generic functions
A-F. This example highlights how quickly the number of system-to-system interac-
tions can increase due to slight changes in functional allocation and the number of
systems included in the SoS architecture. In all, McCabe’s Cyclomatic Complexity
measure provides a single integer value that is easy to interpret, allows for direct
comparison between various designs, and is easy to calculate in the conceptual design
phase. Because it highlights the number of linearly independent system-to-system in-
teractions, it also provides system architects with a good foundation to develop plans
to conduct testing and integration to ensure SoS capability can be met satisfactorily.
Figure 38: Example SoS Cyclomatic Complexity Alternatives [71].
An alternative to the path-based approach used to determine Cyclomatic Com-
plexity is to take a modular approach when quantifying FPC. The modular approach
110
also leverages the use of graphs to represent the logical flow of task/functional sequenc-
ing that defines a military SoS capability. Therefore, instead of counting the number
of linear independent paths as a measure of the complexities that arise from potential
variations in system-to-system interactions, an undirected graph can be partitioned
using mathematical techniques. This will reveal different “clusters” of functionality,
or modules, that represent a grouping of related functions that together perform a
single logical task [65]. The undirected graph used in this analysis is based on the
connectivity of different systems derived from the flow of functionality dictated by
the program control graph.
Figure 39: Example of a Partitioned Graph.
Different graph-theoretic options exist for partitioning graphs. For example, the
Fiedler vector (FV) can be used. The FV is defined as the eigenvector associated
with the second-smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of G [21, 78]. Another
useful option for partitioning an undirected graph is to determine the strength of an
undirected graph. The graph strength, σ(G), corresponds to the minimum ratio of
the total strength of edges to the number of additional connected components created
by deleting edges from the graph [89]. The strength of an edge is the nonnegative
weight of the edge. For example, the graph shown in Figure 39, which is partitioned
into 3 parts, has σ(G) = 2. These are just a sampling of the different options
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that graph theory provides. Ultimately, it is the choice of the system architect to
determine the most suitable method to apply. Once the graph is partitioned into
functional modules, McCabe describes an integration complexity measure based on
the hierarchical relationships that exist among modules of a system [119]:
S1 = So − n+ 1 (17)
First, the module design complexity, So, is calculated for each n number of func-
tional modules by eliminating any complexity which does not influence the relation-
ship between design modules. So for a given module depends on the design complexity
of that module and any descendant modules that it must interact with. Then, using
the top-level module, the integration complexity S1 is measured. McCabe’s integra-
tion complexity quantifies a basis set of integration tests, whose number is S1×n, and
S1 is a function of the top module’s design complexity and the number of modules.
5.6.3 Resource State Complexity
The focus of NCW is to foster the capability to “share, access, and protect informa-
tion to a degree that it can establish and maintain an information advantage over an
adversary” [11]. The nascent field of complexity science also recognizes that informa-
tion processing/computation is an important aspect of complexity, especially when it
involves the parallel or decentralized computation that can occur from multitudes of
networked components [123, 163]. Within these networks, it is the aggregation of lo-
calized interactions that is the dominant, observable feature that gives rise to complex
behavior. Because each system function within the SoS architecture can be associated
with a set of localized information and service exchanges, it is logical to extend this
concept to resource flows in general. Consequently, the interfaces that bind together
a complex system are necessary to facilitate the flow of resources that provide unique,
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value-added SoS functions [68]. For purposes of this research, the word interface is
used as a broad term that encompasses any interconnection that enables the flow of
resources between systems. Thus, there are many types of interfaces. Perhaps the
most familiar are those used in computing and communications-electronics systems.
Interfaces can also encompass infrastructure, procedures, and people that allow re-
sources to be exchanged. In a military SoS context, interfaces ensure that the needed
capability can be achieved at the desired level of performance.
An interface possesses two aspects – both a needline and a technical implementa-
tion – that correspond to its logical and physical components. A needline documents
the required or actual exchanges of resources between systems, and is a conduit for
one or more resource exchanges – i.e., it represents a logical bundle of resource flows.
As previously shown in Figure 13, DoDAF depicts needlines in the OV-2 model. An
additional OV-2 of a military Hunter-Killer UAV architecture is also presented in
Figure 40.
Figure 40: OV-2 Depicting Needlines for a Hunter-Killer UAV Architecture [21].
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A needline can be either uni-directional or bi-directional. Needlines are useful
in explaining which systems are involved in a resource exchange (the who) and the
nature of the resources that need to be exchanged (the what). This is independent
of the detailed implementation of the interface (the how), which is better described
by technical considerations and design requirements [64]. Examples of these include
those described in Ref. [100] such as quality, security, and reliability requirements.
Previous observations obtained from the study of Elementary CA revealed that
classifying the complexity of system behavior means understanding the organization
of the underlying patterns and sensitivities that govern these state transitions. Un-
derstanding the patterns can be accomplished at least in part by measuring the λ
parameter and by describing the topology of the resource sharing network. Likewise,
state transition sensitivity can be estimated by specifying µ. Extending these con-
cepts to military SoS architectures means determining the key factors that affect how
resource exchange occurs and its impact on the global state of the complex system.
These factors will be primarily responsible for causing changes to the state and be-
havior of the SoS. In similar fashion to Elementary CA, complex systems such as a
military SoS undergo state transitions. Each type of resource affects the SoS in differ-
ent ways. This occurs as resources are exchanged via interfaces. The communication
of information helps to change the state of the level of knowledge. For instance, a
common operational picture may emerge. The transfer of energy & materials alters
the physical parameters of systems, allowing functionality to be achieved. Examples
include temperature, pressure, and fuel reserves. Lastly, the exchange of labor &
expertise potentially influences both the level of knowledge as well as some physical
parameters in the case of trained technicians. If each node within a complex system
is considered analogous to a site in an Elementary CA, then estimating the sensitivity
of the overall system to changes in resource processing at an individual site within a
local neighborhood requires understanding the number of configuration changes that
114
can occur at a particular site. As resources are being processed locally, a localized
state transition at a site could propagate through to have global effects. Furthering
this analogy to complex systems, a measure of the sensitivity of the overall system to
these local perturbations requires characterizing the resource state space in terms of
the number of significantly different system configurations it will allow.
The following example borrowed from Ref. [40] will help clarify. A computer
network comprised of n number of nodes that is only capable of processing Top Secret
classified information at all points in the network is characteristic of a homogeneous
resource state space. While there are technical challenges to implementing the needed
security protocols to handle classified material, there is little likelihood of interaction
between classified material and unauthorized users within the system boundaries
(providing that the integrity of the system boundary remains intact, of course). Thus,
this system is only configured in one way and localized changes at each computer
terminal will most likely have little effect on the overall state of system security.
Likewise, a computer network only capable of processing Unclassified information can
be characterized as a homogeneous resource state space as well. Figure 41 provides a
visualization of each resource state space.
Figure 41: Example Homogeneous Resource State Spaces.
On the other hand, if the same system must allow access to personnel cleared
for both classified and unclassified data, then the resource state space becomes more
heterogeneous—there is an increased number of possible interactions at the local
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level between unauthorized users and classified data. This research assumes that this
results in added complexity, since additional procedures, protocols, and resources
must be put in place to describe and maintain system operations. Resource exchange
is also affected as filters may be needed to prevent contamination of the unclassified
portion of the network with classified data. Finally, since there is a greater number
of significantly different configurations present, the system is also more sensitive,
especially since changes in security policy at the local level could potentially have an
effect on globally maintaining system security. Figure 42 provides an example of this.
Figure 42: Example Heterogeneous Resource State Space.
Taking this into consideration, it is possible to define a set of Resource State
Specifiers (RSS’s) that characterize the nature of each needline within the resource
state space. This is accomplished by taking a broad, somewhat abstract view of what
different types of resources have in common in terms of affecting state transitions.





Dimensionality is important because the more multidimensional the resource, the
more information can be extracted from it. For example, many joint military op-
erations require the use of Geospatial Intelligence, or GEOINT. The dimensionality
of GEOINT products can range from basic aerial or satellite imagery to information
products that create a common operational picture through the use of multiple and
advanced sensors. This results in multiple types of data and information that can
include operations, planning, and logistics that can be integrated into the GEOINT
product [95]. The study of dynamical systems shows that as a system operates at
multiple different time scales, perturbations and fluctuations may reach a point that
affects returning to an equilibrium state, impacting system stability [155]. Finally,
a resource’s potential speaks to its influence, or probability to affect change. While
this list may not be be exhaustive, the RSC measure that will be developed will be
flexible in accommodating additional RSS’s. Table 2 gives relevant examples of how
to evaluate the different categories of RSS’s for different types of resources.
Once the relevant RSS’s are identified, the next step is to use them in developing
a measure of RSC. Recall that it is the homogeneity vs. heterogeneity of the resource
state that affects the sensitivity and thus complexity of the complex system. For
a military SoS, this translates to identifying and classifying each needline according
to the RSS’s. To save time, redundant or identical needlines need not be included
in the formulation, and the needlines may be grouped into categories deemed most
appropriate by the analyst or system architect. Continuing with the computer net-
work example, two types of needlines are identified and evaluated for the Top Secret
homogeneous resource state space and the heterogeneous resource state space. The
network provides users with both foreign country news & updates as well as domestic
news & updates. Depending on the fidelity of the analysis, binary (0 or 1) values
can be used to specify each RSS for a particular needline, or percentages can be


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































minimum/baseline level for that RSS, but not that it lacks any dimensionality, for in-
stance. Conversely, a value of 1 means that the resource is always significantly more
multidimensional than the baseline level. Percentages can be used to indicate the
amount of variation if more fidelity is desired and if the information is available. Us-
ing frequency as an example, a value of 0.8 means that for a significant portion of time
during operations, the frequency at which the resource is transmitted/received is at
or near the highest rate. A value of 0.5 indicates that on average the frequency varies
approximately equally in a range between the baseline and maximum values. More
than one measure can be used for each RSS, as well. For example, both encryption
and level of security classification could be used to measure differences in potential.
Also, the types of systems that are involved may impact the resource state space and
must be considered too. For example, an older computer on the network with limited
processing may not be able to handle files encoded in certain multimedia formats. In
terms of military SoS, an Intel Satellite may be able to deliver highly multidimen-
sional GEOINT data to those who request it, but a mobile SOF team deployed in the
field may be limited to downloading and viewing data in simpler formats. If this is the
case, separate Resource State Characterization tables could be developed. In order
to provide a simplified analysis, Tables 3 & 4 represent the network requirements set
forth by system architects that each computer network alternative must adhere to.
Table 3: Top Secret Homogeneous Resource State Space Needlines.
Needline Description Dimensionality Frequency Potential
Foreign Country News & Updates 1 1 1
Domestic News & Updates 1 1 1
Table 4: Homogeneous Resource State Space Needlines.
Needline Description Dimensionality Frequency Potential
Foreign Country News & Updates 1 1 0.8
Domestic News & Updates 1 1 0.3
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If the resource state space is comprised of more than one needline, the resource
state space is automatically heterogeneous. If more than one needline exists, the
following equation can be used to obtain the average of the values that comprise the










j=iRSSij if l ≥ 2 (Num. of Needlines ≥ 1)
(18)
For the Top Secret homogeneous resource state space γ = 1. For the heterogeneous
resource state space γ = 0.85 is obtained. Recall that a homogeneous resource state
space occurs if all of the values in Table 12 are either 0 or 1, resulting in averages of
0 and 1, respectively. As the average move closer to 0.5, the character of the resource
state space is less homogeneous and more heterogeneous, with an assumed increase
in complexity. As a result, determining the level of homogeneity/heterogeneity of the
resource state space can be accomplished in a straight–forward manner by applying
Shannon’s measure of information entropy in the case of two possibilities with prob-
abilities p and (1− p [147]. The use of Shannon’s entropy is found in many studies of
complexity, including the study of Elementary CA’s [82, 104, 107], and proves espe-
cially useful in this context. In a sense, what we are trying to measure is the entropy
of the resource state space, or the global effects on the macrostate of the complex
system due to the distribution of the microstates of individual nodes engaging in
resource sharing and processing with their neighbors. The plot of Shannon’s infor-
mation entropy for this particular case is given in Figure 43. The plot is generated




p(xi)logbp(xi); {xi : i = 1,. . . ,n} (19)
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Figure 43: Entropy In the Case of Two Possibilities With Probabilities p and (1−p)
[147].
Since b = 2 is used as the logarithmic base to produce Figure 43, the resulting
H(p) is measured in bits. So if γ is substituted for p, H(γ) = 0 for the Top Secret ho-
mogeneous resource state space. In similar fashion, H(γ) = 0.6 for the heterogeneous
resource state space. The remaining step is to combine the H(γ) value obtained
for each resource state space with the networked effects of uni-directional and bi-
directional resource sharing. Networked effects are important because the network
structure creates feed-forward and feedback linkages [42]. The same principle is used
in the abstraction based complexity measure, but instead of measuring the number
of cycles, graph energy is calculated instead.
As a reminder, the RSC sub-measure is meant to capture the sensitivity of the
overall system to local perturbations as resources are being exchanged. Hence, the
more homogeneous the resource state space and the less connected each node, the
less likely local perturbations will develop and spread in a manner quickly enough
to significantly disrupt system behavior. This should result in a low RSC score.
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Extending this logic, it follows that a high RSC score will be indicative of a resource
network with high connectivity and a heterogeneous resource state space. Graph
theory provides a way to model the resource network in matrix form, allowing the use
of spectral analysis to study the properties of the graph. There are numerous measures
associated with spectral graph theory and many researchers have conducted extensive
studies. Within the problem domain of military M&S, both Cares and Balestrini-
Robinson provide excellent reviews of the usefulness of many of the existing measures
in analyzing the fundamental properties of military networks [21, 42]. In general,
the measures can be divided into those that help characterize vertex centrality and
those that represent more global network properties. Centrality is the measure of the
importance of a specific vertex (node) within a graph relative to other vertices. For the
purposes of calculating RSC, more attention will be paid to measures that characterize
the connectivity of the network on a more global scale, since we are interested more in
how fast and far localized perturbations can spread to cause system-wide disruptions.
There are numerous measures that exist, but this research will focus on a few primary
ones. The following is an abbreviated list to highlight the options available to system
architects [19, 21, 28, 42, 122]:
• Link/Node Ratio: Compares the link densities of different networks.
• Perron-Frobenius Eigenvalue (PFE): PFE is simply the largest, non-negative
eigenvalue that exists for an adjacency matrix, where the adjacency matrix is
assumed to be a sparse non-negative matrix.
• Coefficient of Networked Effects (CNE): CNE estimates the networked effects
per node. CNE is the PFE normalized for network size by dividing the PFE
by the number of nodes. CNE focuses on the creation of sub-networks, where a
sub-network defines the patterns of localized interaction and collaboration that
occur when the resource flow between nodes describe a path that revisits at least
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one node once. If there are no cycles in a network, then no useful networked
function is completed [42]. If the resource flow is incomplete and the required
sub-networks do not exist, a zero value is obtained. As additional nodes are
added that increase the number of sub-networks, the measured value increases
as well.
• Characteristic Path Length (CPL): The median of the average distance from
each node to every other node in a network. A short CPL means that resources
can proliferate through the network without passing through a high number of
nodes. For a network comprised of n vertices or nodes, CPL is calculated as
log(n). Path horizon, which is a measure of how many nodes, on average, a
node must interact with for self-synchronization to occur is listed as a separate
measure but is also calculated as log(n).
• Clustering : A measure of the local cohesion in a network. The clustering coeffi-
cient is the ratio of the number of actual links between neighbors to the number
of possible links between neighbors. Highly clustered networks tend to have
pockets of connectivity, which can increase the connectivity and redundancy of
the entire network.
• Graph Energy : Graph energy is defined to be the sum of the absolute values of
the eigenvalues of the associated adjacency matrix. Graph energy represents the
density of connections in the system with respect to the total number of possible
interconnections. It is intended to be a measure of the dynamic instabilities that
can increase as both systems and time scales become more interconnected.
• Algebraic Connectivity : The eigenvector associated with the first non-trivial
eigenvalue, or the second-smallest eigenvalue, of the Laplacian matrix is com-
monly referred to as the Fiedler vector. The Laplacian matrix is constructed
using the adjacency matrix and a matrix of vertex degrees. The degree of a
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vertex is a count of the number of edges incident to that vertex. The associated
eigenvalue is commonly referred to as the algebraic connectivity. The algebraic
connectivity is greater than zero if and only if the graph is connected. The
algebraic connectivity increases as the graph grows in connectivity. Algebraic
connectivity provides a measure of the synchronizability of the network and is
closely related to the CPL.
Use of these measures is analogous to determining the neighborhood size in the
case of CA’s, since the more cycles on average a node takes part in, the more likely that
localized instabilities can propagate through the network. The use of eigenvalue-based
measures such as the PFE, CNE, and Graph Energy requires defining an adjacency
matrix for each alternative, taking into account the directionality of the needlines.
This adjacency matrix is now defined as the RS matrix.
RS =

0 rs1,2 . . . rs1,n





rs1,n . . . 0

(20)
RS takes the form of a symmetric n × n matrix with main diagonal entries =
0. To determine algebraic connectivity, the Laplacian matrix must be constructed
instead. The normalized Laplacian matrix, L = (li,j)n×n, for a directed graph with n
vertices can be determined using:
li,j =

1 if i = j
− 1√
deg(vi)deg(vj)




where either indegrees or outdegrees from each vertex can be used, depending on
the application. Figure 44 shows the difference between the adjacency and Laplacian
matrices for a simple network. Table 5 summarizes the results from analyzing the
simple network in Figure 44 using the aforementioned network measures. Also, scores
are calculated in the case where the edge/link between vertices B & C is removed,
resulting in an acyclic network.
Figure 44: Example Adjacency and Laplacian Matrices For a Simple Network.
Table 5: Summary of Network Measures For a Simple Network.
Network Measure Cyclic Score Acyclic Score





Graph Energy 2 0
Alg. Connectivity 1 0.38
Analysis of Table 5 shows that the network measures that are not eigenvalue-
based will yield non-zero values for an acyclic network, complicating their inclusion
into the RSC sub-measure. These measures include the Link/Node Ratio, CPL, and
the Clustering Coefficient. Even though the Algebraic Connectivity is eigenvalue-
based, vertex degree is also used in the construction of the Laplacian matrix. PFE,
CNE, and Graph Energy prove to be useful measures, since they yield zero values
for acyclic graphs and are able to capture the formation of sub-networks. As an
example, Figure 45 shows 3 different variations of a combat cycle consisting of a
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sensor (S) that detects a target, a C2 node (C2) that makes a decision to engage the
target, an engagement node (E) that engages the target, and the target node (T) [17].
For each combat cycle, the PFE of the corresponding adjacency matrix is calculated.
Figure 45: Measuring Networked Effects for Combat Networks.
The next step is to include the network connectivity score into the RSC sub-
measure. Though Graph Energy can be used as well to yield similar results, CNE is
the preferred method since it provides a direct accounting of the networked effects per
node, and will be used in the following demonstration. Thus, the absolute maximum
positive eigenvalue of RS, or λ(RS) = PFE, can be divided by the total number of
nodes (N = n) to obtain the CNE. Note that N depends on the force structure in
place. Consequently, it is representative of the the total number of systems taking
part in resource exchanges, since multiple instances of the same system type may be
present. Since the diagonals of the RS matrix are defined as zero entries, a modified
form of the CNE can also be used, if desired, where the PFE is divided by N = n− 1
nodes. This way, a value of 1 can be obtained for a fully connected, fully bi-directional
resource network. Now, RSC can be calculated using the following:










0 if CNE = 0
CNE if H(γ) = 0 & CNE > 0
(23)
This formulation yields 0 ≥ RSC ≤ 2. Combining terms in Equation (22) yields
an alternate form of the equation:
RSC = µλ(RS) (24)
In Equation (24), µ is defined as the Resource State Multiplier (RSM). For an
acyclic resource network, RSC is zero since λ(RS) = 0. This can be seen in Figure 46 for
the computer network example problem. If the resource state space is homogeneous
the contribution to architecture complexity due to network sensitivity is limited to the
CNE, or connectivity per node. A cyclic resource network for the computer network
example is shown in Figure 47. Table 6 shows the resulting RSC values for the different
combinations of resource state spaces and resource networks for the computer network
example. The fully connected computer network with the heterogeneous resource
state space is evaluated as the most complex in terms of RSC, while the acyclic
computer network is always zero complexity.
Table 6: Computer Network Example Resource State Complexities.






Figure 46: Acyclic Computer Network Example.
Figure 47: Cyclic Computer Network Example.
5.6.4 Resource Processing Complexity
While RSC captures important qualities of the needlines that make up the resource
state space, it does not address the effects that the quantity or volume of resources
plays in defining the complexity of the system. The study of elementary CA’s shows
that both the amount of information that is being exchanged among nodes within
the system and the patterns of collaboration play a critical role in the dynamics of
interconnected systems. Extending this logic to resource flows, RPC seeks to capture
these aspects for military SoS. For example, the amount of resources exchanged be-
tween military SoS can vary based on such factors as the scope of the mission to be
carried out, the level of performance required, or the available infrastructure. Dif-
ferent options exist for measuring resource quantity, depending upon the amount of
information available to the system architect. Since there is usually limited knowl-
edge during the conceptual design phase, for military SoS, a useful way of determining
this is to specify the required level of collaboration between systems by stipulating
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interoperability. Interoperability is defined as [94]:
1) The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.
2) The condition achieved among communications-electronics equipment when in-
formation or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them
and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when re-
ferring to specific cases.
For military SoS, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) specifies Stan-
dardization Agreements, or STANAGs, to help member countries define interoper-
ability for a wide range of equipment and procedures. NATO STANAG 4586, for
example, provides a five-level interoperability scale for the X-47B unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) currently in development. This scale is provided in Table 7, which also
shows how the concept can be generalized in order to make it more broadly applicable
during the conceptual design phase. The interoperability levels (IOLs) put forth in
Table 7 describe a hierarchy of interoperability. For instance, specifying an IOL of 3
between a pair of systems indicates that the resource exchanges might also include
those that occur at IOL 1 & 2 as well. At this point, a subtle distinction should be
made. Care should be taken to avoid confusion between performing an operational
function from providing services in order to interoperate. For example, if System A
is only tasked with deploying or retrieving another system with which it has no inter-
faces to enable coordination, control, or monitoring between the two, then System A
is merely executing a function. System A is not operating in synergistic collaboration
with that system.
Table 7 can be used to develop a weighted network graph to specify the inter-
operability relationships between systems. The associated adjacency matrix is the
resource processing matrix, or RP . RP possesses similar attributes to the RS ma-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































relationship that exists between a pair of systems. Similar to the RS matrix, the RP
matrix can be evaluated using spectral graph measures such as eigenvalue analysis.
Because RP is a symmetric matrix, the algebraic connectivity can be used as well. In
general, the greater the number of systems that collaborate at high interoperability
levels, the higher the RPC score should be. There are some architectural tradeoffs
that exist between a small number of systems with high levels of interoperability vs.
a large number of systems with low interoperability. The RPC sub-measure should
reflect this. The IOLs for a group of systems can be used directly in creating the
RP matrix, or normalized values can be used. Figure 48 provides an example RPC
calculation for two different system groupings using eigenvalue analysis, where the
λ(RP ) value obtained from the PFE of the RP adjacency matrix is used directly for
determining RPC. There is really no strong preference in choosing an eigenvalue-
based analysis method in this case. The available methods that are presented are all
simple to calculate and will yield similar results. The partial exception is algebraic
connectivity, which requires slightly more computation to determine the Laplacian
matrix. The PFE may be preferred by some simply because both CNE and Graph
Energy require an additional calculation once the eigenvector is obtained.
Figure 48: Example RPC Calculations.
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IOLs between systems can change as mission requirements or operating environ-
ments change. This can force an increase in interoperability between systems that
usually work together or emphasize the benefits of including optional exchanges. An
optional exchange is defined as establishing a needline between systems that are not
strictly required to interoperate from a functional standpoint, but their collabora-
tion is expected to enhance SoS performance. Force structure represents the exact
number of each system type (for example, the number of F/A-18’s) that is avail-
able to participate in resource exchanges. In effect, for RPC numbers count. One
item that is important to note is that the architect should only consider resource
exchanges that take place within the operational timeline of providing the capability.
Exchanges involving items that are logistic in nature typically operate on different
time scales and should not be included in the interoperability assessment of the op-
erational architecture. As a reminder, needlines do not represent the actual physical
implementation of interfaces. This is especially important to remember when an IOL
of 1 is specified, since in reality the resource exchange between the systems will take
an indirect physical path. Determining the specific technical implementation of each
interface is an exercise best left for a later, more detailed stage of design after the
appropriate architecture has been selected. Figure 49 provides a visual example of
how RPC translates to managing a variety of complex interfaces to facilitate resource
exchanges for a particular architecture.
It is generally assumed that greater interoperability leads to increased collabora-
tion, yielding positive effects such as improving the degree of shared awareness and
force multiplication [12, 44, 68]. However, the opportunity to collaborate can also
lead to negative effects as network connectivity increases and more resources are ex-
changed. Ref. [137] stresses that the most observable effect occurs as instances of
information overload. This effect can be mitigated by enhancing network discipline,
allowing enough processing time between different resource exchanges, or altogether
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Figure 49: Example Network Interfaces For an Aircraft Carrier-Based UAV Archi-
tecture [49].
ignoring information or service demands that are deemed unimportant at the time.
However, the fact that these measures must be put in place serves to emphasize the
point that the patterns of interaction are influenced. Use of the RPC allows the
system architect to evaluate the benefits derived from increased interoperability and
force structure against the cost of complexity that will be incurred.
5.7 Defining the Measurement Framework
Figure 50 is a matrix of alternatives that summarizes the options available to system
architects in developing the 4 relevant sub-measures to fully describe architecture
complexity for a military SoS. The preferred methods for defining each sub-measure
are highlighted in the figure. Now that methods exist for determining FDC, FPC,
RSC, and RPC, the next step is to determine if the sub-measures can be combined
into an overall measure of architecture complexity. The framework used to com-
bine the sub-measures should not be chosen arbitrarily, especially since this affects
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the mathematical rigor and hence, the usefulness of the overall complexity measure.
Two relevant theories, measurement theory and utility theory provide the necessary
fundamentals to accomplish this.
5.7.1 Measurement Theory
The word measure has been used throughout this thesis. On the surface, the act
of measuring appears to be a rather simple concept that is a fundamental aspect of
physical existence. Yet the development of the theories and procedures surrounding
measurement are rich with well-elaborated and differentiated methods and techniques
that have taken centuries to acquire [30]. In formulating an architecture complexity
measure, it will prove worthwhile to pause a minute and reflect on the insights, precise
definitions, and concepts that comprise measurement theory. It is also necessary to
reflect on exactly what desirable attributes the type of measure that is attempted in
this research should possess in its application to architecture complexity.
The function of measurement, as described by Churchman & Ratoosh, is in “es-
tablishing metrical order among different manifestations of particular properties, and
of making scientific events amenable to mathematical description” [48]. Measure-
ment is often used to establish or clarify the relation between two different proper-
ties. Perhaps the most poignant description of the role measurement plays in science
and engineering is to “connect two parts of theoretical knowledge, the mathematical
and the conceptual, imparting relevance to the one and precision to the other” [48].
Therefore, the fundamental constituents of measurement as it applies to this research
are the object on which a certain operation will be performed and the observable
properties of the system whose “value” will be determined by this operation [30].
While there is scientific debate regarding the best classification scheme of different
measurement scales, there are four widely recognized classifications of scale types.






















































logarithmic interval scale, is widely recognized as well, but less popular than the
linear interval scale. The logarithmic interval scale belongs to the exponential or
power group. The mathematical description for this scale is x′ = kxn where the
constants k and n are positive. In general, the unique properties of each scale make
them suitable for certain operations and not for others. For example, taking ratios
between numbers on the interval scale are not meaningful. However, if one is left with
equal, but unknown ratios the logarithmic interval scale can be used [48]. Also, some
statistical operations are allowed with some scale types but not with others. The only
permissible measure of location for a nominal scale is the mode, whereas nearly all
statistics are applicable to measurements made on ratio scales, including the mean,
median, mode, standard deviation, correlation, regression, and analysis of variance.
This makes the ratio scale the most informative of the four. This is the fundamental
reason why most measurement in the physical sciences and engineering utilize ratio
scales [30, 48].
Since the aim of this research is to develop a complexity measure that quantifies
how much more or less complex an alternative is relative to another one, this makes
both the nominal and ordinal scales poor candidates. Intuitively, negative complexity
scores are not desired either, further eliminating the interval scale. Therefore, the
framework that will be developed will make use of the ratio scale. This requires
specifying a non-arbitrary origin or zero point that has some meaning and significance
in the context of military SoS architecture complexity.
5.7.2 Multiattribute Utility Functions
Utility is the assigning of a real number to a set of options such that a comparison
of the real numbers will reveal the decision maker’s set of preferences [92]. As seen
with measurement scales, the principles of ordinality and cardinality apply to utilities
as well. The use of utility curves/functions is a common methodology used in the
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Table 8: Classification of Scales of Measurement.
Scale Basic Empirical Operations Examples
Nominal: Determination of equality Assignment of labels:
Permutation e.g., “Numbering” of football
Group players, Categories of rocks
x′ = f(x) (igneous, sedimentary, and
1-to-1 subst. metamorphic)
Ordinal: Determination of greater Rank Order:
Isotonic or less 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.,




Interval: Determination of the Arbitrary zero point,
Linear equality of intervals negative values allowed:
Group: or of differences Temperature (Fahrenheit or
x′ = αx+ b Celsius), Position, Time
α > 0 (calendar), Energy (potential)
Ratio: Determination of the Possesses a natural origin/
Similarity equality of ratios zero point:
Group: Length, density, work,
x′ = cx Temperature (Rankine or
c > 0 Kelvin)
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DoD and industry to perform tradeoff analysis. In the DoD it is widely used for cost-
effectiveness analysis and proposal evaluation [65]. Utility curves can capture different
relationships. For example, the relative utility of an attribute or decision factor can be
represented as a constant value relationship (straight line), increasing value (concave
curve), decreasing value (convex curve), or a stepped value. In addition, thresholds
can also be applied. Figure 51 provides an example and highlights the difference
between a step function and a continuous relationship.
Figure 51: Continuous & Step Function Utility Curve Examples [65].
The use of utility theory can yield many benefits if used properly, and Hazelrigg is
a proponent of using utility theory to develop properly formulated objective functions
in the engineering design process [92]. The insights provided by utility theory can be
leveraged to combine the individual sub-measures properly into an overall measure of
architecture complexity. In particular, there are three relevant transformations that
may be applied. They are the linear additive utility, multiplicative utility, and log-
linear utility. The linearly additive utility function is a weighted sum approach. It is
a conceptually simple and easy to use approach that is often employed. While this
approach may be the most commonly used, according to Hazelrigg, it may also be the
most misused. The use of the linear additive utility form would yield the following
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form for measured architecture complexity:
Cα = w1FDC + w2FPC + w3RSC + w4RPC (25)
where w1–w4 are weighting factors. For this specific application, the weights are
necessary in order to counteract the effect of the magnitude of a single measure(s)
overshadowing others and driving the combined score, which is often a concern when
using linear combinations. Moreover, there is another equally important drawback
that arises in using this formulation. It is readily observable that non-zero archi-
tecture complexity scores could be obtained even when the criteria established by
the definition of a complex system are not met. For example, a system with nodes
performing functions independently while there is no resource sharing or processing
between them would have RSC and RPC scores of zero, but the FDC and FPC scores
would not be affected. Thus, Cα would be equal to the weighted sums of FDC and
FPC. This does not satisfy our preferences, especially since we wish to specify an ori-
gin according to the ratio measurement scale. If multiplication of the sub-measures
is carried out instead, the architecture complexity score takes the following form:
Cα = cp × (FDC × FPC ×RSC ×RPC) (26)
where cp is an arbitrary positive constant. As Hazelrigg notes, setting cp = 1 is
perfectly acceptable. There are many benefits to using this form. First, the weight-
ing problems inherent in linear combinations can be avoided. Since the distributive
property holds for multiplication, individual sub-measures can be scaled using multi-
plier constants if desired without affecting the rank order, as long as consistency of
the scaling factors is maintained when comparing different alternatives. Also, when
making comparisons, a baseline score can be selected and all scores can be referenced
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by division to the baseline. Furthermore, Cα = 0 for a single system in isolation and
when an acyclic resource sharing network exists, or when there is zero interoperabil-
ity between all systems i.e., both RSC & RPC are zero. Based on the established
definition for a complex system, this more closely matches expectations for complex
systems/SoS at the origin, helping meet the criteria for a ratio measurement scale.
Since Hazelrigg proves the equivalence of the log-linear, multiplicative, and linear ad-
ditive forms given the proper choice of utility function, multiplicative utility proves a
satisfactory form on which to base the final formulation of the architecture complexity
framework [92]. If later desired, a proper utility function can be chosen such that the
log-linear form can be used as well.
Hazelrigg states that a common mistake made by engineers is that the attributes
themselves are typically used in the utility formulations, rather than converting the
attribute to a utility. Failure to do this might result in the utility function being
valid only in a small region, making them invalid when there are large changes in
the attributes [92]. This prompts the re-evaluation of each of the sub-measures to
ensure they adequately reflect intended preferences, especially since each sub-measure
will be multiplied by each other. The FDC, RSC, and RPC, for instance, all seem
to satisfactorily transform the system attributes they are intended to measure. The
FPC however, requires additional consideration, especially where Cyclomatic Com-
plexity (M) is concerned. First, practically, a SoS architecture with M = 2, or two
linearly independent functional paths, is not necessarily twice as complex than a SoS
architecture with M = 1. It just means there is one extra set of system-to-system
interactions to evaluate. Secondly, the level of functional redundancy can be quite
large, especially for a SoS comprised of tens of constituent systems. This could lead
to very large Cyclomatic Complexity scores that is not necessarily representative of
the true level of complexity. So in this instance, a transformation should be applied
so that increasing Cyclomatic Complexity more closely reflects desired preferences
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and intuitive notions. Since the Cyclomatic Complexity scores can encompass a wide
range of values starting at 1, a logarithmic transform makes the most sense. Log-
linear scaling can be used to perform the scaling, so that FPC = 1 + logM . For
architectures with M = 1, the FPC yields a value of 1.0. For architectures that have
a Cyclomatic Complexity of 2 and 4, FPC is 1.3 and 1.6, respectively. It is not until
M = 10 that the FPC will score will reach a value of 2 and cause a doubling of Cα,
with all else being equal. The following equation provides an example application of






× (1 + logM)× µλ(RS) × λ(RP ) (27)
Figure 52 is an example of the lowest scoring feasible architecture that results
from the use of Equation (27). Figure 53 shows the possible difference in scoring that
can be obtained when a highly networked architecture with high functionality and a
heterogeneous resource state space is evaluated.
Figure 52: Example Architecture Complexity Score Obtained for the Lowest Scoring
Feasible Architecture.
5.7.3 Sub-measure Independence
To make proper use of the multiattribute function it is important to prove the in-
dependence of the submeasures [92]. There is a natural division between the four
measures, since two of them focus on measuring attributes of the system related to
the organization of functionality within the architecture while the other two focus
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Figure 53: Example Architecture Complexity Score Obtained for a Highly Net-
worked/Heterogeneous Resource State Space Architecture.
on patterns and characteristics of resource sharing that arise from needlines. It can
be shown that FDC and FPC are independent of each other, for instance, using the
following simple examples shown in Figures 54 & 55 for generic functions A-F. Fig-
ure 54 shows how FPC can remain the same even if the system’s physical/functional
boundaries shift. In this example, FDC will change as System 1’s boundaries shift
to include function D, resulting in functional overlap. If Cyclomatic Complexity is
used to measure FPC, then the number of linear independent paths based on function
sequencing is one in both cases. A modular approach to measuring FPC should yield
the same results if the proper partitioning is conducted. Figure 55 gives an exam-
ple of FDC of FDC remaining constant while FPC changes. Changes to FPC can
occur in two cases. The first case is when bypassing of functions becomes allowable.
This is the middle case in Figure 55 where the allowable bypassing of functions B-E
means that another linearly independent path opens up between Systems 1 & 3. The
second case involves trading functionality between systems, where in the bottom di-
agram Systems 1 & 3 trade performing functions B and F. If the difficulty associated
with integrating these new sets of functions remains the same, then FDC remains
unchanged as well.
The independence between RSC and RPC is based on the previously presented
study of Elementary CA, where an independent phase parameter was developed to
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Figure 54: Example Showing Functional Processing Complexity Remaining Un-
changed With a Change in Functional Distribution Complexity.
Figure 55: Example Showing Functional Distribution Complexity Remaining Un-
changed With a Change in Functional Processing Complexity.
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aid in the classification of different rules states. Thus, RPC focuses on measuring
the level of interoperability between systems included within the architecture as a
way of capturing the amount of resources required that must be processed by the
architecture. RSC then serves to mimic the role of the independent phase parameter
found in Elementary CA analysis, seeking to capture the sensitivity of the overall
SoS architecture to small, localized perturbations. In this way, architectures with
the same interoperability can be differentiated from each other based on the added
complexity that can result as nonlinearities are introduced. These nonlinearities are
due primarily to the characteristics of the resources that each alternative architecture
is designed to process and the level of connectivity exhibited by the resource sharing
network.
5.7.4 Architecture Complexity Measurement Framework
Now that the relevant complex system attributes, proper measurement scale, and
most appropriate multiattribute function have been chosen, the measurement frame-
work can be fully described. Equation (28) formally presents the resulting framework:
Cα = [FDC × FPC]F × [RSC ×RPC]R (28)
The framework presented in Equation (28) combines the fundamental aspects of
complexity in such a way that should prove useful to system architects in identifying
and communicating the relevant sources of complexity. Cα can be separated into
two principal domains. The first domain, denoted by F , represents the functional
domain. F is primarily focused on the identification, organization, and allocation
of the necessary tasks and activities that must be accomplished as well as the re-
quirements that detail the extent to which functions must be executed. The second
domain, labeled R, represents the resource domain. Within R the primary concern
is with the movement, sharing, and decentralized processing of resources. Resource
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exchanges are comprised of the transfer of useful information, energy & materials,
and even skills & labor [11, 64]. The two domains are linked in that each system
function typically requires some input of resources. Once a function is executed, any
resulting resource that is output may be transferred to other systems in carrying out
their functions.
In general, any means of quantifying complexity should meet the measurement
criteria as put forth by McCabe & Butler [119]. It can be shown that the developed
framework meets the McCabe & Butler criteria, and thus will prove useful to decision
makers for comparing the architecture complexity of various alternatives. Based on
the results presented in Figures 52 and 53, the framework can be used to develop
a measure of architecture complexity that intuitively correlates with the difficulty
of comprehending a design. Seemingly large, complicated design yield high Calpha
scores while simple designs are low scoring. By focusing on defining and using ob-
servable properties of complex systems, objectivity and mathematical rigor have been
achieved. The third criterion is related to the effort to integrate the design. Inclusion
of McCabe’s Cyclomatic and design/integration complexity measures help capture
the system-to-system interactions that provide end-to-end functionality. Also, the re-
source domain measures are useful in giving an indication of the complexities inherent
in resource sharing and collaboration. Next, by taking an organizational approach
to measuring complexity, the measurement framework lends itself readily for use in
the conceptual design phase where there is often limited information. The ability to
compute architecture complexity scores early in the acquisition cycle means that the
measurement framework can be used to help generate an integration test plan early in
the life cycle. Lastly, use of graph theory and associated analyses where appropriate
serves to make the calculation of Cα easily automatable. This is especially important




Acquiring weapons systems typically requires the allocation of large amounts of re-
sources to projects that develop a warfighting capability over a period of many years.
For example, the GAO’s ninth annual assessment of DoD weapons systems acquisi-
tions showed that the fiscal year 2010 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs
consisted of 98 programs totaling $1.68 trillion (FY2011) [87]. This makes strategic
planning in order to determine the best allocation of resources an important factor
[139]. A key element of a strategic plan is that it focuses resources on critical ele-
ments needed to meet the strategic objectives of an organization [148]. Also, a fluid,
dynamic acquisition environment demands the strategic plan be flexible and adaptive
to changing conditions.
The development of an architecture complexity measure suitable for military SoS
means that now, architecture complexity becomes the primary currency of acquiring
weapons systems, rather than relying on monetary cost estimates that have histor-
ically been proven inaccurate during the initial stages of design. Due to the time
value of money, monetary costs usually must be discounted when making economic
comparisons. Likewise, complexity costs must discounted as well. This discounting
should be based on the procedures and processes in place to manage complexity.
For instance, the most experienced personnel may be assigned to a highly complex
project, schedules may be padded with additional slack time to cover unforeseen con-
tingencies, or additional oversight may be instituted to maintain tight control over
the planned interfaces between systems. A useful valuation framework must be able
to take this into account while including uncertainty in the analysis.
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6.1 Overview of Financial Valuation Methods
The fields of economics and finance have developed many methods for comparing the
economic effectiveness of investment alternatives and opportunities. In the world of
business, especially in a capitalistic market structure, studying the economic worth
and desirability of an individual project or a portfolio of investments is central to
developing a resource allocation strategy. Thus, various standard measures of eco-
nomic effectiveness have been developed. They are Present Worth, Annual Worth,
Future Worth, and Rate of Return (ROR). A brief summary of each is provided below
[41, 106]:
• Present Worth: Involves the conversion of each individual cash flow to its
present worth equivalent and the summation of the individual present worths
to obtain net present worth.
• Annual Worth: Determined by converting all cash flows to an equivalent uniform
annual series of cash flows.
• Future Worth: Obtained by converting each individual cash flow to its future
worth equivalent and determining the net future worth for the project.
• Rate of Return: Among the many definitions of rate of return, the most popular
definition is the interest rate that yields a net present worth of zero; such an
ROR is referred to as the Internal Rate of Return (IRR).
The discounting of cash flows to account for the time value of money is a funda-
mental aspect of financial decision making. The mechanism used to express the time
value of money is the interest rate, also called the discount rate and occasionally the
opportunity cost rate [41]. Use of the interest rate can be seen in Equation 29. This










• i = effective interest rate per period
• N = number of compounding periods
• Ft = future sum of money at time t
Equation (29) relates present and future sums of a time-series cash flow, where
cash is either received or expended in some repeating time interval (usually annually).
When determining IRR, the most common method of calculation of the IRR for a
single project involves finding the interest rate at which the present worth of the cash
inflow equals the present worth of the cash outflow. Also, the IRR method involves
comparison against a minimum attractive rate of return [41]. In terms of NPV, a
project or investment is deemed worthwhile if a NPV of zero or greater is achieved.
NPV/DCF assumes separate cash flows that are defined in advance [112, 58, 134].
Unfortunately, the main drawback of NPV is that it does not naturally account for
the variance on the cash flow returns. Capturing this type of uncertainty is essential
to decision making and must be explicitly included in the proposed valuation frame-
work to obtain a proper determination of value. As this type of analysis relates to
engineering design, in particular, Peoples & Wilcox make note that, “Value metrics,
such as net present value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR), and return on invest-
ment (ROI), have also been considered as design objectives. The problem has also
been approached as a multiobjective optimization balancing cost and performance”
[135]. They go on to note the shortcomings of these types of analysis when they state:
Value metrics such as NPV are based on static valuations of the design.
These metrics do not attempt to capture explicitly technical or financial
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uncertainties that may arise and, as such, do not properly account for
the associated business risk of the program. Further, the related issue
of flexibility—that is, the ability of the manufacturer to make decisions
in response to unexpected or changing conditions—is not considered. In
the field of finance, considerable research has been performed to develop
more sophisticated valuation techniques to address the shortcomings of
traditional valuation techniques. Substantial literature exists describing
real options theory, which provides a way to quantify the value of a product
or strategy in the presence of uncertainty.
This leads us to assess the viability of adopting Real Options for use as a decision-
making framework for acquiring military SoS acquisitions. The principle difference
that must be reconciled for this approach to prove useful will be the ability to mone-
tize complexity. Providing an analysis that is independent from traditional financial
metrics will help decision makers avoid focusing overly on reducing costs in the short
term, to the detriment of the long-term evolution of the SoS architecture [135].
6.2 Real Options for Strategic Decision Making
When determining executive strategy, Luehrman also provides a poignant summary
of the widely held shortcomings of NPV/DCF valuation [112]:
When executives create strategy, they project themselves and their or-
ganizations into the future, creating a path from where they are now to
where they want to be some years down the road. In competitive markets,
though, no one expects to formulate a detailed long-term plan and follow it
mindlessly. As soon as we start down the path, we begin learning—about
business conditions, competitors’ actions, the quality of preparations, and
so forth—and we need to respond flexibly to what we learn. Unfortu-
nately, the financial tool most widely relied on to estimate the value of
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strategy—discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation—assumes that we will
follow a predetermined plan, regardless of how events unfold.
Thinking in terms of defense acquisition, where evolutionary acquisition strategies
and rapidly shifting threat environments are encountered, there are obvious parallels
that can be drawn. Since it is oftentimes difficult to get precise forecasts of the future
business environment or projected cash flows, Luehrman goes on to suggest a better
approach:
A better approach would incorporate both the uncertainty inherent in
business and the active decision making for a strategy to succeed. It would
help executives think strategically on their feet by capturing the value of
doing just that—of managing actively rather than passively. Options can
deliver that extra insight. Advances in both computing power and our
understanding of option pricing over the last 20 years make it feasible
now to begin analyzing business strategies as chains of real options.
Therefore, incorporating elements of real options analysis into acquisition decision
making would provide obvious benefits. In finance, an option is a contract giving its
owner the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a fixed number of shares of a
specified common stock or commodity at a fixed price at any time on or before a given
contract date [51]. There are two types of options—call options and put options. A
call option grants the right to buy the underlying security at the fixed price within
a specified time frame while a put option grants the right to sell the underlying
security at the fixed price within the given time frame. Therefore, while the price
of the underlying security fluctuates, the option contract creates an agreed upon
buy/sell price upon exercise. Thus, option contracts have a critical time component
and their value is closely tied to an underlying financial security. Because of these
features, financial options have many different uses by investors, for example risk
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management by using hedging techniques. Different methods of exercising options
include American style, where exercise can be done at any time before expiration
of the option, or European style where exercise is only available on the expiration
date of the option. The method of valuation used by Luehrman in the development
of the option space is the simpler European style option. American style options
require more complex modeling methods to determine their price, such as either the
Black-Scholes option pricing formula or the binomial option pricing formula.
The term ’Real Options’ indicates that the options being considered now pertain
to physical, tangible assets, such as equipment, rather than financial instruments
[58]. The application of Real Options to engineering systems is a relatively new
and growing endeavor, and their application in both producing and valuing flexible,
adaptable engineering designs is a rapidly growing area of research [115, 58, 131, 134].
Real Options are also being used in projects in a multitude of ways. They can be
used to determine the value of actions that either seek to grow and expand a project
or to wait and defer action. Real Options also provide a means to value whether
the best strategy going forward is to change direction mid-course or even abandon
the project altogether. Advances in both computing power and our understanding of
option pricing over the last 20 years make it feasible now to begin analyzing business
strategies as chains of real options [112].
6.3 The Tomato Garden: Luehrman’s Real Option Space
Figure 56 presents the option space as envisioned by Luehrman for comparing alter-
natives.
In his example, Luehrman uses the analogy that managing a portfolio of strategic
options is like growing a garden of tomatoes planted in an unpredictable climate.
To make clear the investment decisions for different alternatives, the options space
is then subdivided into six different regions. As the gardener periodically checks
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Figure 56: The Tomato Garden: Luehrman’s Real Option Space [112].
on the status of his garden prior to harvesting, they will eventually find that some
tomatoes are ripe and perfect and ready for immediate picking. This corresponds
to the first region in the upper right-hand corner. At the other extreme would be
tomatoes that have already gone rotten. These alternatives are grouped together
in the upper left-hand region. Both of these regions have in common low volatility,
i.e. their outcomes are relatively known and stable, but differ in their value-to-cost
ratio. Region 1 tomatoes have value-to-cost greater than one while region 6 tomatoes
are less than one, signifying their poor investment value. As Luehrman points out,
these cases at the extremes-invest now and invest never-are easy decisions for the
gardener to make. The regions in between are where tomatoes of varying prospect
are, representing alternatives with varying degrees of value-to-cost and volatility. In
keeping with the analogy, these tomatoes in region 2 are edible and could be picked
now but would benefit from more time on the vine. Other tomatoes are inedible and
show varying degrees of promise in blossoming into edible, ripe tomatoes before the
season ends.
The true power of the option space is that it encourages activism in managing
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the options space. By providing an assessment of volatility, as is done with financial
options, it can signal to the decision maker how much things can change over time
before an investment decision must finally be made. This allows the formulation
of recommendations on which alternatives could benefit the most from additional
resources of time, money, or labor. In this way, the options space developed by
Luehrman can be a powerful decision making tool. As Luehrman stresses, “Evaluating
the project as an option space means there is more, not less, to analyze, but the
framework tells us what to analyze, gives us a way to organize the effects, and offers
a visual interpretation” [112]. The two key parameters in Figure 56 that define
the option space are value-to-cost, or NPVq, and volatility. The value of an option
depends on a number of factors [15, 51, 91, 111]:
• Stock Price (S): The current price of the underlying stock or security (S)
• Exercise Price (X): Also known as the Strike Price, which the fixed price agreed
upon by the buyer and seller of options as to what price the underlying security
can be bought or sold, which is done by exercising the option.
• Time to expiration (t)
• Risk-free rate of return (rf ): The theoretical rate of return of an investment
with no risk. In practice, no investment is without risk. Typically, a Treasury
bill of a historically stable country with very little chance of credit default such
as the United States is chosen as the default.
• Variance (σ2): In mathematics, variance measures the spread or variability in
the values taken by a random value. For options, the variance of the price of the
underlying stock is measured [51]. The standard deviation is often used in place
of variance to describe the spread of a distribution. The standard deviation is
the positive square root of variance, or σ.
153
In option valuation, the cumulative variance (σ2t) is used as a measure of the
total amount of uncertainty [51]. So an option expiring in two years has twice the
cumulative variance as an otherwise identical option expiring in one year, given the
same variance per period. Finally, by taking the square root of the cumulative vari-
ance, cumulative volatility or σ
√
t can be used as the left axis of the option space.
Including this time dimension means that how much things can change while we wait,
for better of for worse, depends on how long we can afford to wait [111]. The deter-
mination of NPVq can then be made using Equation 30 and Equation 31. Figure 57
explains the correspondences between the option variables and different aspects of a
real commercial business project. Figure 58 explains the link between conventional







(1 + rf )t
(31)
Figure 57: Mapping of Option Variables to Real Projects [111].
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Figure 58: Relationship Between NPV and Option Value [111].
The visual framework of the option space is also visually appealing and has obvious
benefits as a top-level summary for decision making when compared to those usually
presented in multiattribute portfolio analysis. As Luehrman states [111]:
By combining variables in this way, we get to work with two metrics
instead of five. Not only is this easier for most of us to grasp, it also allows
us to plot two-dimensional pictures, which can be helpful substitutes for
equations in managers’ discussions and presentations. Finally, each of the
metrics has a natural business interpretation, which makes option-based
analysis less opaque to non-finance executives.
Consequently, Luehrman’s framework shows promise in extending the top-level
summaries seen in most multiattribute portfolio displays by integrating the informa-
tion necessary to distinguish between different alternatives into an additional top-level
view. The primary benefit of this view is that it is capable of providing clear recom-
mendations on which alternatives show promise for further investment based on the
valuation obtained from performing the real options analysis (ROA). Hence, adapting
Luehrman’s method for use in acquisition decision making and AoA will result in an
Architecture Real Options Complexity-Based Valuation Methodology (ARC-VM).
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6.4 Developing the Acquisition Option Space
6.4.1 Mapping Option Variables to Acquisition Projects
Figure 59 depicts the mapping from a call option to acquisition metrics. The ap-
plication of Real Options to military acquisition is not as straight-forward as sim-
ply describing an acquisition program in terms of a an engineering project with ex-
pected financial benefits, then using the appropriate mappings outlined by Luehrman.
Nonetheless, a similar mapping can be achieved with a bit of creativity. The expense
of obtaining the required capability and any needed flexibility, adaptability, etc. is
now measured in terms of the complexity of the architecture. Use of the Real Options
framework provides mechanisms to include uncertainty in the valuation while also dis-
counting complexity using proper program management. These aspects are captured
by the variance of the MoE and the Probability of Program Success (PoPS). The
framework also helps in capturing the time value of delivering the capability sooner
to the war fighter. This is reflected in the use of the acquisition time ratio.
6.4.2 Effectiveness & Time-Valued Capability
In keeping with Luehrman’s approach, ARC-VM considers the effectiveness in pro-
viding the desired capability as the measurable return on the resources invested to
acquire an SoS. For comparison, different MoEs must be transformed from their na-
tive units to a normalized scale ranging from 0 to 1. Various types of utility functions
may be used to accomplish this, especially if it is deemed that there are nonlinear ef-
fects that must be captured as higher levels of effectiveness are reached. For example,
fulfilling 60% of a capability vs. 70% may not be an additional 10% better, it might
be 30% better because it is a nonlinear payoff to the warfighter. The methodology is
also flexible in that separate valuations can be obtained for various MoEs or a single
valuation can be made by combining the MoEs into an overall capability rating. This








































combining different MoEs along with their respective variances, however. When lin-
early combining more than one MoE and its associated variance, if the MoEs are
not independent quantities, then it may be necessary to account for any covariance,
which is the strength of the dependence between the MoEs [91].
The time value of a capability was previously identified as an important consider-
ation when evaluating alternatives. The acquisition time ratio captures this by taking
the ratio of the baseline acquisition time to the estimated time to IOC for a given
alternative. The baseline time is the time in which the capability must be received in
order to be of value to the warfighter. The baseline time may be the same for each
alternative, or may differ for each. A logarithmic function is used to transform this
ratio in order to account for nonlinear effects which are assumed. The ratio has the
property that an acquisition program that is delivered on time will have an acquisition
time ratio of 1. A project that is projected to deliver a capability in a shorter amount
of time than the baseline will have the effect of increasing the acquisition value of a
project. In contrast, a project that is projected to take longer than the baseline time
to deliver the intended capability will incur a penalty to the acquisition value.
6.4.3 Cumulative Variance
Luehrman states that cumulative variance is a good way to measure the uncertainty
associated with business investments, but instead of using the variance of underlying
project values, he proposes using the variance of project returns. This means that
rather than working with the actual dollar value of the project, the percentage gained
(or lost) per year is used instead. Since a project’s return is determined by the
project’s future and present values, there is no loss of content. Luehrman goes on to
state [111]:
The probability distribution of possible values is usually quite asymmet-
ric; value can increase greatly but cannot drop below zero. Returns, in
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contrast, can be positive or negative, sometimes symmetrically positive or
negative, which makes their probability distribution easier to work with.
To apply Luehrman’s method to military acquisition, the MoEs of the desired
capabilities now become analogous to a project’s return. The MoEs obtained during
M&S are typically represented as varying about some mean value, both positively
and negatively. For example, the number of enemy units destroyed may be evaluated
as 80%± 6%. With this in mind, it is anticipated that using the variance of an MoE
should be in keeping with Luehrman’s preferred practices.
6.4.4 Risk & Probability of Program Success
For traditional business investments, the interest or discount rate is the cost of cap-
ital for the firm felt to be commensurate with the level of risk to be undertaken
[134]. However, Peoples & Wilcox have observed in engineering design that “the ef-
fects of the arbitrary choice of risk-adjusted discounted rate has a large effect on the
resulting design by causing design decisions to focus overly on reducing short-term
development costs” [135]. For this reason, and the fact that the acquisition valua-
tion is now based on the currency of complexity rather than dollars, the development
of the AOS must rely on a surrogate metric for risk other than a financial interest
rate. For an acquisition program, this estimate of risk is reflected in the PoPS. The
Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition defines risk as “a measure of future un-
certainties in achieving program performance goals within defined cost and schedule
constraints” [61]. Therefore, risk directly impacts PoPS. Estimating the probability
of an acquisition program’s success is particularly useful since using probabilities to
characterize and analyze uncertainty early in the design process is one method that
helps bring system knowledge forward in the design process [79]. By using PoPS in
this manner, the architecture complexity can be discounted by the appropriate mea-
sures used to mitigate programmatic risks. This stems from the notion that “some
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programs are worth the risk, and need additional resources to buy the risk down” [24].
Discounting complexity allows decision makers to make these types of trade studies.
It also provides an objective way to compare acquisitions with different MoEs, com-
plexity, and risk management profiles. For example, a highly complex architecture
that has behind it a great deal of support in terms of management and resources
can be compared against a less complex architecture with less available management
resources.
In the context of defense acquisition, risk has three components [61]. The first is
a future root cause. The second is a likelihood assessed at the present time of that
future root cause occurring. The third is the consequence of that future occurrence.
The implementation of methods for risk identification, management, and mitigation
are also well documented by the DoD and among the different branches of the armed
forces [61]. The Army, Navy, and Air Force each have developed PoPS tools for
identifying and tracking different sources of acquisition program risk throughout the
acquisition life cycle [9, 23, 66, 154]. The following is a brief summary of some of
the programmatic risk factors that should be taken into account when analyzing
programmatic risk [125, 135, 144]:
1. Technical : Exposure to the chance that development of critical technologies will
not meet program objectives within cost and schedule constraints. In assessing
technical risk, program managers must address the uncertainty in their esti-
mates about how much time and effort it will take to make new technologies
work. One purpose of evolutionary acquisition is to provide time to better man-
age technology risk and avoid adverse cost and schedule outcomes that often
result from trying to achieve difficult requirements in one step. Proxy measures
such as Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) can be used in determining the
technical risk factor.
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2. System Integration: Exposure to the chance that new and existing technolo-
gies or systems being employed in the SoS architecture may not work together
and/or interact with operators and maintainers to meet program objectives
within cost and schedule constraints. When developing capabilities that are
part of a larger war fighting capability, individually the component programs
might appear to be a low or moderate risk, but in combination with other
programs, the overall risk might be much higher due to coordination and inte-
gration issues. A classic example occurred during the Grenada invasion when
Army and Navy communications systems did not interact well during the joint
operation.
3. Design Risk : Exposure to the chance that the SoS will not result in effective
operation or be easy to produce. Decisions made early in the design process
quickly establish not only the performance but also the ease of manufacture.
Design complexity has also increased with the availability of more sophisticated
design tools such as electronic product models and computational techniques
(e.g. finite element analysis).
4. Production Risk : Exposure to the chance that the facility, labor, manufactur-
ing processes, and procedures will fail to produce the weapon system within
the time and cost constraints. Producibility—or “production capability”—is
a function of the design, production facilities; management skills, processes,
and experience; and workforce skills and experience. As alternatives grow more
complex, the challenges in producing the given SoS are expected to grow.
5. Business Risk : Exposure to the chance that the overall acquisition strategy
for a program will not result in the desired cost, schedule, and/or performance
outcomes. An example would be the risks inherent in utilizing an entirely new
business model to acquire a system. Decisions about the process to select who
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will build elements of the SoS, the standards to which it will be built, and
the schedules for designing and building them all entail risk that is not always
appreciated up front. Evaluation of the business risk entails assessing (1) the
extent to which the acquisition strategy can result in selection of the most effec-
tive, efficient design and most effective, efficient production entities; (2) whether
cost estimates and schedules are valid; (3) whether proper government oversight
organizations are in place; and (4) whether project personnel with proper train-
ing and experience are available. Evaluation of business risk should also take
into account financial uncertainty, as general economic conditions often have a
significant impact on acquisition program funding. Financial uncertainties can
also be related to nonrecurring or recurring costs, price, or demand.
Since a SoS usually has stakeholders of varying influence, each with their own con-
straints and requirements for their respective systems, the organizational complexity
of the acquisition effort should influence the determination of each separate risk fac-
tor as well, or be included as an additional risk factor [72, 145]. A detailed analysis
of the complexity of the various programs/organizations involved in the acquisition
effort by analyzing their collective interrelations and interdependencies would be of
great benefit to the decision making process and is recommended for future work.
Referring back to Figure 3, organizational risk is defined in a similar manner as well:
• Organizational Risk : Exposure to the chance that the number, diversity, and
competing interests and priorities of separate stakeholders will not result in the
desired cost, schedule, and/or performance outcomes. Evaluation of the orga-
nizational risk entails assessing whether or not all of the stakeholders who may
have a vested interest in the acquisition outcome have been properly identified,
the level of involvement of each stakeholder, the amount of influence stakehold-
ers are able to exert, and the management process in place to facilitate effective
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communication, address concerns, and increase knowledge and awareness of
constraints and developmental changes [69, 145].
Together, these factors describe the overall risk profile for an acquisition program.
These risk factors interact in numerous ways to affect the cost, schedule, and perfor-
mance of developing a particular alternative. Technology Readiness Levels have been
previously defined and extensively used. A summary from Ref. [125] is provided as
Figure 60. Following the template of defining TRLs, Murphy researches readiness
levels for system integration and engineering and manufacturing readiness. These are
presented in Figure 61. Integration Readiness Levels (IRLs) developed by Sauser are
included in Murphy’s research [144]. Murphy then proposes readiness levels for busi-
ness processes and design process levels, which are presented in Figure 62. In similar
fashion, a rating scale following the same format as the one used to capture techni-
cal, system integration, design, production, and business risk could be developed to
capture organizational risk factors as well. Overall, by considering all six factors, a
detailed assessment of PoPS can be obtained.
Figure 60: Technology Readiness Levels [125].
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Figure 61: System Integration & Engineering and Manufacturing Readiness Levels
[125].
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Figure 62: System Integration & Engineering and Manufacturing Readiness Levels
[125].
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6.4.5 Scaling & Discounting Architectural Complexity
To recap, an alternative is deemed desirable when NAVq ≥ 1.0 and a poor investment
when NAVq < 1.0. Depending upon the actual formulation of Cα obtained after
selecting architecture complexity sub-measures, the range of scores calculated for
different architectures can encompass a wide range. This was demonstrated previously
in Figures 52 & 53. The end result is that Cα must be scaled prior to use in the Real
Options calculations. The scaling should be carefully performed so that consistency
of NAVq values is maintained as parameters such as effectiveness, PoPS, or the time
required to develop the architecture vary. To accomplish this, a lower bound of 1
is chosen so that an alternative with 100% risk is deemed a poor investment no
matter the capability performance rating or the time of delivery. This means that
the maximum value of E, which is 0 ≤ E ≤ 1, is restricted to the minimum value of
scaled architecture complexity, because 1 ≤ C ′α. This makes the ARC-VM approach
different from many other traditional option valuations where the underlying stock
price can exceed the strike price of the corresponding option. With this in mind, the
following criteria should be adhered to when defining the scaling function:
• Continuous, with 1 ≤ X
• Monotonically increasing so that rank order is preserved i.e., for all X & Y such
that X ≤ Y, then f(X) ≤ f(Y)
Different options exist for defining the necessary scaling function. Based on the
lessons learned from measurement theory and utility theory, both linear and log-linear
transformations will be discussed. First, in order to define a line two points are needed.
The first point is known, since the y-intercept occurs at a value of 1, corresponding to
the minimum allowed value of scaled architecture complexity. Determination of the
second point requires developing an additional parameter. Thus, when determining
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the choice of linear scaling function it is necessary to define a baseline acquisition.
This is depicted in Figure 63.
Figure 63: Linear Architecture Complexity Scaling Function.
The baseline architecture should represent a minimum acceptable alternative, such
that NAV q = 1.0. A guideline for setting the baseline is to assume an acquisition
program that is delivered on time, so that τ = 1. Also, assume a 66% PoPS. This
guideline is derived from the U.S. Navy’s PoPS guidance for naval acquisition pro-
grams [66]. The Naval PoPS guidebook states that an acquistion program with a
PoPS in the range of 66%–90% is a program that has “identified some significant
issues with providing capability, supportability, and/or life cycle SE requirements
within approved cost and schedule constraints, but mitigation strategies are being
executed” [23, 66]. In fact, a PoPS utility curve can be defined based on guidance
like that provided in the PoPS guidebooks for the different branches of the armed ser-
vices. For example, programs with PoPS less than 66% can be scored as having zero
utility, while programs above the 66% threshold would have increasing utility. This
PoPS utility function can be used directly in the ARC-VM real options formulation
if the utility scores are on a normalized scale between 0 and 1.
Next, a baseline normalized MoE of E = 0.75 is assumed. This estimate may
vary based on the specific capability being addressed and the specific requirements
set for the SoS. When these are defined, a C ′α of 1.24 is the result. This scaled
architecture complexity score can be paired with a raw architecture value score to
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define the baseline Cα. Curves can then be fit between these two points. Since it is
not likely that there will be prior knowledge about which ranges of raw complexity
scores correspond to different levels of acquisition difficulty, some recommendations
are given. An alternative that is or close to representing an agreed upon baseline
acquisition program can be selected, and its Cα score used as the baseline value to
pair with the 1.24 value previously calculated for C ′α. Another method is to calculate
the mean Cα of the sample and use that to define the second set of coordinates.
Along with this, the standard deviation of the raw complexity scores can be used
such that alternative with the highest calculated raw complexity (largest value of Cα)
is never more than 1-2 standard deviations away from the baseline. There are obvious
drawbacks to using the linear scaling method, chief among them being that the need
to specify a baseline creates a degree of subjectivity that can potentially limit the
usefulness of the overall analysis.
The second option for scaling the architecture complexity scores is to perform
transformations using logarithmic functions. Logarithmic transformations are chosen
since it is desirable to maintain the relative magnitudes of the comparative ratios
between alternatives [48]. Along these lines, the following general form can be used:
Y = a+ kc logb(X) (32)
where X corresponds to a raw architectural complexity score, Cα, and Y is the
desired scaled architecture complexity score, C ′α. When X = 1, Y is equal to a since
logb(1) = 0 Therefore a = 1, leaving us with the task of defining the constant kc. The
only problem that we may encounter is that when X < 1, negative values appear
for log(X), resulting in C ′α scores that approach − inf. This is easily corrected for
by scaling the raw architecture complexity scores by an appropriate constant (which
is allowed since the multiplicative form of the utility function is used) so that the
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minimum complexity score that can be achieved by the simplest valid architecture is
set equal to one. As a reminder, architectures with zero complexity scores violate the
definition of a SoS in some way, so when an undefined NAV q results, the conceptual
framework still holds. The remaining step is to determine the constant kc.
Determining the constant c requires elaborating on a few important concepts with
regards to architectures. First, a fundamental assumption of this research is that a
capability (or set of capabilities) can be decomposed hierarchically from capability
to high-level activities down to individual tasks or functions. The decomposition,
or functional analysis/allocation, should be performed in such a manner such that
functionality can be allocated properly to individual systems. It is critical that the
functional decomposition is performed correctly, because this sets the level of abstrac-
tion at which the analysis will be conducted. With that said, it is possible that a
function in the context of one capability may be considered a higher-level activity in
another and vice versa, depending upon the level of abstraction and the definition of
what boundaries constitute a system. Thus, a functional decomposition of different
capabilities done could yield different numbers of functions to be distributed within
the architecture, directly impacting the architecture complexity measure. A method
of scaling architecture complexity should be robust in dealing with this issue, so that
the scaling function can be used to analyze architectures that deal with a wide variety





where F is the total number of functions that help define the architecture and
level of abstraction. This form of kc allows normalization by the number of functions
that define the architecture, taking into account the base (b) of the logarithm being
used. Because the normalized MoE (E) is on a 0–1 scale, the base 10 logarithm
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should be used, making b = 10 the preferred choice. If the natural logarithm were to
be used, to maintain the proper scaling relationship, E should be placed on a 0–exp
scale, where exp is the exponential (also commonly referred to as just e). Defining kc
in this manner leads to the final form of the architecture complexity scaling function:






To illustrate the normalization that occurs using this function, when F = X
a value of 1.1 is the result. As an added note, because E is defined on a 0–1 scale,
relatively small changes in scaled architecture complexity values can have a big impact
on the resulting NAV q. In the case of the linear transformation, this makes it very
important to define the slope of the linear transformation properly in order to avoid
over inflating or under inflating the scaled architecture complexity scores. Providing
a logarithmic transformation helps alleviate this concern, making this method the
preferred choice for use in the Real Options valuation framework.
6.4.6 The Acquisition Option Space
Once the mapping from a call option to acquisition metrics is completed, an options
space similar to that put forth by Luehrman [111, 112] but more suitable for ac-
quisition decision making can be defined. This options space is referred to as the
Acquisition Option Space (AOS). The AOS allows the visualization and evaluation
of alternative architectures of varying complexity, capability, and risk. An example
AOS is shown in Figure 64.
The AOS is inverted with respect to Luehrman’s option space, primarily for ease of
plotting. The two key parameters that define the AOS are the Net Acquisition Value
(NAV) Quotient and the cumulative deviation of effectiveness. These are symbolized
by (NAV q) and ∆, respectively. An alternative with a NAV q ≥ 1.0 is desirable,
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Figure 64: The Defense Acquisition Option Space.
whereas an alternative with a NAV q < 1.0 is not. NAV q provides a balanced as-
sessment of effectiveness, complexity, risk, and time-valued capability while ∆ is a
measure of the uncertainty that results from attempting to create complex architec-
tures that must function in a dynamic, shifting threat environment. ∆ is comprised
of two components. The first component of ∆, ε, assumes that SoS effectiveness can
be captured as a distribution. Thus, M&S results should provide the estimated de-
viation in effectiveness that results under different operational circumstances. The
second component, tα, compounds this deviation by the time it takes to deliver the
capability to the warfighter. As the time to field a capability increases, so does the
chance that changes in the threat environment, the budget landscape, or possibly
shifting requirements will impose cost and schedule growth, jeopardizing the acquisi-
tion program. Additionally, in this time the planned effectiveness of the architecture
under development may decrease or even become obsolete as an enemy adapts and
evolves, or other technologies or countermeasures are introduced. On the other hand,
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providing additional time for alternative to mature may raise the chance that critical
breakthroughs are achieved. In reality, there are any number of unforeseen circum-
stances which may arise.
The AOS is not meant to replace the traditional scatter plot and matrix of alter-
native comparison views previously presented in Figure18 and Figure19, but is rather
meant to extend these views and allow for more informed decision making. The AOS
accomplishes this by integrating the information necessary to provide a balanced val-
uation of alternative architectures while providing clear recommendations on which
alternatives show promise for further investment. The latter is accomplished by sub-
dividing the AOS into 4 distinct regions. Alternatives that occupy the first region in
the upper right-hand corner of the AOS are high value alternatives with low ∆. These
represent alternatives that have obvious benefit and that can be pursued immediately
with great confidence. At the other extreme are alternatives with NAV q < 1.0 and
thus occupy the left-hand side of the AOS. These alternatives show little promise
since the complexity costs are too great in comparison and will provide little or no
value when considering the amount of risk and resources necessary to bring them to
fruition. Region 1 & region 4 alternatives are at the extremes and are easy decisions
to make. The regions in between are where architectures of varying prospects are and
that require closer scrutiny. The decision maker may then decide whether the level
of effectiveness provided by an architecture in either regions 2 or 3 would be worth
an additional investment of resources. As ∆ grows larger and an alternative moves
further down into region 3, the acquisition becomes much less promising in providing
a satisfactory return on the resources invested. Early termination of these programs
is recommended if significant design challenges are encountered early on. For these
alternatives, as well as those that occupy region 4, a wait and see approach or further
investments in related R&D efforts are most likely the best courses of action.
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The AOS is not a static representation. Time is a crucial element. As the ac-
quisition program matures and time to IOC draws near, schedules change and the
alternatives in the option space will move nearer to the x-axis as cumulative volatil-
ity decreases. The alternatives will also move sideways depending upon changes in
PoPS, schedule, and changing estimates of effectiveness. Ideally, all the alternatives
will inch closer to Region 1, with the most promising alternatives approaching Region
1 the quickest. Also, the lines that define the boundaries between the different regions
potentially contain important information as well. Luehrman shows this by devising
an alternative method, which can be seen in Figure 65.
Figure 65: Dividing the Option Space Using Curved Regions [112].
Luehrman’s approach to drawing the curved lines in Figure 65 makes use of the
Black-Scholes equation in dividing the option space. This is discussed in Figure 65,
where the curve is derived by holding the rf and σ constant in the Black-Scholes equa-
tion as t varies, then solving for the value of the value-to-cost metric that corresponds
to NPV = 0. In the extreme case of rf = 0, Luehrman notes, the curve is instead a
vertical line corresponding to points where NPV = 1. As rf increases, the slope of the
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curve decreases, causing the curve to bend to the right [112]. Use of the Black-Scholes
equation, with its many assumptions, is not applicable to the AOS. However, there
are guidelines that can be developed to aid decision makers. For example, if some
basic baseline parameters can be identified, the impact on the AOS becomes readily
apparent. Acquisition professionals typically work with baseline values in order to
make meaningful comparisons between alternatives. The baseline values that provide
the most benefit in this context are baseline values for the normalized measure of ef-
fectiveness as well as a baseline value for the variance of the measure of effectiveness.
These two values can be represented by EB and εB, respectively. A third value, tmin,
will prove useful as well, as this represents a minimum funding period for acquisition
programs. For multi-year programs, this basic unit may be a year. For programs of
shorter length, quarters or weeks can be used. With these parameters defined, the
location of the vertical boundary between the first and second AOS regions can be
set using εB as a guide. εB can be multiplied by
√
tmin. So if tmin is one, then the
horizontal boundary is equal to εB. Figure 66 illustrates the effects of changes in εB
on the AOS boundaries.
When a capability must be performed within very tight specifications, as measured
by minimum variance, then the area of region 1 decreases. This makes it more difficult
for alternatives to reach region 1 as they traverse the option space over time, since
they must have an extremely low cumulative deviation of effectiveness. In contrast,
as requirements are relaxed and the desired capability level can take a wider range of
values, say 80%± 10% vs. 80%± 5%, the area of region 1 expands. As can be seen in
the figure, the boundary defining regions 2 and 3 shift as well. In order to ascertain
the effects of changes in EB, first it is necessary to specify how the boundary line
between regions 2 and 3 can be defined. In order to specify a line two points are
needed. The first point is given. This is the point of intersection between regions 1-3.
The y-coordinate of the second point can be defined in terms of baseline parameters,
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Figure 66: The Effect of Baseline Variance of Effectiveness Requirements on the
Acquisiton Option Space.




Thus, ∆B is the cumulative deviation of effectiveness that an alternative with
baseline variance and that can be developed within the desired time frame would have
within the AOS. This leaves the remaining x-coordinate that still must be determined.
This requires determining the NAV q for the baseline alternative. Since tβ is used to
define ∆B, this means that tα = tβ can be substituted into the NAV q equation. This
results in an acquisition time ratio of 1. If we also assume an alternative of minimum
complexity and maximum PoPS, then the following equation results:
NAV q = EB(.99 + 1) (36)
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This NAV q defines the x-coordinate so that the boundary line between regions 1
and 2 can be drawn. Using Equation (36), it is possible to see the effect of changing
EB. Figure 67 provides a visual example. Specifying that greater effectiveness is
required means increasing EB. As EB increases, NAV q value used as the second
x-coordinate for defining the boundary increases as well. This causes the slope of the
boundary line to decrease. The net effect is that the area of region 2 decreases while
the area of region 3 increases. This corresponds with the intuitive notion that more
stringent requirements will make it harder for alternatives to be rated as promising.
If the opposite occurs, and baseline effectiveness requirements are relaxed, the NAV q
coordinate decreases and the slope of the boundary line increases. Thus region 3
increases in area, meaning that more alternatives will be able to meet the requirements
and be recommended as promising. At approximately EB = 50%, region 3 vanishes
alltogether and is replaced entirely by region 2. Past this point, the region 4 area
begins to diminish as well.
Lastly, it is possible to incorporate the effects of a decision maker’s risk tolerance
into the AOS analysis. The contributions by von Neumann and Morgenstern highlight
the importance of accounting for a decision maker’s preferences or indifferences [92].
Therefore, utility theory can be used to described individuals or groups who are risk
neutral, or who are risk provers and take risks, or who are risk averse and wish to
avoid risks. Figure 68 shows how this can be incorporated into the AOS, whereas a
decision maker that is risk proverse will tend to inflate the area of region 2, while
a decision maker that is risk averse will tend to deflate the area of region 2. The
following equations detail one possible method for defining the risk proverse/averse
curves using the previously defined baseline variables:
NAV Maxq = 1× (1 + .99)(
1+ln (tβ/tmin)) (37)
176
Figure 67: The Effect of Baseline Effectiveness Requirements on the Acquisiton
Option Space.




NAV q − 1
NAV Maxq − 1
)
(38)
as NAV q varies from 1 to NAV Maxq . Then:
g = (1− f) (39)
∆N = m(NAV q) + b (40)
where m and b are the slope and y-intercept of the risk neutral boundary line
between regions 1 and 2. This leads to the calculation of the risk adjusted cumulative
deviation (∆R) for a given NAV q so that the risk proverse/averse curves can be
drawn:
∆R = ψR(f log2 f + g log2 g)∆B + ∆N (41)
where ψR is the risk tolerance factor and −1 ≤ ψR ≤ ψR. For a decision maker
with a strong risk aversion, ψR = −1. Conversely, a decision maker that is very risk
proverse will be characterized by a ψR = 1.
In summary, the adaptation of Luehrman’s option space provides a useful con-
ceptual and visual framework for depicting analysis results, and serves to augment
the traditional AoA and visualizations in current practice today. Though application
of Luehrman’s framework is not straightforward, this research details at least one
possible way in which this can be accomplished. It should be emphasized that the
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objective of applying Luehrman’s methodology is not to produce a specific option
price. To develop a single option value for each alternative would require the use of
established option pricing techniques with their many underlying assumptions. These
assumptions may not be readily applicable to the acquisition of complex military SoS.
Rather, the principal advantage gained in developing the AOS is that it provides an
analytical framework for the formulation of recommendations during an AoA. More
specifically, it provides a detailed analysis on which alternatives could benefit the most
from additional resources of time, money, and/or manpower. Furthermore, using an
objective measure of architecture complexity as the basis for determining valuation
should help mitigate the effects of overly optimistic estimates of schedule, effective-
ness, and risk. Decision makers will be able to decide more clearly if such estimates
are warranted for an alternative of given complexity. The inclusion of uncertainty
using the cumulative deviation of effectiveness as one of the primary axes of the AOS
should also serve in mitigating these effects. Overall, the AOS provides a rigorous,
repeatable, and traceable manner in which to make acquisition decisions, supporting
the development of defensible recommendations. The AOS is a powerful decision aid,
structured in such a way that it provides understandable interpretations using an
intuitive visualization format. This directly supports the stated research objective by
ensuring that the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative are presented in
a clear and unbiased manner.
6.5 High Level ARC-VM Summary & Overview
With the Real Options framework in place, it is now possible to fully describe the
entire ARC-VM methodology. The methodology was created with the intention of
meeting the overarching goal of aiding decision makers in the down-selection of alter-
natives for the implementation of a cost-effective, evolutionary acquisition strategy.
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The steps in applying the methodology are summarized in Figure 69. ARC-VM be-
gins with a clear definition of the capability requirements and their relationship to one
another. This step also includes defining the functional relationships between tasks
and activities that comprise the needed capability or capabilities. Next, candidate
systems must be identified that can fulfill the required tasking, resulting in a mapping
of the system-to-task functional allocations for each system within the SoS. This de-
termines the possible system portfolios that will be used later to generate alternative
architectures. The next step is to determine the needlines that exist between systems.
This will aid the system architect in evaluating the actual vs. desired IOLs that ex-
ists between systems. This also helps to determine the amount, type, and make-up of
the resources that need to be shared between systems to fulfill the needed capability.
Once this is complete, alternative system portfolios must be identified. The portfolios
define which systems will be grouped together as a SoS, making it possible to move
on the next step of generating feasible alternative architectures that can vary in force
structure, patterns of collaboration, IOL, process sequencing, and technology.
Once these alternative architectures are generated, assessing the performance of
each through M&S becomes necessary. Since a complex SoS architecture varies in
many aspects, it is important to assess the appropriate M&S environments that will
capture the relevant features of SoS performance. Along with this, cost estimates
can be generated using appropriate cost models. Down-selection to a smaller number
of alternatives can also be accomplished at this point in time, if desired. At this
stage, with the alternatives fully described, it becomes possible to calculate the ar-
chitecture complexity score for each alternative. With the architecture complexity
score in hand, the next step is to perform the AoA by developing the AOS, the Cost-
Effectiveness scatterplot, and any other top-level portfolio analysis summaries that
are needed. The process need not stop here, as further down-selection may result in





























and techniques. The ARC-VM methodology is meant to support iterative design ef-
forts. With the steps of the methodology clearly enumerated, Figure 70 serves as a
visual overview of the progress up to this point. Now that ARC-VM has been fully
developed and described, the remaining task is to demonstrate that the methodol-
ogy meets the aforementioned research objectives. This can be best accomplished by
demonstrating implementation of the method using an appropriate, fully described
mission scenario. This requires selecting an appropriate architecture for a military
SoS so that the needed capability can be delivered to the warfighter in a timely and
ongoing fashion. To gauge the effectiveness of the military SoS in meeting those capa-
bility requirements during the early stages of acquisition, M&S will be used. Creation
of a M&S environment will allow meaningful comparisons to be made. Specifically,
three critical questions must be answered when dealing with military SoS architec-
tures. These represent key aspects of a SoS architecture that affect SoS cost, schedule,
and performance that need to be well understood.
1. Which systems should be included in the SoS? i.e., What is the system portfolio?
2. How do these systems work together? i.e., What is the pattern of interoper-
ability & collaboration present in the architecture?
3. How does this architecture respond to changes in force structure?
A Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) capability provides the desired level
of complexity for a military SoS acquisition test case for a number of reasons [71].
SEAD requires that a number of diverse, independent, geographically distributed,
and networked assets interoperate to provide the needed capability. Also, alternative
SEAD architectures can include both legacy and to-be-designed systems as well as the
use of new technologies. SEAD is defined as any activity that neutralizes destroys, or
temporarily degrades enemy surface-based air defenses by destructive and/or disrup-

























Artillery (AAA), early warning (EWR) and fire control radars, and Ground Control
Intercept (GCI) sites can be combined by potential adversaries into an Integrated
Air Defense System (IADS). Over time, IADS have become increasingly complex and
can differ widely in terms of organization, sophistication, and operational procedures.
The widespread proliferation of weapon systems and continual improvements in their
speed, range, accuracy, stealth, and lethality require joint forces to be more respon-
sive, flexible, and integrated. Since SEAD can be conducted jointly, a multitude of
various system types can be included within the architecture. These range from sea,
land, air, and space-based assets to manned and unmanned systems. Also, sophis-
ticated communication systems are needed to enable and enhance Command and
Control since enemy air defenses can be mobile or stationary and pose a significant
threat to current military assets. For purposes of developing the complexity measure,
a SEAD scenario that focuses on Area of Responsibility (AOR)/Joint Operating Area
(JOA)-Wide Air Defense System Suppression provides the desired complexity for a
military SoS architecture test case. This means that SEAD is conducted against
specific enemy air defense systems throughout the AOR/JOA to degrade or destroy
their major capabilities/effectiveness. The duration and level of disruption depends
upon the mission objectives and the sophistication of the IADS [96].
Demonstration of the validity of the ARC-VM method will be achieved by fur-
ther developing the SEAD AOR/JOA example problem into an appropriate mission
scenario. A scenario-based approach is selected since the storyboard nature provides
a useful context for application of the research methodology [157]. Scenarios are an
integral part of an AoA, and define the operational locations, the enemy order of
battle, and the corresponding enemy strategies and tactics. To be useful, the SEAD
AOR/JOA scenario is developed with consideration of the capability need, applicable
constraints and assumptions, and the physical environments expected Ref. [127]. For
security classification purposes, it should be noted that all data and parameters used
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in this analysis is either derived from open, unclassified sources or purely from the
author’s estimation. Development of this mission scenario is only intended to provide
a clearer understanding of the methodology and its application.
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CHAPTER VII
VALUATION OF SEAD ARCHITECTURES USING
ARC-VM
7.1 Step 1: Define Capability Requirements
An integral step in defining how a capability is to be carried out is providing a
breakdown of the different activities that require different systems or organizations
to perform them. SEAD is commonly comprised of 5 different activities [158]. A
summary of these activities is provided in Table 9.
Table 9: SEAD Activities.
1.0 Detect 4.0 Target Assignment
2.0 Identify 5.0 Weapon Control
3.0 Correlate/Track
These higher level activities can then be broken down into lower level functions
that must be completed. For example, Weapon Control includes battle damage as-
sessment and possible removal of the target from the target list. An activity flow
diagram similar to that found in Ref. [68] is included as Figure 71. The diagram pro-
vides a functional breakdown of the higher level SEAD activities. It also includes a
mapping of the different systems available for different function tasking. The systems
listed in Figure 71 are representative of different system types. While many more
systems of a given type can be included in an architecture (e.g., more than one type
of fixed-wing fighter such as an F-35, or another airborne surveillance aircraft such
as the E-8), for purposes of this study one system from each type is chosen. Table 10
provides an overview of the different system/system types for further clarity. Listed
in parentheses next to each available system is the number of functions from Figure 71
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the respective system can perform. Table 11 also provides a mapping of the different
functions each system can perform.
Table 10: SEAD Systems & Number of Supported Functions.
Available System System Type
F/A-18 Hornet (5) Fixed-Wing Fighter/Attacker/Bomber
AH-64 Apache (5) Attack Helicopter
X-47B (7) Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
EA-6B Prowler (5) Electronic Warfare
M252 Mortar Crew (4) Indirect Fire
DDG (1) Naval Surface Fire Support
SOF (6) Special Operations Forces
E-2 Hawkeye (5) Airborne Surveillance
Intel Satellite (5) Space-based Sensor
CVN (10) In-theater Command & Control













































































































































































































































Based on the activity activity flow diagram given as Figure 71, a total of 5 distinct
needlines exist that comprise the resource state space. They are presented in Table 12,
and represent requirements that all alternative architectures must meet. The resource
state space is heterogeneous, with γ = 0.67. For this resource state space, H(γ) is
0.92 bits, and this value will be used in the RSC calculation for each alternative,
along with the CNE measure of the alternative’s resource sharing network.
Table 12: Characterization of SEAD Needlines Using Resource State Specifiers.
Needline Number Needline Description Dimensionality Frequency Potential
N1
Search & Detect Tasking 1 1 1
and Updates
N2
Target ID Data 0 0.5 1
N3
Target Tracking Data 1 1 1
& Updates
N4
Target Assignment 0 0 1
& Target List Updates
N5
Weapons Payload Status 0 0.5 1
& Engagement Updates
In order to calculate RPC later, required IOLs must be specified between the
systems that will be included in the analysis. Table 13 provides a summary of this,
where dashed numbers represent the possible ranges of IOLs that can exist between
a pair of systems.
Table 13: Interoperability Levels for Blue SEAD Force.
System F/A-18 AH-64 X-47B EA-6B M252 DDG SOF E-2 Intel Satellite CVN Central C2
F/A-18 2 1-2 1-3 2 1 1-2 1-2 2-3 0 5 2
AH-64 2 0-3 1-2 1 0 1-2 1-3 0 1 2
X-47B 2 1-3 0 0 0 2-3 0 5 4
EA-6B 2 2 1-2 1-2 2-3 0 5 2
M252 2 0 2 2 2 1-2 2
DDG 2 1-2 1-2 0 1-2 2
SOF 2 1-2 1-2 1 2
E-2 2 0 5 2
Intel Satellite 0 0 3
CVN 2 2
Central C2 2
The Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) serves as the source for the SEAD MoEs.
Using the UNTL, the following top-level SoS requirements are identified [47]:
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1. Maximize the % of enemy air defenses and capabilities that are either disrupted
or destroyed.
2. Minimize the % of friendly air losses due to enemy air defenses.
7.2 Step 2: Define Alternative System Portfolios
Since many different systems are capable of carrying out the required tasking pre-
sented in Figure 71, one of the key questions that arises in architectural design is a
combinatorial one. The architect must decide which is the best portfolio of systems
to carry out the required tasking. Using Figure 71, three alternative system portfolios
are constructed from the list of available systems. They are depicted in Table 14.
Table 14: Alternative SEAD System Portfolios.
Alt.1 Alt.2 Alt.3
Central C2 CVN CVN
SOF Team F/A-18 F/A-18





The system portfolios are chosen so that all 11 system types are represented,
though many more combinations of system portfolios can be evaluated. When defining
system portfolios it is important to ensure feasibility, meaning that all of the required
functionality is covered by at least one combination of the systems included in the
portfolio.
7.3 Step 3: Generate Feasible Architecture Alternatives
The aim of NCW is the generation of additional combat power from platforms that are
linked as part of a shared awareness network [12]. This is in contrast to traditional,
platform-centric warfare. As Perry explains, in platform-centric warfare “One must
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mass force to mass combat effectiveness because each weapon system acts indepen-
dently, whereas in network-centric warfare effects are massed, rather than force”[137].
While there are assumed benefits to NCW, there are possible downsides as well. As
we have seen, there is increased complexity due to the networking of individual plat-
forms. This complexity may negatively impact performance. For example, with many
systems sharing the same communications network, there exists a greater possibility
for information overload [137]. Perry goes on to state:
Traditional measures of effectiveness (MOEs) usually ignore the effects
of information and decision making on combat outcomes. In the past,
C4ISR operations have been analyzed separately using measures of per-
formance (MOPs). The effects of changes in C4ISR operations on combat
outcomes have been inferred rather than directly assessed, and therefore
the quantifiable link between variations in C4ISR capabilities and combat
outcomes has been relatively difficult to assess.
From this, it becomes clear that to fully and accurately assess the effectiveness
of a network-centric SoS architecture means that the M&S environment must be
able to capture any potential differences in effectiveness between platform-centric
and network-centric architectures [108, 124]. Before this can be accomplished, how-
ever, we must first understand the different types of SoS collaborations that distin-
guish platform-centric architectures from network-centric ones. Collaboration can
be defined as “a process in which individuals work together to achieve a common
goal. Shared information is an essential ingredient to ensure effective collaboration”
[137, 138]. In general, more effective collaboration and information sharing has a
direct impact on the speed and quality of decision making that occurs.
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7.3.1 SoS Collaboration Categories
The task hierarchy and system-to-function mapping shown in Figure 71 is the best
place to begin when attempting to understand the different patterns of collaboration
that define a SoS architecture. Using Figure 71, it is clear that three distinct types of
collaboration can take place between systems that are part of a SoS. These categories
are described as the following:
• Category 1 — Required Task-to-Task Collaboration: Resource exchanges occur
between systems performing sequential tasking.
• Category 2 — Shared Task Collaboration: Resource exchanges occur between
systems with shared tasking.
• Category 3 — Non-specific Collaboration: Resource exchanges occur between
systems performing indirectly linked, non-sequential tasking.
An example using the SEAD task hierarchy and system-to-function mapping is
provided as Figure 72. Figure 73 gives a visual description of a platform-centric SoS
architecture versus a network-centric SoS architecture. In the platform-centric case,
collaborations are usually limited to Category 1 collaborations and C2 is hierarchical
and centralized. For example, in Figure 73, all communications and coordination are
routed through the central C2 node, which is the aircraft carrier (CVN). In contrast,
the distributed, fully networked SoS architecture is decentralized in structure. In
addition to Category 1 collaborations, Category 2 collaborations are usually present.
Category 3 collaborations may occur as well. While the CVN retains the primary
C2 functions within the architecture, more direct communications and coordination
can be achieved between other systems within the SoS. There are several possible
technical implementations for this type of architecture.
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Figure 72: SEAD Example of SoS Collaboration Categories.
Figure 73: Platform-Centric SoS Architecture vs. Network-Centric SoS Architec-
ture.
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7.3.2 Design Space of Alternative SoS Architectures
Keeping in mind that an architecture is defined as the structure of components,
their relationships, and the principles and guidelines governing their design evolution
over time [64], and that each alternative architecture can be uniquely represented by
DoDAF or elements thereof, it follows that alternative military SoS architectures can
also be generated by manipulating baseline DoDAF products. For a given capability
need, SoS architectures can differ in the following ways:
• Operational/Process Variations: Changes made to the choice of tasks/activities
used to provide capabilities and changes in the sequencing and timing. Figure
74 gives a generic example. In Figure 74, there is a difference in when tasks
in the second sequence can be bypassed and there is also a difference in the
sequential/parallel tasks that comprise the second sequence itself. The DoDAF
Event-Trace Description, referred to as the OV-6c, is used to trace the actions
in a scenario or sequence of events. The CV-6, the Capability to Operational
Activities Mapping, portrays the mapping between the required capabilities and
the operational activities that those capabilities support.
• System & Technology Variations: Composed of changes to the specific tasks or
activities that specific systems within the architecture can support. Total dis-
tribution of functionality across the SoS designs multiple single points of failure,
therefore there is often some form of redundancy or duplication of functionality.
When this occurs, this opens up the space for possible system-to-system inter-
actions. Force structure variations are also possible, meaning possible changes
to the specific number and types of constituent systems included in the SoS.
Included systems can range from older legacy systems to newer systems specif-
ically adapted for operating as part of the SoS. Also of note, a top-down CBA
may identify novel applications for existing systems in order to achieve desired
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operational effects. An example is the use of a CVN as a rapidly deployable
emergency power station during disaster aid and relief efforts. Individual sys-
tems may also vary in the specific technologies and technical standards they
employ, which affects their cost, performance, and possibly their availability.
For example, the Army’s Apache Block III program is a planned upgrade to
AH-64D Longbow Apache helicopters expected to improve performance, situa-
tional awareness, lethality, survivability, interoperability, and the prevention of
friendly fire incidents. This requires each Apache to go the factory for hard-
ware changes while software changes are installed in the field [87]. Much of this
information is contained within the various models that comprise the Systems
Viewpoint in DoDAF V2.0.
• Interface & Network Variations: Changes to the way in which resources such
as data and information is exchanged between systems. This includes changes
to the specified IOL, changes in collaboration ranging from platform-centric
to network-centric patterns of collaboration, and changes to the technical im-
plementation of the interfaces used to realize the distribution and sharing of
resources. Much of this information is contained with the various models that
comprise the Services Viewpoint in DoDAF V2.0.
• Organizational Variations: Changes to the organizations responsible for par-
ticular systems, processes, and activities. Changes to the structure of the re-
lationships among organizations can occur as well. OV-4, the Organizational
Relationships Chart, provides the organizational context, role, or other rela-
tionships among organizations.
Table 14 specifies the three different system groupings contained in each candidate
system portfolio. It is expected that the performance of each system portfolio will be
affected differently as the architecture that specifies the relationships between systems
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Figure 74: Example Process Sequence Changes.
within a particular portfolio changes. For a given portfolio of systems, alternatives
are generated by allowing variations in the patterns of collaboration between systems
as well as the level of interoperability, or IOL. This can be seen in Figure 75, where
the system portfolio is represented in a vector format, with each number representing
the presence (or absence in the case of a zero) of the numbers of a particular system
type. The matrices in the Collaboration & Interoperability Variations column are
the Resource Processing Matrices, with each entry in the matrix representing the
specified IOL. Alternatives are also generated by allowing the force structure of Blue
SEAD assets to vary. Figure 76 shows the effect of variations in force structures. In
order to limit the amount and complexity of the M&S environments that need to be
created, neither operational/process variations nor technology variations are included
in this analysis.
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Figure 75: Defining Alternatives: Variations in Collaboration Patterns & Interop-
erability Levels.
Figure 76: Defining Alternatives: Variations in Force Structures.
198
7.4 Step 4: Develop M&S Environments and Perform Cost
Analyses
7.4.1 SEAD Mission Scenario Development
Intelligence reports confirm that country Red has successfully developed a nuclear
theater ballistic missile (TBM-N) capability with support from neighboring coun-
try Orange. This is in clear violation of international peace treaties. International
sanctions have failed to deter Red’s military and political leaders from bringing the
TBM-N capability to IOC. This has lead to the immediate destabilization of the
entire region and has sever international implications.
Country Blue has tasked its military commanders with eliminating Red’s TBM-
N capability by destroying the co-located TBM launch and nuclear fuel processing
facilities. These facilities have been fortified and hardened, requiring the use of heavy
bombing payloads from Long Range Strike (LRS) assets. Red possesses an IADS
consisting of the following:
• Early Warning Radars (EWRs)
• Surface-to-air Missiles (SAMs)
• Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA)
• Centralized Command & Control (C2) Center
Figure 77 is a visual depiction of Red’s EWR, SAM, and AAA assets. The SEAD
AOR/JOA is shown in Figure 78. The inland location of the target facilities prohibit
direct naval cruise missile strikes on these facilities, but naval surface fire support
can be brought to bear on some IADS assets. The time critical nature of the mission
coupled with the sophistication and lethality of Red’s IADS requires the SEAD within
the AOR/JOA shown in Figure 78. Pre-planned SEAD in the AOR/JOA will be
conducted in two phases. The goal of Phase I is locate, destroy, and disrupt Red
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mobile EWRs. Intel suggests that Red’s inventory has been supplemented by an
unknown number of Orange-supplied EWRs. The EWRs employ camouflage and
concealment to help evade detection, especially by satellite imagery. The mobile
EWRs also frequently shift locations to ensure their survivability, since they have
very low defensive capabilities. After the locations of EWRs within the AOR/JOA
have been ascertained and as many EWRs neutralized, Phase II will commence.
Phase II consists of Blue forces entering the Red IADS engagement zone with the
goal of neutralizing Red SAM sites. Successful completion of Phases I & II will allow
successful LRS operations.
Figure 77: Systems in the Red IADS.
7.4.2 Phase I M&S: Modeling the Effects of Collaboration
7.4.2.1 ARCNET Development
Now that alternative SEAD SoS architectures can be defined, the next task is to
determine a way to estimate the benefits of increased knowledge resulting from the
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Figure 78: SEAD Mission Scenario AOR/JOA.
changes in collaboration patterns, IOL, and force structure. To complete this task, a
method proposed by Perry [137] is adapted for use. Perry’s method relies upon In-
formation theory, with information entropy concepts developed by Shannon to assess
the “amount” of knowledge available in a C2 system [137, 147].
The first step in Perry’s method is to determine the primary sources of uncertainty
that affect mission requirements and MoEs, then to quantify this mission uncertainty
using a probability distribution. Once the distribution f(x) is assumed, Information
entropy provides a measure of the average amount of information in the probability
distribution. Information entropy (also commonly referred to as Shannon entropy) is
based on the notion that the amount of information in the occurrence of an event is
inversely proportional to the likelihood that the event will occur. The Information
entropy of f(x) can be assessed by applying Equation 42, which is the differential





ln [f(x)] f(x)dx (42)
For the SEAD AOR/JOA mission scenario, the primary source of uncertainty that
must be modeled occurs in Phase I of the mission. This is where mission planners face
uncertainty surrounding the number and location of EWRs within the AOR/JOA.
This uncertainty must be resolved since the EWRs will pass radar cueing data to the
SAM sites, allowing them first shot opportunity. This directly impacts the probabil-
ity of successfully engaging Red SAM sites and the success of the subsequent LRS
mission. It is assumed that collaboration among systems in the SEAD SoS could help
reduce this uncertainty, perhaps through coordinated search efforts and the sharing
of information to perform data fusion.
To determine f(x), the EWR search area is divided into individual sensor grids.
The assumption is made that EWRs must maintain a minimum separation distance
from each other to maintain effective search coverage. It is also assumed that the indi-
vidual sensor grids are small enough such that multiple EWRs will not be co-located
within a single search grid. As a consequence of these assumptions, locating an EWR
in one grid is independent of finding EWRs in other grids. This allows modeling the
search as a Poisson process, where the number of events occurring in a time interval
of length t has a Poisson distribution with mean λt. As a result an exponential dis-
tribution is chosen for f(x). Equations (43-46) show the probability density function,
cumulative distribution function, expected value, and variance, respectively.
f(x) = λe−λx (43)










E(X) can be interpreted as the average number of sensor grids that must be
searched between detections. As the number of EWRs increase, then E(X) should
decrease and vice versa. Next, an independent sensor coverage parameter, λi is de-
fined for each Phase I search platform. Table 15 illustrates the different factors that
affect this parameter. Also, Equation (47) shows how these factors can be combined
to calculate λi for each search aircraft. Equation (48) shows that the combined sen-
sor coverage parameter is simply the summation of the independent sensor coverage
parameters for each asset taking part in the Phase I search for EWRs.
Table 15: Aircraft & Satellite Independent Sensor Coverage Factors.
Search Aircraft Intel Satellite
(X-47B, F/A-18, AH-64)
Search Area (A) Resolution
Sweep Width (s) Availability
Search Speed (v) Imagery Processing Time
Effective Search Time (T) Occlusion From Weather or Other Obstructions




It is important to note that the exponential distribution also possesses the mem-
oryless property, meaning that if the random variable X measures the time until a
certain event occurs and the event has not occurred by time xo, the additional waiting
time for the event to occur beyond xo has the same exponential distribution as X. If
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any of the original assumptions are changed, the memoryless property may not hold,
and a more suitable distribution should be chosen [91].
Once f(x) has been defined, the next step is to create a mapping of entropy onto
a [0,1] knowledge scale by selecting an upper bound on the entropy. This is done by
first applying Equation (42) to the recently defined exponential distribution, f(x).










0 if λ < λmin
ln (λ/λmin) if λmin ≤ λ < eλmin
1 if λ ≥ eλmin
(50)
Where:






A plot of the normalized knowledge function is presented as Figure 79. Figure 79
reflects the relative amount of information about the number and location of EWRs
that can be gained from independent search operations during Phase I. Obviously, as
more assets are engaged in the search, combined search coverage increases along with
knowledge.
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Figure 79: SEAD Phase I Normalized Knowledge Function.
Once the amount of knowledge that can be gained from independent operations
can be estimated, the next step is to model the impact of collaboration. Perry’s
method assumes a statistical reliability model to be an appropriate model. The
collaboration between a pair of systems takes the general form of Equation (53),
where r(s) is called the failure rate function and is dependent on the nature of the
collaboration.
cij(t) = 1− e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds (53)
When there is no time to collaborate, i.e., t = 0, then cij(t) = 0. Additionally,
the time at which successful collaboration occurs between two systems depends on
the form of the failure rate function for that collaboration. A constant is selected so
that earlier successful collaboration can be modeled by simply increasing the constant
value. This leads to the following form of the previous equation:
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cij(t) = 1− e−θt for t ≥ 0 (54)
Referring back to Table 7, the IOL that exists between the two systems serves as a
measure of the amount of information or services that can be exchanged directly and
satisfactorily between them. Table 16 shows the mapping of IOL to θ used for Phase I
of the SEAD mission. Instead of simply assigning a single value for θ at each IOL, the
value of θ is given a normal distribution and standard deviation. Figure 80 is a plot of
the collaboration reliability curves, using the mean values of θ for ease of presentation.
The mapping was chosen so that there would be diminishing returns as IOL levels
increase. This effect can be seen in a preliminary SEAD M&S study conducted in
Ref. [17]. More research is needed in this area to more accurately determine how
changing IOL affects collaboration reliability, and how much variability there is at
each IOL.
Table 16: IOL to Reliability Constant Mappings.











The probability density function is an exponential distribution with 1/θ being the
mean time for systems i and j to collaborate with a variance of (1/θ)2. The entropy
calculation for the exponential distribution with parameter θ is:
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Careful study of this formulation yields the following observations:
• The entropy varies with the variance of the distribution as should be expected.
• As (1/θ) increases (θ decreases), H(t) = ln(e/θ) also increases.
• Entropy is unbounded for the distribution, which is true for all continuous
distributions.
The collaboration entropy function can now be used to develop a measure of
knowledge by assessing the “certainty” in the density function. An approximate
upper bound is assigned to H(t), the equivalent to assigning a maximum expected
time to complete a collaboration. Letting (1/θ)max = θmin represent the maximum

















Perry notes that K(t) is a dimensionless quantity and therefore can be used di-
rectly to influence combat MoEs. He also states that it is desirable, however, for the
measure of knowledge to be normalized. This can be accomplished by noting that
when θ = θmin, K(t) = ln(1) = 0 and when θ/θmin = e, K(t) = ln(e) = 1. This sug-
gests the following definition for the knowledge gained from the collaboration between
systems i and j:
Kij(t) =

0 if θ < θmin
ln (θ/θmin) if θmin ≤ θ < eθmin
1 if θ ≥ eθmin
(58)
Where the following values are chosen for the SEAD scenario:









In Equation (58), for small values of θ, the mean and variance are large, thus
implying great uncertainty and therefore little knowledge. For large values of θ, the
opposite is true and therefore considerable knowledge is gained. In this way, Kij(t)
models the positive effects of having more time, on average, to collaborate. A plot of
the collaboration knowledge curve is provided in Figure 81.
After this, the next step in Perry’s method is to determine a total system collab-
oration factor that accounts for all pairs of collaborating systems. In his example,
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Figure 81: SEAD Phase I Collaboration Knowledge Curve.
Perry uses an inverse reliability model for sequential overall system collaboration.





Once KM(t) is calculated, the effects of collaboration are represented using the
following linear model:
KC(λ) = KM(t) [1−K(λ)] +K(λ) (62)
Equation (61) assumes the that the collaboration effect from each collaborating
pair is equal in value. This method is not directly applicable to the SEAD mission
for the following reason. As IOL increases, so does the value of θ. Larger values
of θ equate to larger Kij(t) between systems. For a given number of systems, using
Equation (61) would result in a smaller value of KM(t) and thus a smaller value of
KC(λ). For example, when examining a SoS with two collaborating pairs, the SoS
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Kij(t) = 1− (0.5)(0.5) = 0.75 (64)
For this analysis, a modified method of combining the effects of localized collab-
oration is used instead. The modified method begins with defining an n× n collabo-
ration matrix, CK. Each entry of CK, or ckij is equal to the Kij(t) between the pairs




0 ck1,2 . . . ck1,n





ck1,n . . . 0

(65)
Next, the maximum absolute eigenvalue of CK (λ
(CK)
max ) and the number of systems
(n) is used to determine KM(t):






This is analogous to determining the CNE, where the PFE is normalized by the
number of nodes. Since the CK matrix consists of actual systems and not system
types, the diagonals of the CK matrix are zero (collaboration is defined as occurring
with another external system). Normalization is therefore performed by dividing by
(n− 1) nodes, instead of n.
The last step is to include the negative effects of collaboration in the model. Perry
attempts to capture these negative effects as the complexity that results as the total
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number of connections between systems increase. However, Perry acknowledges that
“complexity alone, as defined by the number of connections in a network, is clearly
not enough to assess the effectiveness of network-centric operations” [137]. Therefore,
instead of using the number of connections, the resource processing matrix RP that is
used to determine RPC is used instead. Similar to what was done for the collaboration











0 ≤ Cn ≤ 1 (68)
Estimating the effects of collaboration complexity in this way is in keeping with
Perry’s method, since RPC takes into account interoperability, which strongly influ-
ences network complexity. The maximum eigenvalue is normalized by the (n−1) num-
bers of systems. By taking the normalized eigenvalue of the RP matrix, a weighted
connection density is obtained. This weighted connection density can then be cor-
rected to avoid penalizing architectures with small force structures the same as ar-
chitectures with large ones. For example, without the correction factor, a network
consisting of two systems with maximum interoperability would have the same nor-
malized network complexity factor as a network consisting of 100 nodes all operating
at max IOLs. Once Cn is calculated, a logistic curve is used to simulate a nonlinear
trend and obtain a value of g(Cn). Once the normalized complexity of the network in-







Figure 82: Complexity Logistic Curve Mapping.
The final equation, taking into account complexity effects is then:
KCC(λ) = [1− g(Cn)]× {KM(t)[1−K(λ)] +K(λ)} (70)
Equation (70) can be used to determine the total knowledge obtained by the
systems employed during Phase I of the SEAD mission. KCC is then directly used
as the probability of locating an EWR in the search area. Once located, the EWR is
engaged by Blue assets.
Overall, incorporation of Perry’s method into the M&S environment meets the
objective of adequately assessing the impact of net-centricity on combat outcomes.
Implementation of Perry’s method results in the creation of an Architecture Resource-
based Collaborative Network Evalulation Tool (ARCNET) that can be reused for
many different types of mission scenarios.
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7.4.3 Phase II M&S: Simplified Engagement Model Development
Now that the mission scenario has been fully described, the next step is to begin the
task of M&S in order to determine: 1) the % of IADS assets suppressed and 2) the
number and % of Blue units lost during the engagement [47]. These are the MoEs
identified from the UNTL for assessing the success of a SEAD operation. M&S of the
mission scenario is based on the following assumptions developed by Barkdoll et al.
for modeling SEAD [25]:
1. Pre-planned SEAD is being employed by Blue in the AOR/JOA against a fully
operational Red IADS.
2. Red is defending their launch and nuclear processing facilities with several
SAMs. These SAMs have overlapping engagement envelopes that create a single
engagement zone.
3. Blue attackers/weapons must enter the engagement zone to reach their targets.
The time spent inside the engagement zone is Blue’s vulnerability window.
4. Red engagement radars are co-located with Red SAM batteries.
5. Blue forces within the engagement zone can be automatically detected by SAM
engagement radars, but each SAM can only execute a certain number of en-
gagements at a time, as determined by the SAM engagement radar saturation
rate.
6. Saturation of EWRs and ground unit detectors can occur when the number of
Blue forces exceed the EWR saturation rate.
7. Red does not present a significant fighter threat to Blue.
8. Blue attackers start beyond the radar horizon (undetected).
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9. Blue LRS bomber aircraft are separated from the Blue attackers and remain
outside the Red engagement envelope during Phase I. LRS assets are scheduled
to enter Red airspace upon commencement of Phase II.
10. Both Red & Blue forces have sufficient weapons/munitions to cover attacks and
re-attacks for the entire duration of the vulnerability window.
Using these assumptions, a simplified engagement model (SEM) is created. Inputs
to the SEM include the relevant size and disposition of both Red and Blue forces.
The size of each force is determined by the force structure, which details the specific
number of each unit taking part in the engagement. Relevant MoPs for both Red
and Blue forces that serve as inputs to the SEM include the probability of hitting an
enemy with an attack to either destroy or disrupt (PHit), the probability of surviving
an attack if hit (PSurvive|Hit), and the maximum number of enemy units that can be
engaged within a specific time window. Additional M&S inputs to describe enemy
radars include the probability of detecting enemy units (PDetect) and a stealth prob-
ability (PStealth). PStealth describes the probability of evading detection, and is also
include for Blue SEAD systems as appropriate. Lastly, IOLs may vary between Blue
systems also. These M&S inputs are summarized in Tables 17– 19.
Table 17: M&S Inputs for Red IADS.
System Min # Available Max # Available PSurvive|Hit PDetect PHit Saturation Rate
EWR 3 6 0.1 0.75 - 6
SAM Site 2 4 0.1 - 0.5 3
Table 18: M&S Inputs for Blue SEAD Force (Portfolios 1 & 2).
System Min # Max # Sensor Coverage PStealth PHit PSurvive|Hit Max Attack Rate
Available Available (λi) Against EWRs
F/A-18 2 6 0.10 0.40 0.60 0.30 3
X-47B 2 6 0.10 0.50 0.60 0.30 3
SOF Team 5 10 - 0.70 0.65 0.40 1
Intel Satellite 1 1 0.30 1 - 1 -
CVN 1 1 - 1 - 1 -
Central C2 1 1 - 1 - 1 -
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Table 19: M&S Inputs for Blue SEAD Force (Portfolio 3).
System Min # Max # Sensor Coverage PStealth PHit PSurvive|Hit Max Attack Rate
Available Available (λi) Against EWRs
F/A-18 2 4 0.10 0.40 0.60 0.30 3
AH-64 2 4 0.05 0.65 0.50 0.15 2
EA-6B 2 4 0.08 0.40 0.60 0.25 3
M252 3 3 - 0.60 0.70 0.50 1
DDG 1 2 - 0.50 0.30 1 5
E-2 1 1 - 0.40 0.60 0.15 -
CVN 1 1 - 1 - 1 -
Instead of a full factorial Design of Experiments (DOE) for the Red IADS force
structure, the fractional factorial DOE in Table 20 is used. The primary reason for
this is that each alternative is re-run a certain number of times dependent upon a
parameter referred to as the block size. The block size is defined as the product of
the number of repeat engagements and the size of the Red Force Structure DOE.
Consequently, the number of model executions increases dramatically as the numbers
of alternatives grow in size with changes in force structure, collaboration patterns,
and variations in IOLs. Later, as changes in process sequences and technology are
included, even more emphasis must be placed on intelligently sampling and exploring
the design space using DOEs and advanced M&S techniques.
Table 20: Red Force Structure DOE.
Red IADS Force Structure












Execution of the engagements is stochastic, and random uniform distributions are
used for random variable sampling. For example, to determine if an attack is suc-
cessful, a random number is drawn from a uniform distribution with interval [0,1].
If the selected number is less than the attack probability, then the attack is consid-
ered successful. If desired, other distributions may be used in place of the uniform
distribution. Each engagement is re-run numerous times over varying operational pa-
rameters in order to obtain mean and standard deviations for the engagement MoEs.
Table 21 provides a summary of the number of run executions, which vary by portfo-
lio primarily due to the number of force structure variations that are analyzed. The
performance of each alternative generated from the three separate system portfolio
groupings can be seen in Figures 83–85. (To prevent confusion, it should be noted
that the y-axis on Figures 83–85 should be interpreted as 0.4 = 40%, and not 0.4%,
for example.) An example force structure legend interpretation is also given in Table
22.
Table 21: SEM Run Execution Summary.
Vulnerability Window = 2
Portfolio Number of Block Total Number of
Number Repeat Engagements Size Run Executions
1 100 900 10,800
2 100 900 32,400
3 100 900 115,200
Table 22: Example Force Structure Legend Interpretation.
System SOF Intel Central
Type F/A-18 AH-64 X-47B EA-6B M252 DDG Team E-2 Satellite CVN C2
# Included 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 1 0 1
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Figure 83: Mission Performance for Alternatives Generated from the 1st SEAD
System Portfolio.
Figure 84: Mission Performance for Alternatives Generated from the 2nd SEAD
System Portfolio.
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Figure 85: Mission Performance for Alternatives Generated from the 3rd SEAD
System Portfolio.
Figure 86: Alternatives Selected from the 3rd SEAD System Portfolio.
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For the 3rd SEAD system portfolio, Figure 87 is included to demonstrate the di-
minishing benefits of collaboration as force size increases. The Packard Commission’s
1986 defense acquisition report provides an explanation for the occurrence of this
trend [16]:
At some point, more weapons of lower performance can overcome fewer
weapons of higher performance. Hence it is necessary to achieve a crit-
ical balance between high military capability and low life cycle cost. In
these and other respects, defense acquisition is one of the most difficult
management jobs.
An architecture alternative is chosen from each system portfolio grouping that
delivers the best performance for a given force structure, collaboration pattern, and
IOLs. For comparison, an additional alternative architecture is chosen that is less
effective and smaller in terms of force structure. Table 23 provides a summary of the
results obtained from Phase I and Phase II M&S for the different alternatives under
consideration, as well as the RSC values for each alternative. Additional output data
is included in Appendix A.
7.4.5 Life Cycle Cost Analysis
LCC data is obtained from a variety of sources with the goal of obtaining rough
order of magnitude purposes for similar systems [2, 86, 87]. A simple estimate of per
unit cost for each system is made in order to develop a cost order of magnitude for
each alternative. The results are shown in Table 24. The life cycle of each system
is assumed to be in the 20–25 year range. Also, in reality, the cost for each system
is affected by the amount of missions and capabilities that each system supports,
as systems are usually multi-mission in their use. This analysis assumes the same
fraction of time-sharing for each system in relation to the time it will be used to
conduct SEAD. For a more accurate accounting, the cost for each system can be
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multiplied by an appropriate factor to account for a system’s uniqueness in terms of
time commitments towards a specific set of capabilities.
Table 24: Estimated Life Cycle Costs.













7.5 Step 5: Calculate Architecture Complexity & Specify
ROA Inputs
The architecture complexity scores for the alternative SEAD architectures are calcu-






× (1 + logM)× µλ(RS) × λ(RP ) (71)
The RSC and RPC scores for each alternative are dependent on force structure.
These values are contained in Table 23. Based on the aforementioned MoEs, the







Using eigenvalue analysis to evaluate the SEAD R matrix, specifically the PFE,
λ(R) = 2. This allows the calculation of FDC for each alternative, based on the









































Using the SEAD system portfolios in conjunction with the information contained
in Figure 71, the Cyclomatic Complexity is computed, resulting in the determination
of FPC. The results of the calculations are presented in Table 25.
Table 25: SEAD FDC & FPC Scores.
Portfolio Alt. # FDC M FPC (1 + logM)
1 53.7 4 1.60
2 58.0 5 1.70
3 32.0 33 2.52
Now that all four sub-measures have been obtained, the overall architecture com-
plexity score for each alternative can be determined. The results are posted in Table
26. The next step is to scale the architecture complexity scores using Equation (76).
Figure 88 provides a graph of the scaling function and plots of both the measured
and scaled scores.
















































Next, a time to IOC is determined for each alternative based on included system
types and force structure. Also, a PoPS is assessed for each alternative by taking
into account the types of systems included in the architecture as well as the level of
integration required due to IOL requirements. Some systems, such as the X-47B are
still in development and make use of advanced technology. Other systems are more
readily available and/or face less challenges in their development. The Naval PoPS
formulation is also used as a guide in assigning PoPS scores. The following is a brief
description of different PoPS categories [23, 66]:
• Green Program (90%–100% PoPS): Program is on track to provide capability,
supportablility, and life cycle systems engineering requirements within approved
cost and schedule constraints.
• Yellow Program (66%–< 90% PoPS): Program has identified some significant
issues with providing capability, supportability, and/or life cycle systems engi-
neerging requirements within approved cost and schedule constraints, but mit-
igation strategies are being executed.
• Red Program (< 66% PoPS): Program has identified issues that will inhibit
delivery of capability, supportability, and/or life cycle systems engineering re-
quirements within approved cost and schedule constraints.
This completes the input requirements for the ARC-VM inputs. Using these
inputs, and the results from the M&S acquisition value can be determined. The
results are presented in Table 26. Figure 89 provides an accounting of some of the
important programmatic parameters contained in Table 26, merely to provide a more
visual way of making comparisons of the different alternatives. Figure 89 also contains
plots of the utility functions used in the analysis.
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Table 26: ARC-VM Data & Calculations for SEAD AOR/JOA Alternatives.
tβ = 5 Years Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 Alt. 6
E 0.69 0.48 0.94 0.77 0.90 0.82
Cα 2,439 311 870 2,247 977 3,934
C ′α 1.275 1.202 1.239 1.272 1.243 1.292
tα 3 0.5 5.5 7 3.75 5
τ 1.51 3.30 0.90 0.66 1.29 1
PoPS 0.85 0.98 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.70
ε 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.13
∆ 0.26 0.11 0.21 0.45 0.21 0.29
PV (C ′α) 0.51 0.13 0.75 0.90 0.60 0.76
NAVq 1.36 3.75 1.25 0.86 1.50 1.07
LCC ($M) 13,080 13,050 22,250 20,750 24,234 23,634
Figure 89: Summary of SEAD Programmatic Parameters.
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7.6 Step 6: Conduct Analysis of Alternatives
The AOS and Cost-Effectiveness scatter plot for the SEAD AOR/JOA mission are
shown in Figures 90 and 91, respectively. Note that the y-axis has been inverted in
order to make use of the plotting software. Figure 92 shows possible trajectories that
alternatives may take within the option space. The lefthand AOS is meant to capture
the negative effects of schedule slips, where the time to acquisition grows to twice the
desired IOC for each alternative. On the other hand, the righthand AOS in Figure 92
shows the position in the AOS when only 6 months are remaining to reach IOC for
each alternative. It should be stressed that these plots are only meant to provide a
sense of the possible trajectories that the alternatives may take within the AOS. The
actual trajectory of an alternative depends on a number of dynamic factors, including
changes along the way in PoPS, rated effectiveness, and variance in effectiveness.
Figure 90: SEAD AOR/JOA AOS (EB = 0.75, εB = 0.1).
Figures 93 and 94 help illustrate the effects of changing requirements on the size
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Figure 91: SEAD AOR/JOA Cost-Effectiveness Scatter Plot.
and shape of the AOS regions. Figure 93 shows the effects of changing the required
baseline effectiveness. EB = 0.60 for the lefthand AOS in the figure and EB = 0.95
for the righthand figure, while εB = 0.1 for both. As greater effectiveness is required
for conducting SEAD, region 2 gives way to region 3, which grows in area. In Figure
94, a change in the variance of the required effectiveness causes region 1 to change in
size. In the lefthand figure εB = 0.05 and εB = 0.2 in righthand figure. For both plots
in Figure 94 EB = 0.75. Thus, if the SoS is expected to conduct SEAD with very
little variation in performance, the AOS reflects that the alternatives have a farther
distance to traverse to reach region 1.
From this analysis, it is clear to see that Alternatives 2, 3, and 5 are the most likely
candidates for acquisition. While Alt. 2 provides low initial capability, that capability
can be fielding quickly at low cost, with minimum risk, and limited complexity. If
decision makers agree that Alt. 2 is not worth pursuing, then the threshold value can
be raised to lower the NAVq of Alt. 2 and update the AOS to reflect the decision
makers’ shifting preferences. However, it is worth considering that Alt. 2 could














































































































































































quickly fielding Alt. 2 while continuing to simultaneously develop Alt. 1, which is
compromised of the same systems but is expected to take longer to reach IOC due to
a more complex architecture that relies more heavily on networking.
Based on its position in the option space, Alt. 5 is examined next. Though Alt. 5
is relatively complex and costly, it delivers a high enough return on capability to offset
these costs. While the programmatic risk for Alt. 5 could be described as merely
acceptable in comparison to some of the other alternatives, the relatively quick time
to achieve IOC makes this alternative more attractive. Thus, while Alt. 5 is the
costliest of all the alternatives, it still represents a valuable opportunity to pursue,
budget withstanding. If a lower cost solution is desired due to budget constraints, then
Alt. 1, with a NAV q = 1.36 and PoPS of 85%, also proves to be a valuable solution.
While less effective than some of the other alternatives, it is a relatively low cost,
low complexity alternative. With that said, the AOS clearly shows that additional
oversight may still be needed. This is primarily due to the relatively higher variance
of effectiveness, which contributes significantly to the overall cumulative deviation
of effectiveness for this alternative. Any moderate increases in risk or schedule will
jeapordize any value of Alt. 1 and may be cause for program termination.
Meanwhile, Alt. 3 represents the best performing alternative. Alt. 3 is compro-
mised of F/A-18’s and X-47B and is an example of an architecture where autonomous
UAV’s are working alongside manned aerial components to conduct SEAD operations.
Though more costly in term of budget, primarily due to the new technologies that
must be developed, the AOS shows that expending resources to pursue this alter-
native holds value. The AOS also recommends, however, that additional oversight
be afforded to keep this alternative from entering Region 4 due to the complexi-
ties involved. The AOS does show, however, that the PoPS would have to drop to
approximately 40% before this alternative would cease to hold acquisition value.
Lastly, the AOS is able to confirm the poor value of alternatives that should not
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be recommended. Alt. 6 for example, is an architecture with poor performance, high
complexity, low PoPS, and will take approximately two years longer than desired to
be fielded. Even if this alternative were to be considered low cost in terms of budget,
it would not represent a good value by any means. Thus, by providing a means for
assessment independent of monetary costs, the AOS has proven useful in determining
when additional performance is worth the investment of additional resources. Using
the SEAD example, it has been shown that the AOS can help to determine the value of
increased levels of interoperability and resource sharing when comparing alternatives.
Use of the AOS also provides decision makers with the capability to quantify how
changes in the PoPS can impact the value of an acquisition. It was also demonstrated
how the AOS can be used to help craft evolutionary acquisition strategies. It should
also be noted that this analysis assumes a neutral risk tolerance. Inclusion of risk
tolerances will affect the recommendations provided by the AOS analysis. In all, the




The purpose of this research was to document the development of a methodology
designed to address some of the shortcomings that have come to plague military
acquisition, namely chronic cost and schedule overruns in the pursuit of advanced
weaponry, tactics, and operations. The problem is compounded by the necessity for
the acquisition of Systems-of-Systems, which themselves can be classified as complex
systems. Thus, while Systems-of-Systems bring added capabilities to help achieve
greater levels of military effectiveness, they also introduce additional complexities in
fielding and maintaining new weapons systems critical to national defense. This led
to the formulation of the research objective, stated in the following:
Research Objective: Allow for more informed tradeoffs between
cost, schedule, and performance during the pre-Milestone A
phase of military SoS acquisitions by developing a valuation
methodology suitable for acquisition-level decision making. The
valuation methodology should provide a measure of System-of-
System architecture complexity and a conceptual and visual
framework to quantifiably and traceably combine complexity,
time-valued performance levels, programmatic risks, and the un-
certainties in performance and schedule estimates.
First, a framework was developed in Chapter 5 to measure the architecture com-
plexity of a System-of-System. To accomplish this, it was necessary to identify precise
definitions of both an architecture and a complex system in the context of military
SoS acquisition. This made it possible to apply research from the field of Complexity
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Science in order to determine which of the various approaches to measuring com-
plexity would prove useful in developing an architecture complexity measure, with
the result being that measuring the degree of organization of a system would be the
most sensible approach. Next, criteria were identified that would facilitate judging
the overall applicability of the developed architecture complexity measure. A survey
of existing system complexity measures was conducted, and while no single existing
measure proved to be directly applicable, each of the existing measures provided im-
portant insights as to what features should be captured in providing a comprehensive
accounting of architecture complexity. Alternative methods were identified to the
formulation of each sub-measure, allowing for flexibility in accounting for problem-
specific nuances that may arise.
With this knowledge in hand, individual sub-measures were identified, each de-
signed to capture an important observable feature of the complex system architecture.
The application of measurement theory and utility theory aided in the development
of a logical framework to combine the independent sub-measures into an overall archi-
tecture complexity score. Additionally, the inclusion of graph theory directly resulted
in an automatable, objective, and mathematically rigorous measure of architecture
complexity that met all of the applicability criteria. The primary benefit to system
architects is the ability to compare the complexity of different architectures through
careful analysis of the arrangement of functionality and resource sharing. Specifi-
cally, the framework addresses the tradeoffs that occur when component reduction is
achieved at the expense of fewer, more complex systems. It also addresses the addi-
tional complexity that results from overlapping functionality as multiple components
must interact in a programmed sequence. The impact on complexity from increased
interoperability between components is also included. Lastly, the factors that affect
the underlying patterns of resource exchange is another important aspect to consider
in selecting a military system-of-system architecture.
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The need for assessing the value of allocating resources towards a particular acqui-
sition is not unique to defense acquisition. However, the fundamental structure of the
customer-supplier relationship makes it difficult to assess a fair market price for the
development and purchase of military systems. Because complexity can be consid-
ered as the cost inherent in a design for achieving increased functionality, efficiency,
or flexibility, this research identified that making the conceptual shift of “monetizing”
complexity, or treating complexity as a cost, allows for more advanced financial theo-
ries and methods to be used. This resulted in the use of Real Options, and Chapter 6
details the development of an Acquisition Option Space as a way to provide decision
makers with a conceptual and visual framework with which to value and compare
alternatives.
The Acquisition Option Space supports the research objective by providing an
analysis framework for taking into account programmatic risks, uncertainties, and
sensitivities while also pushing to the forefront the hidden costs of complexity and
emphasizing time-valued capability. The AOS is a powerful decision aid, structured
in such a way that it provides understandable interpretations using an intuitive visu-
alization format. This helps to ensure that the advantages and disadvantages of each
alternative are presented in a clear and unbiased manner. Finally, development of
the Acquisition Option Space allows for the creation of the overall valuation method-
ology. ARC-VM provides a means for acquisition-level decision makers to quantify
complexity, which is one of the main drivers of unsuccessful acquisition attempts, and
to use this measured complexity as the basis in determining acquisition value.
ARC-VM begins with clearly defining capability requirements, since they have
a profound impact on system complexity and acquisition program success. The
next step is to define alternative system portfolios that define which systems will
be grouped together as a SoS. This makes it possible to move on the next step of
generating feasible alternative architectures that can vary in force structure, patterns
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of collaboration, interoperability levels, functional process sequencing, and technol-
ogy. In order to assess the performance of each alternative architecture, a modeling
and simulation environment was created, using a suppression of enemy air defenses
scenario as a test case. The modeling and simulation environment includes an archi-
tecture resource-based collaborative network evaluation tool to estimate the benefits
of increased knowledge that results from systems collaborating as part of a system-of-
systems. In conjunction with the performance assessments, a notional cost analysis
was conducted for later use in the analysis of alternatives.
Prior to the analysis of alternatives, the complexity score for each alternative
architecture is calculated. With this information in hand, the analysis of alternatives
can be conducted using the Acquisition Option Space, cost-effectiveness scatter plot,
and any necessary summary portfolio views. The end result of applying the ARC-VM
methodology is an assessment of acquisition value—that is, an assessment of when
additional effectiveness is worth an additional investment of resources when comparing
alternatives. Because the Acquisition Option Space does not use monetary costs in its
formulation of acquisition value, ARC-VM provides an important alternative analysis
that can be used in conjunction with existing techniques. This provides decision
makers with a better overall assessment of alternatives, which is the first step in
developing an evolutionary acquisition strategy to provide warfighters with timely,
affordable military capabilities.
8.1 Recommendations for Future Work
A key element of performing a successful analysis of alternatives is ensuring that
threats and scenarios are realistic, and that a broad range of environmental and hos-
tile operating environments are considered. The identification of threat and scenario
aspects deemed most influential to the outcome of the analysis should also be per-
formed [127]. While the scenario developed for this study addresses some of these
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issues, for example by including the uncertainty that may be faced due to varying
enemy force structure and location, further work is needed. This work should also
include studying the impact of new technologies on architecture development. Ac-
complishing this requires the integration of additional M&S environments into the
overall analysis. Also of particular note, further research into the subject area of
interoperability is needed. A methodology for more accurately determining the shape
of the IOL utility curves used in this research would be of great benefit, especially if
it can be determined how the IOL utility curves change in relation to each other and
under what conditions and assumptions.
For purposes of this research, a simplified M&S environment was created to model
the engagements between Blue and Red forces. The aim of this research was to pro-
vide a proof of concept for the overall ARC-VM methodology. In the future, to
adequately assess all aspects of architecture performance, more sophisticated and di-
verse M&S environments should be used to provide a more robust measure of all
aspects of architecture performance. For example, the Red IADS itself should even-
tually be modeled as a complex SoS as well during simulated engagements, with its
own emergent and adaptive behavior. The principal benefit that arises from the de-
velopment of ARC-VM is in providing an overarching framework to combine M&S
results with other information necessary from an acquisition standpoint to provide
decision makers with a comprehensive assessment of value.
In reality, military systems and SoS must provide capabilities across broad mis-
sion areas. For instance, the suppression of enemy air defenses capability encompasses
multiple competing mission areas in addition to the AOR/JOA mission studied here.
Additional mission areas include localized suppression and opportune suppression.
The inclusion of these additional mission areas in the analysis may require capability
tradeoffs and evolutionary acquisition to fully satisfy all of the mission area require-
ments. In addition, the opportunity exists to investigate and quantify the correlation
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between added complexity and system flexibility, adaptability, and robustness. A key
question that may be addressed is how much added complexity is usually needed for
a system to realize significant improvements in any of the aforementioned traits, and
under what circumstances.
This research represents a preliminary attempt at incorporating complexity-based
Real Options into the acquisition decision-making process. The use of Real Options
should be investigated further in order to determine the feasibility of applying more
advanced Real Options techniques. For example, the use of nested options may prove
useful, particularly in more fully developing evolutionary acquisition strategies. As
with any newly developed methodology, validation requires the use of the methodol-
ogy in real-world applications to a variety of test cases. This will provide a basis for
comparing measured architecture complexity scores against the outcomes of actual
acquisition programs. Also, the strength of the relationship between the architec-
ture complexity measure developed in this research and developed cost estimating
relationships should be explored. One area of research would be to investigate if the
architecture complexity framework developed in this thesis can lead to better cost
estimating relationships and reduce the relatively large uncertainty in cost estimates
seen during the initial stages of design.
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